<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This study analyses the status of the new EU member states and, in particular, Poland as it is perceived by the representatives of the older EU members. On a theoretical level, it argues that the transformation of the newcomers into “normal players” or even “regional leaders” is dependent on five specific conditions that each of these countries must fulfil. These range from (1) simple compliance with the EU’s basic norms and (2) a sufficient level of orientation in EU decision-making to (3) establishment of the country’s unique policy expertise, (4) the ability to create winning coalitions and finally and above all (5) a willingness to defend the interests of the Union as a whole. On an empirical level, we draw on an extensive set of interviews with diplomats belonging to the permanent representation of the old member states in Brussels. Based on these data, we conclude that (1) Poland has already established itself as a normal EU player fully comparable with the older member states. In terms of the country’s leadership status, (2) Poland has also moved to the position of frontrunner among the new member states. However, the country still fails in at least one criterion: (regional) leadership. This precludes it from becoming a fully respected and leading state in the EU.</abstract>

Newcomer, Normal Player or Regional Leader? Perceptions of Poland in the EU

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This study examines the changing role of the EU agenda in Slovak politics. It identifies old and newly emerging faces of Euroscepticism and compares them with general theoretical concepts. Furthermore, it asks to what extent Eurosceptical appeals mobilised Slovak voters in the European Parliament (EP) elections of 2014 and whether Eurosceptical parties represent a meaningful electoral choice for voters. In the past, many analyses have provided evidence that the European agenda is not salient and the EU political arena is perceived as one where there is less at stake. Nevertheless, the economic crisis and so-called Greek bailout were followed by a rise in Euroscepticism and EU-criticism. In some EU countries, this enhanced voter mobilisation in the EP elections. In others – including Slovakia – we saw not only a significant decline in electoral turnout but relatively poor results for Eurosceptical parties as well. This study identifies the factors behind abstention and explores voting patterns in this specific second-order election in Slovakia. Moreover, it investigates how the parties are perceived in terms of their positions on EU integration and the potential impact on voter choices. I conclude that the EU agenda is still not the deciding factor for voters even in the case of EP elections. Eurosceptical appeals are less mobilising in this context, and the public sees no differences among parties’ stances on the EU.</abstract>

Euroscepticism: A Mobilising Appeal? Not for Everyone!

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This paper is focused on the issue of corruption perception in the Czech Republic. After introducing the general framework for corruption perception in post-communist countries, this paper uses the Czech Republic as an example of the ways in which corruption is perceived, the areas Czech citizens feel are most plagued by corruption, and the ways in which corruption perception has transformed in terms of post-communist developments. This paper points out the differences in corruption perception among Czech citizens, the media and political parties and their representatives. The conclusion of the paper attempts to answer the question of how corruption perception has affected the overall perception of the democratic regime in the Czech Republic. It also asks questions regarding how this has influenced the evaluation of democracy and the relationship between Czech citizens and political institutions, including individual political parties.</abstract>

Corruption Perception in the Czech Republic

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">This article is a case study focusing on employer organisations and business organisations in the Czech Republic. In legal terms, employer organisations are a specific type of interest group with special regimes of registration and record keeping. Unlike business groups, they are endowed with certain privileges and, in particular, can participate in collective bargaining. This study analyses the relations between these two types of groups. The database originates from a questionnaire-based survey undertaken in 2010 among 91 groups representing businesses and employers. The analysis focuses on the relationship between a group’s registration as an employer organisation and its orientation towards employer and business interests. It also investigates similarities between the two organisation types in terms of secondary organisation and strategies used. The analysis suggests that the differences between these two types are minimal and that the possibility of participating in collective bargaining and in tripartite counselling bodies remains the only relevant distinction. This holds true even when we take into account these groups’ self-perceived primary role, i.e. defending their members as employer or as business organisations.</abstract>

Employer Organisations and Business Groups in the Czech Republic

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Epistocracy, the rule by the experts or educated, poses a significant challenge to authentic democratic rule. Epistocrats typically reason from the premise, “experts have knowledge of political truths” to the conclusion, “experts should have the authority to rule.” There may be powerful moral reasons for thinking that the inference is fallacious. Invoking a public reason standard of acceptability, David Estlund makes a powerful argument of this sort. I argue that Estlund’s argument against epistocracy overlooks democratic epistemology, which can and should be utilized to strengthen the epistemic merits of a democratic rule. I therefore examine whether democratic democracy’s epistemic value can rest on a formal epistemic model. The inadequacy of the formal epistemic model leads us to defend democratic epistemology differently. This will be defended in two ways. The first step will be to cast doubt into the epistemic merits of expert rule in two ways. First, experts sometimes do not have access to privileged information of citizens who bear the consequences of expert decisions. Second, experts themselves can be biased. I argue that democratic deliberation can offset those two disadvantages of expert rule. The second step will be to examine the epistemic values of inclusive democratic rule.</abstract>

Epistocracy and democratic epistemology

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Existing work on euro support has provided insights into the dynamics of preferences, but most of these studies focus on older member states that already form an integral part of the Eurozone. This article inquires into public attitudes towards monetary integration in new member states of the EU: Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria and Lithuania. Focusing on the cross-sectional variation of preferences, it applies multilevel logit regression to test three perspectives – economic, conceptual and political – using individual-level survey data and NUTS-2 regional statistical data from seven countries for 2013. One of its novel findings is that beliefs such as the one that European Monetary Union (EMU) adherence will cause a spiral in economic inflation are powerful disincentives to euro support in these countries.</abstract>

Public Attitudes towards Monetary Integration in Seven New Member States of the EU

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Politics in Central Europe

 POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE publishes original, double-blind, peer-reviewed manuscripts that provide scientific essays focusing on issues in comparative politics, policy analysis, international relations and other sub-disciplines of political science, as well as original theoretical or conceptual analyses. The essays should contribute to a broad understanding of the region of Central Europe.  The journal does not have article processing charges (APCs) nor article submission charges.  Archiving  Sciendo archives the contents of this journal in Portico - digital long-term preservation service of scholarly books, journals and collections.  Plagiarism Policy  The editorial board is participating in a growing community of Similarity Check System's users in order to ensure that the content published is original and trustworthy. Similarity Check is a medium that allows for comprehensive manuscripts screening, aimed to eliminate plagiarism and provide a high standard and quality peer-review process. 