<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This lecture given at Birmingham City University School of Law, March 21, 2019 considers the origins of the right to silence in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States and compares the constitutional protections against self-incrimination with those of the United Kingdom. It notes that the effect of the changes introduced by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 is that there is now a fundamental divergence in approach between the two jurisdictions and concludes that as the twenty first century progresses, defendants on both sides of the Atlantic will be less likely to exercise their rights without consequence and then when they do choose to speak it will be at their peril.</abstract>

Joseph A. Greenaway Jr. Lecture Series on Law and Justice<xref ref-type="fn" rid="j_bjals-2020-0007_fn_061_w2aab3b7c18b1b6b1ab1b5c11b2Aa">*</xref> Speak at Your Own Peril

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This article concerns the question of how legal academics imagine ‘outsiders’ perceive legal academia. Centralising our empirical work undertaken at a UK research intensive University which explored the attitudes, beliefs and knowledges of non-legal academics about the field of legal academia, we focus on the findings flowing from benchmarking surveys with legal academics which invited self-evaluations of the field of legal academia as well as imagining how non-legal academics (’outsiders’) might evaluate the field of legal academia. Of particular interest, we note the presence of a curious divergence between self-perceptions of legal academia and their ‘imaginaries’ as to how ’outsiders’ will perceive the field. Supported by a review of the legal scholarly literature, our study reveals a persistently bleak ‘folklore’ surrounding the question of how ‘outsiders’ will regard legal academia – though critically, one which on the basis of our empirical work, finds little root in reality. Providing the first study of its kind, and offering a range of novel analytical techniques, we highlight the significant purchase of empirical meta-disciplinary work of this nature for better understanding legal academia and its relationship with other fields. While undertaken as a scoping study, we identify potential opportunities for raising the profile of legal academia in wider spheres, as well as enhancing opportunities for cross-disciplinary collaboration. As we argue by reference to our findings, part of that work may simply involve legal academics projecting their more positive self-perceptions of their field and the value of their work to the outside world.</abstract>

Fear and Loathing in Legal Academia: Legal Academics’ Perceptions of Their Field and Their Curious Imaginaries of How ‘Outsiders’ Perceive It

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The relationship between the law and masculinity has not been as thoroughly examined as the relationship between the law and feminism or, more generally, between the law and gender. Yet, the reach of masculinity stretches deep into the very fiber of the law. Masculinity has for too long served as an invisible bedrock on which the law founded both its substance and method. The struggle for formal equality during the last half century sought the elimination of the masculinist bias, but has only exposed the extent of the entrenchment. The popular idea is that the law exists in a removed and exalted position where it sits in judgement of a pre-existing and fully formed masculinity. Indeed, much of the internal coherence of the law is premised on the integrity of the subject and the propagation of sexual difference. Thus, the law is precluded from acknowledging or engaging with its own productive power and vacuously characterizes itself as a neutral arbiter. Today, while significant changes occur in sex and sexuality, the study of masculinity appears theoretically stagnant.Part I of this paper distinguishes between masculinity studies and the men's movement and explains the relationship of each to feminist theory. Part II looks at how the power of the law works and how masculinity studies is an effective tool to help understand how that power manifests and is employed. Part III examines the relationship between feminist legal theory and masculinity studies with a particular focus on two areas where I view masculinity studies as having successfully employed insights from feminist theory. Finally, Part IV considers four areas where I suggest masculinity studies could better incorporate certain insights from feminist theory, which would result in a more rigorous understanding of the relationship among power, masculinity, and law, and point masculinity studies in a more nuanced direction. To advance this critique, the paper analyzes underlying arguments that support the power of law based in classic liberal political theory. It employs recurrent critiques of the law, and of liberalism more generally, found in Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Race Theory, Queer Theory, and Critical Legal Studies to reveal the law as always already intertwined with masculinity.</abstract>

Directions for the Study of Masculinity: Beyond Toxicity, Experience, and Alienation

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">William O. Douglas, venerated by some and reviled by others, was very much his own man, disdaining his colleagues on the bench and the work they produced. For him, the point of judging was simply to do justice. However, justice is not always self evident, and legal norms and values, like objectivity and stare decisis, are ignored at a high cost. Nor, as it turns out, was his carefully carved authentic persona more than a mask of lies.</abstract>

