A computational model of outguessing in two-player non-cooperative games

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Abstract

Several behavioral game theory models aim at explaining why “smarter“ people win more frequently in simultaneous zero-sum games, a phanomenon, which is not explained by the Nash equilibrium concept. We use a computational model and a numerical simulation based on Markov chains to describe player behavior and predict payoffs.

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Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Informatica

The Journal of "Sapientia" Hungarian University of Transylvania

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