<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>The paper identifies a distinctive feature of friendship. Friendship, it is argued, is a relationship between two people in which each participant values the other and successfully communicates this fact to the other. This feature of friendship, it is claimed, explains why friendship plays a key role in human happiness, why it is praised by philosophers, poets, and novelists, and why we all seek friends. Although the characterization of friendship proposed here differs from other views in the literature, it is shown that it accommodates key insights of other writers on the topic. Thus, in accordance with the Aristotelian strategy the paper employs, it is shown that the account on offer preserves the received opinions on friendship.</abstract>

What is Friendship?

<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title> I argue that virtual reality is a sort of genuine reality. In particular, I argue for virtual digitalism, on which virtual objects are real digital objects, and against virtual fictionalism, on which virtual objects are fictional objects. I also argue that perception in virtual reality need not be illusory, and that life in virtual worlds can have roughly the same sort of value as life in non-virtual worlds.</abstract>

The Virtual and the Real

What is structuralism?

<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>Direct Doxastic Voluntarism — the notion that we have direct (un-mediated) voluntary control over our beliefs — has widely been held to be false. There are, however, two ways to interpret the impossibility of our having doxastic control: as either a conceptual/ logical/metaphysical impossibility or as a psychological impossibility. In this paper I analyse the arguments for (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_disp-2007-0003_ref_012_w2aab3b7b2b1b6b1ab1ac12Aa">Williams 1973</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_disp-2007-0003_ref_011_w2aab3b7b2b1b6b1ab1ac11Aa">Scott-Kakures 1993</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_disp-2007-0003_ref_001_w2aab3b7b2b1b6b1ab1ab1Aa">Adler 2002</xref>) and against (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_disp-2007-0003_ref_003_w2aab3b7b2b1b6b1ab1ab3Aa">Bennett 1990;</xref><xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_disp-2007-0003_ref_009_w2aab3b7b2b1b6b1ab1ab9Aa">Radcliffe 1997</xref>) both types of claim and, in particular, evaluate the bearing that putative cases of self-deception have on the arguments in defence of voluntarism about belief. For it would seem that if it is the case that self-induced cases of self-deception are indeed possible, then voluntarism about belief could be true after all. Bennett claims that Williams’ argument for the impossibility case proves too much in that if it is successful in ruling out direct doxastic voluntarism, it is also successful in ruling out cases of indirect doxastic voluntarism. If cases of self-deception can also be cases of indirect doxastic voluntarism, then such cases support the argument against the impossibility case. I argue that Bennett is right in claiming that Williams’ argument proves too much, that cases of self-deception are indeed also sometimes cases of indirect self-deception and so that they cause genuine trouble for the conceptual impossibility case. However, I also argue that this is the <italic>only</italic> genuine worry for Williams’ argument. I end, while considering whether cases of self-deception can tell us anything about the psychological possibility of direct doxastic control, by suggesting a way of establishing the conceptual impossibility of direct doxastic control that circumvents Bennett’s counter-argument.</abstract>

Doxastic voluntarism and self-deception

<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>In this paper, I focus on the so-called ‘tacking by disjunction problem.’ Namely, the problem to the effect that, if a hypothesis <italic>h</italic> is confirmed by a statement <italic>e</italic>, <italic>h</italic> is confirmed by the disjunction <italic>e</italic> ∨ <italic>f</italic>, for whatever statement <italic>f</italic>. I show that the attempt to settle this difficulty made by Grimes 1990, in a paper apparently forgotten by today methodologists, is irremediably faulty.</abstract>

Grimes on the tacking by disjunction problem

Mcdowell’s Moral Realism and the Secondary Quality Analogy

<abstract>
<title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>
Expressivism, as applied to a certain class of statements, evaluative ones, for instance, is constituted by two doctrines, only the first of which will concern me in this paper. Evaluative statements, according to this doctrine, aren’t propositional (susceptible of truth or falsity). In this paper, I will argue that one of the vexing problems (that I label the “logical problem”) this doctrine engenders for the expressivist is equally pressing for some cognitivists (who think evaluative statements <italic>do</italic> have a truth-value). I will present the difficulty and argue that some constructivists, who <italic>are</italic> cognitivists, cannot contend with it at all, and others must resort to more complex ways than the one available to other cognitivists.
</abstract>

Who Is Afraid of the Logical Problem in Meta-Ethics?

