<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The definition of metabolic syndrome (MetS) has been, and still is, extremely controversial. My purpose is not to give a solution to the associated debate but to argue that the controversy is at least partially due to the different ‘causal content’ of the various definitions: their theoretical validity and practical utility can be evaluated by reconstructing or making explicit the underlying causal structure. I will therefore propose to distinguish the alternative definitions according to the kinds of causal content they carry: (1) definitions grounded on associations, (2) definitions presupposing a causal model built upon statistical associations, and (3) definitions grounded on underlying mechanisms. I suggest that analysing definitions according to their causal content can be helpful in evaluating alternative definitions of some diseases. I want to show how the controversy over MetS suggests a distinction among three kinds of definitions based on how explicitly they characterise the syndrome in causal terms, and on the type of causality involved. I will call ‘type 1 definitions’ those definitions that are purely associative; ‘type 2 definitions’ the definitions based on statistical associations, plus generic medical and causal knowledge; and ‘type 3 definitions’ the definitions based on (hypotheses about) mechanisms. These kinds of definitions, although different, can be related to each other. A definition with more specific causal content may be useful in the evaluation of definitions characterised by a lower degree of causal specificity. Moreover, the identification of the type of causality involved is of help to constitute a good criterion for choosing among different definitions of a pathological entity.</p><p>In section (1) I introduce the controversy about MetS, in section (2) I propose some remarks about medical definitions and their ‘causal import’, and in section (3) I suggest that the different attitudes towards the definition of MetS are relevant to evaluate their explicative power.</p></abstract>

The definition of metabolic syndrome (MetS) has been, and still is, extremely controversial. My purpose is not to give a solution to the associated debate but to argue that the controversy is at least partially due to the different ‘causal content’ of the various definitions: their theoretical validity and practical utility can be evaluated by reconstructing or making explicit the underlying causal structure. I will therefore propose to distinguish the alternative definitions according to the kinds of causal content they carry: (1) definitions grounded on associations, (2) definitions presupposing a causal model built upon statistical associations, and (3) definitions grounded on underlying mechanisms. I suggest that analysing definitions according to their causal content can be helpful in evaluating alternative definitions of some diseases. I want to show how the controversy over MetS suggests a distinction among three kinds of definitions based on how explicitly they characterise the syndrome in causal terms, and on the type of causality involved. I will call ‘type 1 definitions’ those definitions that are purely associative; ‘type 2 definitions’ the definitions based on statistical associations, plus generic medical and causal knowledge; and ‘type 3 definitions’ the definitions based on (hypotheses about) mechanisms. These kinds of definitions, although different, can be related to each other. A definition with more specific causal content may be useful in the evaluation of definitions characterised by a lower degree of causal specificity. Moreover, the identification of the type of causality involved is of help to constitute a good criterion for choosing among different definitions of a pathological entity.In section (1) I introduce the controversy about MetS, in section (2) I propose some remarks about medical definitions and their ‘causal import’, and in section (3) I suggest that the different attitudes towards the definition of MetS are relevant to evaluate their explicative power.

Defining Metabolic Syndrome: Which Kind of Causality, if any, is Required?

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Defining Metabolic Syndrome: Which Kind of Causality, if any, is Required?"}

The definition of metabolic syndrome (MetS) has been, and still is, extremely controversial. My purpose is not to give a solution to the associated debate but...

Defining Metabolic Syndrome: Which Kind of Causality, if any, is Required?

Data publikacji: 16 paź 2018

Zakres stron: 553 - 580

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0018

Słowa kluczowe
Metabolic syndrome, medical definitions, causal models, mechanistic property clusters, natural kinds

© 2017 Margherita Benzi, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Defining Metabolic Syndrome: Which Kind of Causality, if any, is Required?

Data publikacji: 16 paź 2018

Zakres stron: 553 - 580

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0018

Słowa kluczoweMetabolic syndrome, medical definitions, causal models, mechanistic property clusters, natural kinds

© 2017 Margherita Benzi, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Słowa kluczowe
Metabolic syndrome, medical definitions, causal models, mechanistic property clusters, natural kinds