<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">While many philosophers speak of ‘pluralism’ within philosophy of biology, there has been little said about what such pluralism amounts to or what its underlying assumptions are. This has provoked so me anxiety about whether pluralism is compatible with their commitment to naturalism (Cussins 1992). This paper surveys three prominent pluralist positions (Sandra Mitchell and Michael Dietrich’s (2006) ‘integrative pluralism’, and both Peter Godfrey-Smith’s (1993) and Beth Preston’s (1998) pluralist analyses of functional explanations in evolutionary biology) and demonstrates how all three are committed to a form of <italic>pragmatism</italic>. This analysis both clarifies the justification and grounding of pluralism and allows these pluralisms to avoid the criticisms of Cussins. I close by making some more general points about pluralism and its relationship to history and integration.</abstract>

Pluralism, Pragmatism and Functional Explanations

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this paper, I examine an evolutionary approach to the action selection problem and illustrate how it helps raise an objection to the predictive processing account. Clark examines the predictive processing account as a theory of brain function that aims to unify perception, action, and cognition, but - despite this aim - fails to consider action selection overtly. He off ers an account of action <italic>control</italic> with the implication that minimizing prediction error is an imperative of living organisms because, according to the predictive processing account, action is employed to fulfill expectations and reduce prediction error. One way in which this can be achieved is by seeking out the least stimulating environment and staying there (Friston <italic>et al.</italic> 2012: 2). Bayesian, neuroscientific, and machine learning approaches into a single framework whose overarching principle is the minimization of surprise (or, equivalently, the maximization of expectation. But, most living organisms do not find, and stay in, surprise free environments. This paper explores this objection, also called the “dark room problem”, and examines Clark’s response to the problem. Finally, I recommend that if supplemented with an account of action selection, Clark’s account will avoid the dark room problem.</abstract>

How and why actions are selected: action selection and the dark room problem

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Ortega y Gasset is known for his philosophy of life and his effort to propose an alternative to both realism and idealism. The goal of this article is to focus on an unfamiliar aspect of his thought. The focus will be given to Ortega’s interpretation of the advancements in modern mathematics in general and Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers in particular. The main argument is that Ortega acknowledged the historical importance of the Cantor’s Set Theory, analyzed it and articulated a response to it. In his writings he referred many times to the advancements in modern mathematics and argued that mathematics should be based on the intuition of counting. In response to Cantor’s mathematics Ortega presented what he defined as an ‘absolute positivism’. In this theory he did not mean to naturalize cognition or to follow the guidelines of the Comte’s positivism, on the contrary. His aim was to present an alternative to Cantor’s mathematics by claiming that mathematicians are allowed to deal only with objects that are immediately present and observable to intuition. Ortega argued that the infinite set cannot be present to the intuition and therefore there is no use to differentiate between cardinals of different infinite sets.</abstract>

Ortega y Gasset on Georg Cantor’s Theory of Transfinite Numbers

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">My aim in this paper is to critically assess Plantinga’s modal ontological argument for existence of God, such as it is presented in the book “The Nature of Necessity” (1974). Plantinga tries to show that this argument is (i) valid and (ii) it is rational to believe in his main premise, namely “there is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated”. On the one hand, I want to show that this argument is logically valid in both systems B and S5 of modal logic. On the other hand, I think that this argument is not a good argument to show that God exists or that it is rational to believe in God.</abstract>

<article-title xml:lang="pt">Uma avaliação do argumento ontológico modal de Plantinga

Interview with Shahid Rahman

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Volume 24 (2020): Issue 1 (December 2020)

Volume 23 (2020): Issue 1 (December 2020)

Volume 22 (2019): Issue 1 (December 2019)

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Volume 19 (2017): Issue 1 (December 2017)

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Volume 15 (2016): Issue 1 (April 2016)

Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science

 Kairos. Journal of Philosophy &amp; Science is an open access peer reviewed journal published by the Center for Philosophy of Science of the University of Lisbon (CFCUL) on a three-monthly basis (issues in March, July and November). Following CFCUL’s main objectives, Kairos aims to publish original and consistent research in the areas of Philosophy of Science and of Philosophy and Science. In that sense, it accepts philosophical papers motivated by scientific research as well as philosophically relevant scientific papers, from areas such as metaphysics, politics, ethics, aesthetics, logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and cognition, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, and philosophy of biology.  The journal does not have article processing charges (APCs) nor article submission charges.  Acceptance Rate:   20%   Archiving  Sciendo archives the contents of this journal in Portico - digital long-term preservation service of scholarly books, journals and collections.  Plagiarism Policy  The editorial board is participating in a growing community of Similarity Check System's users in order to ensure that the content published is original and trustworthy. Similarity Check is a medium that allows for comprehensive manuscripts screening, aimed to eliminate plagiarism and provide a high standard and quality peer-review process. 

Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science

Volume 15 (2016): Issue 1 (April 2016)

Pluralism, Pragmatism and Functional Explanations

How and why actions are selected: action selection and the dark room problem

Ortega y Gasset on Georg Cantor’s Theory of Transfinite Numbers

Uma avaliação do argumento ontológico modal de Plantinga

Interview with Shahid Rahman

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