<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The question of whether phenomenal consciousness is limited to the capacity of cognitive access remains a contentious issue in philosophy. Overflow theorists argue that the capacity of conscious experience outstrips the capacity of cognitive access. This paper demonstrates a resolution to the overflow debate is found in acknowledging a difference in phenomenological timing required by both sides. It makes clear that the “no overflow” view requires subjects to, at the bare minimum, generate an unconscious visual image of previously presented items if it is to explain performance in the change detection paradigm. It then demonstrates that conscious imagery should support better task performance than unconscious imagery because of a necessary difference in representational strength. However, this contradicts empirical findings, and so a new argument for overflow is presented without requiring the premise that subjects need to obtain a specific phenomenology of presented items during change detection.</p></abstract>

The question of whether phenomenal consciousness is limited to the capacity of cognitive access remains a contentious issue in philosophy. Overflow theorists argue that the capacity of conscious experience outstrips the capacity of cognitive access. This paper demonstrates a resolution to the overflow debate is found in acknowledging a difference in phenomenological timing required by both sides. It makes clear that the “no overflow” view requires subjects to, at the bare minimum, generate an unconscious visual image of previously presented items if it is to explain performance in the change detection paradigm. It then demonstrates that conscious imagery should support better task performance than unconscious imagery because of a necessary difference in representational strength. However, this contradicts empirical findings, and so a new argument for overflow is presented without requiring the premise that subjects need to obtain a specific phenomenology of presented items during change detection.

Can the Unconscious Image Save “No Overflow”?

nicholas.daloisio-montilla@hertford.ox.ac.uk

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Can the Unconscious Image Save \u201cNo Overflow\u201d?"}

The question of whether phenomenal consciousness is limited to the capacity of cognitive access remains a contentious issue in philosophy. Overflow theorists...

Can the Unconscious Image Save “No Overflow”?

Data publikacji: 03 sty 2019

Zakres stron: 1 - 42

Otrzymano: 18 lut 2018

Przyjęty: 22 paź 2018

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2018-0002

Słowa kluczowe
Consciousness, imagery, overflow, unconscious, access

© 2018 Nicholas D’Aloisio-Montilla, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Can the Unconscious Image Save “No Overflow”?

Data publikacji: 03 sty 2019

Zakres stron: 1 - 42

Otrzymano: 18 lut 2018

Przyjęty: 22 paź 2018

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2018-0002

Słowa kluczoweConsciousness, imagery, overflow, unconscious, access

© 2018 Nicholas D’Aloisio-Montilla, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Słowa kluczowe
Consciousness, imagery, overflow, unconscious, access