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This special issue on Logic and Law consists of four research papers and one interview focusing on epistemological reflections on relationships between logic and law, whether in a reductionist or complementary approach. Logic aims to elucidate through formal frameworks, yet it often grapples with the intricate nuances of everyday legal discourse. While law endeavors to delineate permissible conduct within defined jurisdictions, it often encounters challenges stemming from the ambiguity of terms, leading to frequent judicial interpretations and the perception that proliferating exceptions undermines the efficacy of the rule itself.
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Logic and Law: A Matter of Values Behind Content and Form

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Classical logic is based on an underlying view of the world, according to which there are elementary facts and compound facts, which are logical combinations of these elementary facts. Sentences are true if they correspond to, in last instance, the elementary facts in the world. This world view has no place for rules, which exist as individuals in the world, and which create relations between the most elementary facts. As a result, classical logic is not suitable to deal with rules, and is therefore unsuitable to deal with legal reasoning. A logic that is more suitable should take into account that law is a part of social reality, in particular a part that consists of constructivist facts, and that rules play a central role in law. This article gives a superficial description of how social reality exists and of the place of law and legal rules in it. It uses this description to argue that traditional techniques to reason with and about legal rules provide a better logic for law than classical logic. These techniques can be accommodated in a logic that treats rules as logical individuals.
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How Law’s Nature Influences Law’s Logic

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This paper investigates the basis arguments of so-called legal logic and their relation to logic in its standard meaning. There is no doubt that legal arguments belong to logic in the wide sense (<italic>sensu largo</italic>), but their reduction to schemes of formal logic (<italic>logica sensu stricto</italic>) is a controversial issue. It can be demonstrated that only some legal arguments fall under explicit rules of formal logic, that is, having a deductive character. Most such reasoning is fallible, and its correctness depends on appealing to extra-logical principles taken from legal norms. For instance, if we say, “If it is permitted more, then it is permitted less” (<italic>argumentum a maiori ad minus</italic>), we assume that the concepts expressed by the words “more” and “less” are already defined.
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Legal Reasoning and Logic

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The concept of legal gap is tackled from a number of logical perspectives and semantic methods. After presenting our own goal (Section 1), a first introduction into legal logic refers to Bobbio’s works and his formalization of legal statements (Sections 2 and 3). Then Woleński’s contribution to the area is taken into account through his reference to the distinction between two juridical systems (viz. Common Law vs Civil Law) and the notion of conditional norms (Section 4). The notion of reason is also highlighted in the case of Raz’s legal logic, thereby leading to a future connection with von Wright’s logic of truth and an analogy made with an anti-realist reading of truth-values and norms (Section 5). Our personal contribution is introduced through a reflection on how logic should deal with the logical form of norms (Section 6), before entering a number of crucial definitions and distinctions for the concepts of norm, legal statement, and promulgation (Section 7). The final point is a proposed semantics for legal statements, which is both many-valued and gap-friendly (Section 8). A distinction between a number of requirements for permission and forbiddance leads to a set of non-classical juridical systems in which non-permission and forbiddance are not equivalent with each other any more; this does justice to Woleński’s former distinction between Common Law and Civil Law, also leading ultimately to a non-classical square of legal oppositions in which several legal operators may collapse into other ones (Section 9).
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Legal Gaps and their Logical Forms

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This article explores the domain of legal analysis and its methodologies, emphasising the significance of generalisation in legal systems. It discusses the process of generalisation in relation to legal concepts and the development of ideal concepts that form the foundation of law. The article examines the role of logical induction and its similarities with semantic generalisation, highlighting their importance in legal decision-making. It also critiques the formal-deductive approach in legal practice and advocates for more adaptable models, incorporating fuzzy logic, non-monotonic defeasible reasoning, and artificial intelligence. The potential application of neural networks, specifically deep learning algorithms, in legal theory is also discussed. The article discusses how neural networks encode legal knowledge in their synaptic connections, while the syllogistic model condenses legal information into axioms. The article also highlights how neural networks assimilate novel experiences and exhibit evolutionary progression, unlike the deductive model of law. Additionally, the article examines the historical and theoretical foundations of jurisprudence that align with the basic principles of neural networks. It delves into the statistical analysis of legal phenomena and theories that view legal development as an evolutionary process. The article then explores Friedrich Hayek’s theory of law as an autonomous self-organising system and its compatibility with neural network models. It concludes by discussing the implications of Hayek’s theory on the role of a lawyer and the precision of neural networks.
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Neural Networks in Legal Theory

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This interview features Andrea Reichenberger. Currently she holds a substitute professorship for history of technology at TUM Technical University of Munich. She is junior research group leader at the Department of Mathematics, University of Siegen, Germany, and leads the research project “Rethinking the History of Mathematics and Physics: Women in Focus.” Reichenberger has held several postdoctoral positions, e.g., at the Center for the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists (HWPS) at Paderborn University (Germany) and in the DFG research project “Thought Experiment, Metaphor, Model” at the Institute for Philosophy I at the Ruhr University Bochum. Between 2019 and 2021, she was a fellow at the University of Paderborn and principal investigator of the research project “Foundational research in mathematical logic – relativity – quantum physics. Case studies on the integration of women philosophers.” Reichenberger has written a book on Émilie du Châtelet (Springer, 2016) and has published many articles in journals, collected editions, and encyclopedias.
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Logic Matters – Gender and Diversity, Too

