<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p> Consider games where players wish to minimize the cost to reach some state. A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium can be regarded as a collection of optimal paths on such games. Similarly, the well-known state-labeling algorithm used in model checking can be viewed as computing optimal paths on a Kripke structure, where each path has a minimum number of transitions. We exploit these similarities in a common generalization of extensive games and Kripke structures that we name “graph games”. By extending the Bellman-Ford algorithm for computing shortest paths, we obtain a model-checking algorithm for graph games with respect to formulas in an appropriate logic. Hence, when given a certain formula, our model-checking algorithm computes the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (as opposed to simply determining whether or not a given collection of paths is a Nash equilibrium). Next, we develop a symbolic version of our model checker allowing us to handle larger graph games. We illustrate our formalism on the critical-path method as well as games with perfect information. Finally, we report on the execution time of benchmarks of an implementation of our algorithms</p></abstract>

Consider games where players wish to minimize the cost to reach some state. A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium can be regarded as a collection of optimal paths on such games. Similarly, the well-known state-labeling algorithm used in model checking can be viewed as computing optimal paths on a Kripke structure, where each path has a minimum number of transitions. We exploit these similarities in a common generalization of extensive games and Kripke structures that we name “graph games”. By extending the Bellman-Ford algorithm for computing shortest paths, we obtain a model-checking algorithm for graph games with respect to formulas in an appropriate logic. Hence, when given a certain formula, our model-checking algorithm computes the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (as opposed to simply determining whether or not a given collection of paths is a Nash equilibrium). Next, we develop a symbolic version of our model checker allowing us to handle larger graph games. We illustrate our formalism on the critical-path method as well as games with perfect information. Finally, we report on the execution time of benchmarks of an implementation of our algorithms

A symbolic shortest path algorithm for computing subgame-perfect Nash equilibria

Institute for Research in Applied Mathematics and Systems National Autonomous University of Mexico, A.P. 20-126, C.P. 01000, Mexico D.F.

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

{"article-title":"A symbolic shortest path algorithm for computing subgame-perfect Nash equilibria"}

Consider games where players wish to minimize the cost to reach some state. A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium can be regarded as a collection of optimal paths...

A symbolic shortest path algorithm for computing subgame-perfect Nash equilibria

Pubblicato online: 30 set 2015

Pagine: 577 - 596

Ricevuto: 20 dic 2013

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/amcs-2015-0043

© by Pedro A. Góngora

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.