<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p> In this introductory study I discuss the notion of alternative possibilities and its relation to contemporary debates on free will and moral responsibility. I focus on two issues: whether Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities, and whether alternative possibilities are relevant to grounding free will and moral responsibility. With respect to the first issue, I consider three objections to Frankfurt-syle cases: the flicker strategy, the dilemma defense, and the objection from new dispositionalism. With respect to the second issue, I consider the debate between Alternative Possibilities views and Actual Sequence views, as framed by Carolina Sartorio in her Causation and Free Will. I then explain how these two issues are relevant to the papers included in this volume.</p></abstract>

In this introductory study I discuss the notion of alternative possibilities and its relation to contemporary debates on free will and moral responsibility. I focus on two issues: whether Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities, and whether alternative possibilities are relevant to grounding free will and moral responsibility. With respect to the first issue, I consider three objections to Frankfurt-syle cases: the flicker strategy, the dilemma defense, and the objection from new dispositionalism. With respect to the second issue, I consider the debate between Alternative Possibilities views and Actual Sequence views, as framed by Carolina Sartorio in her Causation and Free Will. I then explain how these two issues are relevant to the papers included in this volume.

Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities?

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

{"article-title":"Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities?"}

In this introductory study I discuss the notion of alternative possibilities and its relation to contemporary debates on free will and moral responsibility. I...

Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities?

Data publikacji: 06 mar 2018

Zakres stron: 131 - 146

Otrzymano: 09 maj 2017

Przyjęty: 11 lut 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0001

Słowa kluczowe
Alternative possibilities, Frankfurt, actual sequence, free will, moral responsibility

© 2018

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities?

Data publikacji: 06 mar 2018

Zakres stron: 131 - 146

Otrzymano: 09 maj 2017

Przyjęty: 11 lut 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0001

Słowa kluczoweAlternative possibilities, Frankfurt, actual sequence, free will, moral responsibility

© 2018

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Słowa kluczowe
Alternative possibilities, Frankfurt, actual sequence, free will, moral responsibility