On Phenomenal Functionalism about the Properties of Virtual and Non-virtual Objects
| 08 cze 2020
O artykule
Data publikacji: 08 cze 2020
Zakres stron: 399 - 410
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0005
Słowa kluczowe
© 2019 Alyssa Ney, published by Sciendo
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.
According to phenomenal functionalism, whether some object or event has a given property is determined by the kinds of sensory experiences such objects or events typically cause in normal perceivers in normal viewing conditions. This paper challenges this position and, more specifically, David Chalmers’s use of it in arguing for what he calls virtual realism.