Presentation

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

This paper focuses on Carl Stumpf’s evaluation of Husserl’s phenomenology in his <italic>Logical Investigations</italic> and in the first book of <italic>Ideas</italic>. I first examine Stumpf’s reception of the phenomenology of the <italic>Logical Investigations</italic>. I then turn to §§ 85-86 of <italic>Ideas</italic>, in which Husserl seeks to distinguish his “pure” phenomenology from Stumpf’s phenomenology. In the third part, I examine Stumpf’s critique of the new version of phenomenology that Husserl develops in his <italic>Ideas</italic> in §13 of <italic>Erkenntnislehre</italic>, and, in the fourth part, I examine the Spinozist interpretation of noetic-noematic correlations in Stumpf’s two studies of Spinoza. I conclude by asking whether the version of phenomenology that Husserl elaborates on during the Freiburg period does not anticipate, to some extent, Stumpf’s criticisms while confirming the latter’s diagnosis of the phenomenology of <italic>Ideas</italic>.
</abstract>

Carl Stumpf Lecteur de Husserl<xref ref-type="fn" rid="j_phainomenon-2022-0009_fn_001">1</xref>

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

What, if any, are the limits of the Husserlian concept of <italic>Gegebenheit</italic>? Is there a limit beyond which nothing can be seen by the phenomenologist? In asking these questions, we allude to a distinction typical of Kantian criticism: “<italic>Grenze</italic>” or “<italic>Schranke</italic>”, limit or boundary? These same questions are reformulated in a famous review of <italic>Ideen</italic> I by Paul Natorp, a Marburg neo-Kantian who directly attacks the unlimited scope Husserl gives to the phenomenological principle of intuition. From a phenomenological point of view, however, the Achilles’ heel of the critical method lies in the impossibility of accessing by intuition, beyond phenomena, the thing-in-itself. A major consequence is that the phenomenological dissolution of the “<italic>Grenze</italic>” prescribes a limitless opening to the horizon of phenomena. But if we can speak of a limitless openness, it is because in a certain way everything gives itself to be seen. What kind of vision is this? And what kind of <italic>Gegebenheit</italic> is at work here? The Husserlian answer lies in the recovery of a concept, the “idea in the Kantian sense”, without its counterpart, the “limit”, whereas for Kant as well as for Natorp it is precisely the concept of “limit” that characterizes the gnoseological status of the “idea”.
</abstract>

LA LIMITE SANS LIMITES QUELQUES RREMARQUES SUE LE PRINCIPE PHENOMENOLOGIQUE DE LA GEGEBENHEIT A L’EPREUVE DU NEOKANTISME

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

In 1931 Husserl writes and publishes the Epilogue to his <italic>Ideas</italic>, where he aims to explain the core of his work. Aware that this is his a legacy which must be carried forward, he seeks to preserve it from what he calls “the mistaken views” found in the new ways of conducting phenomenology. Our text underlines the polemic side of Husserl’s project, which is basically but tacitly against Heidegger, and sustains that this auto-interpretive piece is a fundamental key within Husserl’s corpus, where he defines the direction of his phenomenological project. At the center of the controversy are the answers to the objections of intellectualism and solipsism, and the disavowal of all forms of anthropologism in the conception of subjectivity.
</abstract>

Husserl Et Heidegger de 1913 À 1931 : LA Postface de Husserl Aux <italic>Ideen III</italic>

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

This work starts by unfolding Levinas’ legacy from Bergson to phenomenology. Particularly, the article explores how Levinas deeply understood the meaning of Husserl’s transcendental idealism of <italic>Ideas</italic> I. He adheres to Husserl’s re(con)duction to the transcendental, understood by Levinas as the sense of existence overlooked by the naturalist ontology. Finally, it develops the Levinasian continuation of genetic phenomenology and its conclusion, that is, the irreducibility of ethical responsibility.
</abstract>

Emmanuel Levinas : <italic>Ideen I</italic> En Tant Qu’invitation au Travail<xref ref-type="fn" rid="j_phainomenon-2022-0012_fn_001">1</xref>

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

An attempt to bring Husserl’s phenomenology and psychopathology closer, based on the text of § 49 of the Ideen. What is an experience of annihilation of the world? How is a world undone? We will focus on the examples of the end of the world described in the stories of Gérard de Nerval and in the patients of Wolfgang Blankenburg.
</abstract>

Anéantissement du Monde et Expérience Psychotique de Fin du Monde

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

Countless scholars have wrestled with the ambiguities and complexities in determining the role of the noema in Husserl’s theory of intentionality since his transcendental turn, and consequently converted what was intended to be a structural solution to a problem into a contested problem itself.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="j_phainomenon-2022-0014_fn_001">1</xref> Shifting emphasis from the ‘whatness’, or ontological concerns of the correlate noesis—noema to the ‘howness’, or methodological force of phenomenology, allows me to discuss two things. The first is theological. Before and since Janicaud’s pronouncement of the ‘theological turn’ in phenomenology, the intentionality thesis has been rejected as a means to account for certain experiences given differently to object-phenomena (Janicaud, 2000). In accounting for religious experience as a complex movement between faith and doubt, my work reaches not for the ‘essence of phenomenality’ (Marion), or a givenness beyond intuition made invisible, nor does it seek to describe a transcendence beyond immanence, or proof in the existence of a god/gods, rather it concerns itself with the processes and underlying structures of belief. Arguably by focusing upon the noetic and noematic structure of intentional acts, intentional analysis is revitalised for delineating the belief modalities of faith and doubt in religious experiences.
</abstract>

The Believed as Believed: The Noematic Dimensions of Faith and Doubt in Religious Experience

