Phantasy-Ego, Image Consciousness and Aesthetic Experience : Phenomenological Approaches

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This paper consists in a study of the development of Husserl’s thought on the notions of phantasy and image consciousness. It shows how, following a first phase in which he still identified phantasy with image consciousness, Husserl gradually began to distinguish the two and define what is proper to each in an increasingly precise manner.
The paper then shows how Husserl came to view pure phantasy as a modification of perception. Concerning image consciousness, it shows how the status of the image-object and the nature of its reference to the image subject evolved throughout Husserl’s thought. The problems raised by this model are also discussed, in particular when it comes to cases where there is no image subject, e.g. in theatre. Finally, the paper shows how the development of these concepts in Husserl’s work involves a new conception of the notion of “phantasm” – one that goes hand in hand with rejection of the ‘content of apprehension-apprehension’ scheme.
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Sobre a elaboração progressiva dos pensamentos de Husserl acerca da fantasia e da consciência de imagem através da escrita

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I offer an outline of an integrated phenomenological analysis of free fantasy and of fictional worlds. My main concern amounts to stress the scissions entailed in free fantasy and in the consciousness of fictional objects: a scission of the I, and a scission of the experience. Firstly, I offer a somewhat new characterization of the presence of the objects of free fantasy, which disconnects any possible relationship of those objects with a real perception as the leading form of an originally giving consciousness. My leading example is daydream. Secondly, I take the Husserlian analysis of neutralization as a conceptual tool to explain the consciousness of fictional worlds, against a new tendency for interpreting these worlds in light of the concept of “possible world”. The two approaches converge to a twofold characterization of the mode of being of fictions and of the modality of presence of the objects of fantasy.
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Phenomenology of Phantasy and Fiction: Some Remarks Towards a Unified Account

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What are fictional emotions and what has phenomenology to say about them? This paper argues that the experience of fictional emotions entails a splitting of the subject between a real and a phantasy ego. The real ego is the ego that imagines something; the phantasy ego is the ego that is necessarily co-posited by any experience of imagining something. Fictional emotions are phantasy emotions of the phantasy ego. The intentional structure of fictional emotions, the nature of their fictional object, as well as the process of constituting the phantasy ego in representificational acts of consciousness are further elaborated to provide the groundwork for a phenomenological analysis of fictional emotions.
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Towards a Phenomenological Analysis of Fictional Emotions

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This study aims at exposing the phenomenological description of attention as presented by Husserl in his 1904-05 Göttingen-lecture <italic>Principal Parts of the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge,</italic> in its relevance for the study of so-called “intuitive re-presentations”, that is, phantasy and image-consciousness. Starting with the exposition of the fundamental traits of the intentional theory of attention, this study discusses the definition of attention in the terms of meaning [<italic>Meinen</italic>] and interest, which allows it to become an encompassing modification of all kinds of lived experiences that does not imply an alteration of their act-character (Husserl, 2004: 73). We refer to this character of attention as “plasticity”. In what follows, the study underlines these two definitions of attention and their importance for the understanding of phantasy and image-consciousness. Both kinds of re-presentations will be described stressing the role of attention in the “structuring” of the intentional act and in its affective basis. Finally, the study deals more specifically with the complex description of image consciousness from the viewpoint of the attentional meaning of the image subject.
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Attention and the Subject of Depiction Some Remarks on Husserl’s Approach to the Function of Attention in Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Pictorial Experience

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As early as 1905, Husserl made clear that, when it comes to aesthetic consideration, our “interest” is not directed toward the existence of the object as such, but rather toward the object’s way of appearance. Husserl’s famous letter to Hofmannsthal (1907) goes as far as to suggest that any existential concerns are potentially even a menace to the purity of aesthetic experience. This position clearly echoes Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment presented in the third <italic>Critique</italic>, notably as regards the notion of disinterestedness. However, this is not tantamount to claiming that aesthetic attitude implies the suspension of all interest: this paper aims to show that it would be more appropriate to discuss it in terms of a change of interest: from an existential interest to an axiological one.
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A Husserlian Approach to Aesthetic Experience: Existential Disinterest and Axiological Interest

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In the debate over the ontological structures of the entity that exists as being-in-the-world, the French philosopher Henri Maldiney focuses his theoretical developments on the unintentional and pre-predicative dimension of experience, where sensing (<italic>sentir</italic>) takes its origin, and based on which the Existentials of “encounter”, “surprise” and “rhythm”, that are key to understanding the aesthetic-artistic experience, are explained in the horizon of transpassibility and transpossibility. Given that that dimension is the privileged field of encounter with art, this paper will raise the question of the nexus of the articulation between art and image. This question will be developed through the opposition of form and image, of the reality of image and the image of reality, and the aesthetic vision and imaginative vision. In this analysis, we will rely upon the Heideggerian conception of Existence, as well as some of Husserl’s and the neuro-psychiatrist Erwin Straus’s researches into the passive dimension of experience, with the purpose of showing how Maldiney, starting from them, contributed in a singular and significant way to the deepening of that unintentional dimension of existence which he calls “pathic”.
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Art and Image in Henri Maldiney's Aesthetics

Book Reviews

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Phainomenon

Phainomenon is an international journal specializing in phenomenology.  It was founded in 2000 and has been published since then with the support of the Center of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon, Portugal.  Phainomenon seeks to contribute to the development of phenomenological studies worldwide, stimulating original work in all fields of phenomenological research, as well as in the areas where phenomenology crosses paths with other philosophical traditions and scientific domains. Phainomenon also seeks to contribute to a better cognizance and understanding of the phenomenological tradition – both of its authors and its themes – accepting works that advance our comprehension of it.  Phainomenon publishes works in English (recommended), Portuguese, Spanish, French, Italian, and German. Contributions are accepted following a double or single-blind peer review process, always with external reviewers.  The current publisher of Phainomenon is SCIENDO, which belongs to De Gruyter Verlag,  Regularly, the journal has two sections: a general section, where papers are continuously received and published; and a thematic section, preceded by an announcement and a call for papers, sometimes under the responsibility of guest editors. The thematic section usually has a comprehensive theme, intended to encompass other philosophical traditions, as well as other disciplines belonging either to the social and human sciences or to the natural sciences.  Moreover, Phainomenon publishes book reviews and bibliographical notes and, though not on a regular basis, translations into Portuguese of fundamental texts belonging to the intellectual patrimony of phenomenology. Phainomenon is published twice a year, in Spring and Fall. All articles, notes, translations, reviews and other content can be accessed and downloaded for free thanks to our open access policy.  Phainomenon is financed through Portuguese national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., in the scope of the project UIDP/00310/2020.  ArchivingSciendo archives the contents of this journal in Portico - digital long-term preservation service of scholarly books, journals and collections.  Plagiarism Policy  The editorial board is participating in a growing community of Similarity Check System's users in order to ensure that the content published is original and trustworthy. Similarity Check is a medium that allows for comprehensive manuscripts screening, aimed to eliminate plagiarism and provide a high standard and quality peer-review process.  Journal SponsorshipCentro de Filosofia da Universidade de LisboaFacultade de Letras da Universidade de LisboaFundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia - Portugal 