AHEAD OF PRINT

Volume 13 (2024): Issue 3 (May 2024) Special issue title: Logic and Law

Volume 13 (2024): Issue 2 (April 2024) Special issue title: Logic in Poland in the 20th Century

Volume 13 (2024): Issue 1 (April 2024) Special issue title: Logic in Poland in the 20th Century

Volume 12 (2023): Issue 4 (December 2023)

Volume 12 (2023): Issue 3 (April 2023) Indian Philosophy

Volume 12 (2023): Issue 1-2 (March 2023) Indian Logic

Volume 11 (2022): Issue 3-4 (December 2022)

Volume 11 (2022): Issue 2 (June 2022)

Volume 11 (2022): Issue 1 (March 2022)

Volume 10 (2021): Issue 4 (December 2021)

Volume 10 (2021): Issue 3 (June 2021) Humanistic Economy

Volume 10 (2021): Issue 2 (May 2021) Humanistic Economy

Volume 10 (2021): Issue 1 (February 2021)

Volume 9 (2020): Issue 3-4 (October 2020)

Volume 9 (2020): Issue 2 (July 2020) Libertarianism from the Philosophical Perspective

Volume 9 (2020): Issue 1 (March 2020)

Volume 8 (2019): Issue 4 (December 2019)

Volume 8 (2019): Issue 3 (October 2019)

Volume 8 (2019): Issue 2 (June 2019)

Volume 8 (2019): Issue 1 (February 2019)

Volume 7 (2018): Issue 4 (December 2018)

Volume 7 (2018): Issue 3 (September 2018)

Volume 7 (2018): Issue 2 (June 2018)

Volume 7 (2018): Issue 1 (March 2018)

Volume 6 (2017): Issue 4 (October 2017)

Volume 6 (2017): Issue 3 (July 2017)

Volume 6 (2017): Issue 2 (June 2017)

Volume 6 (2017): Issue 1 (March 2017)

Volume 5 (2016): Issue 4 (December 2016)

Volume 5 (2016): Issue 3 (September 2016)

Volume 5 (2016): Issue 2 (June 2016)

Volume 5 (2016): Issue 1 (March 2016)

Volume 4 (2015): Issue 4 (December 2015)

Volume 4 (2015): Issue 3 (July 2015)

Volume 4 (2015): Issue 2 (June 2015)

Volume 4 (2015): Issue 1 (February 2015)

Volume 3 (2014): Issue 4 (December 2014)

Volume 3 (2014): Issue 3 (September 2014)

Volume 3 (2014): Issue 2 (June 2014)

Volume 3 (2014): Issue 1 (February 2014)

Studia Humana

Studia Humana (SH) is a multi-disciplinary double blind peer reviewed journal publishing valuable contributions on methodological aspects of human and social sciences such as (1) analytic philosophy and philosophical logic related to universal features of epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, praxeology, non-classical logics and their applications to methodology of science, linguistics or theology, etc. as well as (2) communication and political economy to provide a forum for the academic discussion of original ideas which explore new approaches and methodologies in communication with emphasis on social economics and transitive processes, methodology of Austrian school of economics, economy and policy in conjunction with issues of culture, identity, gender, and ecology, etc., but predominantly with a comparative perspective for approaches and methodologies that are not in mainstream to promote dialogue and exchange in looking for new theoretical means of conceiving the life-world.  The editors invite the submission of articles, book reviews, and responses from professional scientists. It is particularly interested in publishing contributions by new authors who pursue their academic development. One of the objectives of SH is the provision of a suitable platform for the discussion in all areas of human sciences beyond the limits of Western-centrism, with emphasis on problems of post-Socialist European states and ideas marginal to mainstream. Currently, SH has four electronic issues per year. SH aspires to become a venue to connect human sciences to the world and thus the editors strongly encourage submissions in English language. The journal also aims to contribute to the understanding of society and state through the study of relevant institutions, using concepts belonging to the disciplines of philosophy and economics. The crossing of different disciplinary points of view will enable us to gain a deeper insight into the various aspects of the observed phenomena. Our main objective is to study changes and their underlying mechanisms in modern societies (e.g., in post-Socialist countries), through the analysis of the institutions that remain most hidden from the public eye. Calls for contributions will be also published on the journals website and in newsletters sent through internet.  The publication policy of Studia Humana follows strictly the ethical rules recommended by COPE – Committee on Publication Ethics. https://publicationethics.org/     Archiving  Sciendo archives the contents of this journal in Portico - digital long-term preservation service of scholarly books, journals and collections.  Plagiarism Policy  The editorial board is participating in a growing community of Similarity Check System's users in order to ensure that the content published is original and trustworthy. Similarity Check is a medium that allows for comprehensive manuscripts screening, aimed to eliminate plagiarism and provide a high standard and quality peer-review process. 

Volume 13 (2024): Issue 3 (May 2024) - Special issue title: Logic and Law

Special issue title: Logic and Law

Volume 13 (2024): Issue 3 (May 2024)