AHEAD OF PRINT

Volume 36 (2023): Issue 1 (December 2023)

Volume 35 (2023): Issue 1 (May 2023)

Volume 34 (2022): Issue 1 (December 2022)

Volume 33 (2022): Issue 1 (September 2022)

Volume 32 (2021): Issue 1 (December 2021)

Volume 31 (2021): Issue 1 (October 2021)

Volume 30 (2020): Issue 1 (December 2020)

Volume 29 (2019): Issue 1 (December 2019)

Volume 28 (2018): Issue 1 (October 2018)

Volume 27 (2018): Issue 1 (April 2018)

Volume 26 (2017): Issue 1 (October 2017)

Volume 25 (2012): Issue 1 (October 2012)

Volume 24 (2012): Issue 1 (April 2012)

Volume 22-23 (2011): Issue 1 (October 2011)

Volume 20-21 (2010): Issue 1 (October 2010)

Volume 18-19 (2009): Issue 1 (October 2009)

Volume 16-17 (2008): Issue 1 (October 2008)

Volume 15 (2008): Issue 1 (April 2008)

Volume 14 (2007): Issue 1 (April 2007)

Volume 13 (2007): Issue 1 (October 2007)

Volume 12 (2006): Issue 1 (October 2006)

Volume 11 (2006): Issue 1 (April 2006)

Volume 10 (2005): Issue 1 (October 2005)

Volume 9 (2004): Issue 1 (October 2004)

Volume 8 (2004): Issue 1 (April 2004)

Volume 7 (2003): Issue 1 (October 2003)

Volume 5-6 (2003): Issue 1 (April 2003)

Volume 4 (2002): Issue 1 (October 2002)

Volume 3 (2001): Issue 1 (October 2001)

Volume 2 (2001): Issue 1 (April 2001)

Volume 1 (2000): Issue 1 (October 2000)

Phainomenon

Phainomenon is an international journal specializing in phenomenology.  It was founded in 2000 and has been published since then with the support of the Center of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon, Portugal.  Phainomenon seeks to contribute to the development of phenomenological studies worldwide, stimulating original work in all fields of phenomenological research, as well as in the areas where phenomenology crosses paths with other philosophical traditions and scientific domains. Phainomenon also seeks to contribute to a better cognizance and understanding of the phenomenological tradition – both of its authors and its themes – accepting works that advance our comprehension of it.  Phainomenon publishes works in English (recommended), Portuguese, Spanish, French, Italian, and German. Contributions are accepted following a double or single-blind peer review process, always with external reviewers.  The current publisher of Phainomenon is SCIENDO, which belongs to De Gruyter Verlag,  Regularly, the journal has two sections: a general section, where papers are continuously received and published; and a thematic section, preceded by an announcement and a call for papers, sometimes under the responsibility of guest editors. The thematic section usually has a comprehensive theme, intended to encompass other philosophical traditions, as well as other disciplines belonging either to the social and human sciences or to the natural sciences.  Moreover, Phainomenon publishes book reviews and bibliographical notes and, though not on a regular basis, translations into Portuguese of fundamental texts belonging to the intellectual patrimony of phenomenology. Phainomenon is published twice a year, in Spring and Fall. All articles, notes, translations, reviews and other content can be accessed and downloaded for free thanks to our open access policy.  Phainomenon is financed through Portuguese national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., in the scope of the project UIDP/00310/2020.  ArchivingSciendo archives the contents of this journal in Portico - digital long-term preservation service of scholarly books, journals and collections.  Plagiarism Policy  The editorial board is participating in a growing community of Similarity Check System's users in order to ensure that the content published is original and trustworthy. Similarity Check is a medium that allows for comprehensive manuscripts screening, aimed to eliminate plagiarism and provide a high standard and quality peer-review process.  Journal SponsorshipCentro de Filosofia da Universidade de LisboaFacultade de Letras da Universidade de LisboaFundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia - Portugal 

Phainomenon

Volume 34 (2022): Issue 1 (December 2022)

Presentation

Carl Stumpf Lecteur de Husserl¹

LA LIMITE SANS LIMITES QUELQUES RREMARQUES SUE LE PRINCIPE PHENOMENOLOGIQUE DE LA GEGEBENHEIT A L’EPREUVE DU NEOKANTISME

Husserl Et Heidegger de 1913 À 1931 : LA Postface de Husserl Aux Ideen III

Emmanuel Levinas : Ideen I En Tant Qu’invitation au Travail¹

Anéantissement du Monde et Expérience Psychotique de Fin du Monde

The Believed as Believed: The Noematic Dimensions of Faith and Doubt in Religious Experience

Chercher

Tous les volumes et éditions dans cette revue

Phainomenon

Volume 34 (2022): Issue 1 (December 2022)

Presentation

Carl Stumpf Lecteur de Husserl1

LA LIMITE SANS LIMITES QUELQUES RREMARQUES SUE LE PRINCIPE PHENOMENOLOGIQUE DE LA GEGEBENHEIT A L’EPREUVE DU NEOKANTISME

Husserl Et Heidegger de 1913 À 1931 : LA Postface de Husserl Aux Ideen III

Emmanuel Levinas : Ideen I En Tant Qu’invitation au Travail1

Anéantissement du Monde et Expérience Psychotique de Fin du Monde

The Believed as Believed: The Noematic Dimensions of Faith and Doubt in Religious Experience

Chercher

Tous les volumes et éditions dans cette revue

Carl Stumpf Lecteur de Husserl¹

Emmanuel Levinas : Ideen I En Tant Qu’invitation au Travail¹