A computational model of outguessing in two-player non-cooperative games
e | 27 giu 2014
INFORMAZIONI SU QUESTO ARTICOLO
Pubblicato online: 27 giu 2014
Pagine: 71 - 88
Ricevuto: 16 feb 2014
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/ausi-2014-0019
Parole chiave
© 2014
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License, which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Several behavioral game theory models aim at explaining why “smarter“ people win more frequently in simultaneous zero-sum games, a phanomenon, which is not explained by the Nash equilibrium concept. We use a computational model and a numerical simulation based on Markov chains to describe player behavior and predict payoffs.