<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>What is the Specious Present? Which is its duration? And why, ultimately, do we need it to figure in our phenomenological account of temporal perception? In this paper, after introducing the role of the Specious Present in the main models that account for our phenomenological present, and after considering the deflationary objection by Dennett (that the debate relies on the fallacy of the Cartesian Theatre of Mind, the idea that it is meaningful to ask where and when an experience becomes conscious), I claim—thanks to a spatial analogy—that there could be a good criterion to distinguish between a present experience and a past experience, that there are good reasons to sustain the Specious Present (while snapshots are in no sense part of our phenomenological life), and that there could be a precise way to define the nature—and to measure the duration—of the Specious Present; as I will clarify, our capability and possibility to act and react are central in this perspective. If we accept this change of perspective, there is a definite sense in which the Specious Present is part of our temporal phenomenology.</p></abstract>

What is the Specious Present? Which is its duration? And why, ultimately, do we need it to figure in our phenomenological account of temporal perception? In this paper, after introducing the role of the Specious Present in the main models that account for our phenomenological present, and after considering the deflationary objection by Dennett (that the debate relies on the fallacy of the Cartesian Theatre of Mind, the idea that it is meaningful to ask where and when an experience becomes conscious), I claim—thanks to a spatial analogy—that there could be a good criterion to distinguish between a present experience and a past experience, that there are good reasons to sustain the Specious Present (while snapshots are in no sense part of our phenomenological life), and that there could be a precise way to define the nature—and to measure the duration—of the Specious Present; as I will clarify, our capability and possibility to act and react are central in this perspective. If we accept this change of perspective, there is a definite sense in which the Specious Present is part of our temporal phenomenology.

How Long is Now? A New Perspective on the Specious Present

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"How Long is Now? A New Perspective on the Specious Present"}

What is the Specious Present? Which is its duration? And why, ultimately, do we need it to figure in our phenomenological account of temporal perception? In...

How Long is Now? A New Perspective on the Specious Present

Data publikacji: 03 sty 2019

Zakres stron: 119 - 140

Otrzymano: 26 cze 2018

Przyjęty: 28 wrz 2018

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2018-0009

Słowa kluczowe
Philosophy of time, temporal experience, specious present, co-consciousness, experiential now

© 2018 Andrea Roselli, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

How Long is Now? A New Perspective on the Specious Present

Data publikacji: 03 sty 2019

Zakres stron: 119 - 140

Otrzymano: 26 cze 2018

Przyjęty: 28 wrz 2018

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2018-0009

Słowa kluczowePhilosophy of time, temporal experience, specious present, co-consciousness, experiential now

© 2018 Andrea Roselli, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Słowa kluczowe
Philosophy of time, temporal experience, specious present, co-consciousness, experiential now