<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Since Michel Dummett published “Can an effect precede its cause?” (1954), in which he argued for the logical consistency of backwards causation, the controversial concept has turned to a subject of all kinds of interpretations and misinterpretations. Some like Ben-yami, Peijnenburg and Gorovitz have wrongly ascribed to Dummett the view that the argument for the consistency of believing in backwards causation applies only in cases where the agent doesn’t know about the occurrence of the past effect. In this paper I defend Dummett’s argument by clearing up the confusion caused by ascribing the ignorance condition to Dummett.</p></abstract>

Since Michel Dummett published “Can an effect precede its cause?” (1954), in which he argued for the logical consistency of backwards causation, the controversial concept has turned to a subject of all kinds of interpretations and misinterpretations. Some like Ben-yami, Peijnenburg and Gorovitz have wrongly ascribed to Dummett the view that the argument for the consistency of believing in backwards causation applies only in cases where the agent doesn’t know about the occurrence of the past effect. In this paper I defend Dummett’s argument by clearing up the confusion caused by ascribing the ignorance condition to Dummett.

Defending Backwards Causation against the Objection from the Ignorance Condition

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Defending Backwards Causation against the Objection from the Ignorance Condition"}

Since Michel Dummett published “Can an effect precede its cause?” (1954), in which he argued for the logical consistency of backwards causation, the...

Defending Backwards Causation against the Objection from the Ignorance Condition

Data publikacji: 31 gru 2018

Zakres stron: 173 - 197

Otrzymano: 17 gru 2013

Przyjęty: 02 wrz 2014

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2014-0012

Słowa kluczowe
Cause, effect, backwards causation, ignorance condition, logical consistency

© 2014 Abla Hasan, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Defending Backwards Causation against the Objection from the Ignorance Condition

Data publikacji: 31 gru 2018

Zakres stron: 173 - 197

Otrzymano: 17 gru 2013

Przyjęty: 02 wrz 2014

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2014-0012

Słowa kluczoweCause, effect, backwards causation, ignorance condition, logical consistency

© 2014 Abla Hasan, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Słowa kluczowe
Cause, effect, backwards causation, ignorance condition, logical consistency