William O. Douglas and The Assault on Objectivity

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Scholars often appeal to Kant in defending a retributivist view of criminal punishment. In this paper, I join other scholars in rejecting this interpretation as insufficiently attentive to Kant's wider theory of justice, particularly as found in the <italic>Rechtslehre</italic>, a section of the <italic>Metaphysics of Morals</italic>. I then turn to the <italic>Tugendlehre</italic>, where I examine analogies between Kant's treatments of morality and justice. In particular, I argue that Kant's own views about conscience and moral cognition should cause us to rethink the importance of lex talionis (an integral retributive principle) in the criminal justice system, and to adopt a more merciful attitude toward punishable criminals than we might otherwise be inclined to do. I end with a few policy proposals aimed at encouraging such moral cognition in contemporary Anglo-American criminal justice systems</abstract>

Moral Cognition in Criminal Punishment

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Within the United States, legal challenges to the death penalty have held it to be a “cruel and unusual” punishment (contrary to the Eighth Amendment) or arbitrarily and unfairly enacted (contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). The Eighth Amendment requires that punishments not be disproportionate or purposeless. In recent rulings, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a piecemeal approach to this matter. In regard to particular classes of defendant, the Court has sought to rule on whether death is likely to be a proportional and purposeful punishment, as well as whether—given the condition of these defendants—such a determination can be reliably and accurately gauged. This article will suggest a different approach. Instead of asking whether, given the nature of certain categories of human defendant, the death penalty is constitutional in their case, I will begin by asking what—given the nature of the U.S. death penalty—one must believe about human beings for death to be a proportionate punishment. From this, I will argue that to believe that these penal goals are capable of fulfilment by the death penalty entails commitment to an empirically unconfirmable philosophical anthropology. On this basis, it will be further argued that the beliefs required for the U.S. death penalty's proportional and purposeful instigation (pursuant to the Eighth Amendment) are not congruent with the demands of legal due process.</abstract>

Revisiting Death's Difference: The Philosophical Anthropology of the U.S. Death Penalty and the Impossibility of Capital Due Process

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British Journal of American Legal Studies

 The British Journal of American Legal Studies is the premier American legal studies journal in Europe. This peer reviewed, cross-disciplinary journal is a bridge between American and European legal scholarship focused on American legal issues. The journal has a theoretical focus, but will occasionally publish articles with a doctrinal or empirical focus that cast light on important issue within the journal's remit. The journal highlights scholarship examining shared intellectual traditions between America, Britain and Europe. Authors whose work draws connections between American, British and European constitutional, political, historical, intellectual ideas and materials informing legal studies are particularly welcome to submit articles to the journal.　   Submissions/information for authors:  Submissions may be made through Scholastica and are typically but not exclusively between 10 - 15, 000 words excluding footnotes. The journal uses Bluebook referencing format.　  The journal does not have article processing charges (APCs) nor article submission charges.  Archiving  Sciendo archives the contents of this journal in Portico - digital long-term preservation service of scholarly books, journals and collections.  Plagiarism Policy  The editorial board is participating in a growing community of Similarity Check System's users in order to ensure that the content published is original and trustworthy. Similarity Check is a medium that allows for comprehensive manuscripts screening, aimed to eliminate plagiarism and provide a high standard and quality peer-review process.  Target Group   academics and practitioners in the field of constitutional law having relevance to the United States, including human rights, legal and political theory, socio-legal studies and legal history 

British Journal of American Legal Studies

Volume 9 (2020): Issue 1 (May 2020)

Joseph A. Greenaway Jr. Lecture Series on Law and Justice^* Speak at Your Own Peril

Fear and Loathing in Legal Academia: Legal Academics’ Perceptions of Their Field and Their Curious Imaginaries of How ‘Outsiders’ Perceive It

Directions for the Study of Masculinity: Beyond Toxicity, Experience, and Alienation

William O. Douglas and The Assault on Objectivity

Moral Cognition in Criminal Punishment

Revisiting Death's Difference: The Philosophical Anthropology of the U.S. Death Penalty and the Impossibility of Capital Due Process

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Tutti i volumi ed i numeri in questa rivista

British Journal of American Legal Studies

Volume 9 (2020): Issue 1 (May 2020)

Joseph A. Greenaway Jr. Lecture Series on Law and Justice* Speak at Your Own Peril

Fear and Loathing in Legal Academia: Legal Academics’ Perceptions of Their Field and Their Curious Imaginaries of How ‘Outsiders’ Perceive It

Directions for the Study of Masculinity: Beyond Toxicity, Experience, and Alienation

William O. Douglas and The Assault on Objectivity

Moral Cognition in Criminal Punishment

Revisiting Death's Difference: The Philosophical Anthropology of the U.S. Death Penalty and the Impossibility of Capital Due Process

Cerca

Tutti i volumi ed i numeri in questa rivista

Joseph A. Greenaway Jr. Lecture Series on Law and Justice^* Speak at Your Own Peril