<abstract>
<title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>
I argue that <italic>pace</italic> Quine, indeterminacy of translation affects observation sentences. I illustrate this indeterminacy with examples and show how it is tied to the indeterminacy affecting the analytical status of observation categoricals. I propose my own construal of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation, according to which indeterminacy is based on the inextricability of meaning and belief. I explain why this construal should be favored over Quine’s.
</abstract>

Translating Observation Sentences

<abstract>
<title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>
By “strong representationalism” (“SR” hereafter), I mean a version of naturalistic philosophy of mind which first naturalizes intentionality by identifying it with causation to physical properties and then naturalizes phenomenology by identifying it with intentionality or making them co-supervene on each other (Montague [2010]). Most specifically, SR will be taken as the conjunction of causal-function semantics and the intentionality-phenomenology identity thesis, the latter of which entails what I call “converse intentionalism”, the principle that experiential content supervenes on phenomenology. Because of this identity thesis, SR enjoys some phenomenological plausibility which is absent from traditional physicalism of mind. However, in this paper, I shall raise an <italic>integration challenge</italic> to SR by arguing that its foundational principles do not integrate easily. I will also explore some strategies open to SR for addressing my challenge, and argue that by invoking those strategies, SR either loses its phenomenological plausibility or undermines causal-function semantics. I conclude that if my argument is correct, it provides us reason to search for new principles to replace SR’s foundations.
</abstract>

An Integration Challenge to Strong Representationalism

<abstract>
<title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>
As a legitimate authoritative directive is a second-order reason, it defeats conflicting reasons by a process of exclusion. Nonetheless, a legitimate authoritative directive can be defeated by more weighty reasons, including, as I argue in this paper, the more weighty reasons it excludes. This is part of a value pluralist conception of authority, according to which there is no general rule for the resolution of conflicting reasons. And I advance this argument in response to the work of Joseph Raz. Although Raz is a value pluralist, he posits a general rule for the resolution of some conflicts: namely, that an exclusionary reason cannot be defeated by a (more weighty) reason it excludes. This represents a weak version of value pluralism. My argument is that Raz does not succeed in his efforts to show that this general rule either better ensures conformity with reason or that it is justified by commitment to autonomy.
</abstract>

Authority, Excluded Reasons and Moral Conflict

<abstract>
<title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>
Thomas Hobbes’s most important recommendations for a sovereign reader concerned the governing of opinion. Due to the spread of false doctrines and their powerful champions, Hobbes was afraid that subjects would have opinions contrary to the maintenance of peace. His solution comprehended a combination of civic education and censorship. This text explains how Hobbes justifies his recommendations from the perspective of individual deliberation. It argues that Hobbes conceived censoring circulating doctrines as a way of keeping subjects’ minds like clean paper, ready for the sovereign to imprint civil doctrine in them through teaching, thereby increasing the chances of influencing subjects’ (free) deliberation, and thus of producing obedience.
</abstract>

The Governing of Opinions

<abstract>
<title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>
Very roughly, the epistemic objection to the growing block theory (GBT) says that according to that theory there are many past times at which persons falsely believe they are present. Since there is nothing subjectively distinguishable about a situation in which one truly believes one is present, from a situation in which one falsely believes one is present, the GBT is a theory on which we cannot know that we are present. In their articulation and defence of the GBT, Correia and Rosenkranz (C&amp;R) argue that the epistemic objection fails miserably. In what follows I try to unpack their response to the objection, and locate it amongst others. Along the way I flag some confusions I have about how we are to think about the GBT as articulated by C&amp;R.
</abstract>

Times, Locations and the Epistemic Objection

<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>Rationality requires various things of you. For example, it requires you not to have contradictory beliefs, and to intend what you believe is a necessary means to an end that you intend. Suppose rationality requires you to F. Does this fact constitute a reason for you to F? Does it even follow from this fact that you have a reason to F? I examine these questions and reach a sceptical conclusion about them. I can find no satisfactory argument to show that either has the answer ‘yes’. I consider the idea that rationality is normative for instrumental reasons, because it helps you to achieve some of the things you ought to achieve. I also consider the idea that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons. I reject both.</abstract>

Is Rationality Normative?

Scepticism and Implicit Bias

<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>What is the relation between the intentionality of states and attitudes which can miss their mark, such as belief and desire, and the intentionality of acts, states and attitudes which cannot miss their mark, such as the different types of knowledge and simple seeing? Two theories of the first type of intentionality, the theory of correctness conditions and the theory of satisfaction conditions, are compared. It is argued that knowledge always involves knowledge of formal objects such as facts and values, that emotions are reactions to (apparently) known values and that beliefs are reactions to known or apparently known facts or to the objects of relational states.</abstract>

Intentionality, Knowledge and Formal Objects

Steps Toward Origins of Propositional Thought

<abstract><title style='display:none'>Abstract</title>Are the objects and events that take place in Virtual Reality genuinely real? Those who answer this question in the affirmative are <italic>realists</italic>, and those who answer in the negative are <italic>irrealists</italic>. In this paper we argue against the realist position, as given by Chalmers (2017), and present our own preferred <italic>irrealist</italic> account of the virtual. We start by disambiguating two potential versions of the realist position—weak and strong— and then go on to argue that neither is plausible. We then introduce a <italic>Waltonian</italic> variety of <italic>ictionalism</italic> about the virtual, arguing that this sort of irrealist approach avoids the problems of the realist positions, fits with a unifying theory of representational works, and offers a better account of the phenomenology of engaging in virtual experiences.</abstract>

Virtual Reality: Digital or Fictional?

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