<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Moral theorists like <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_disp-2018-0003_ref_022_w2aab3b7b2b1b6b1ab1ac22Aa">Singer (2005)</xref> and <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_disp-2018-0003_ref_008_w2aab3b7b2b1b6b1ab1ab8Aa">Greene (2014)</xref> argue that we should discount intuitions about ‘up-close-and-personal’ moral dilemmas because they are more likely than intuitions about ‘impersonal’ dilemmas to be artifacts of evolution. But by that reasoning, it seems we should ignore the evolved, ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuition to save a drowning child in light of the too-new-to-be-evolved, ‘impersonal’ intuition that we need not donate to international famine relief (contra <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_disp-2018-0003_ref_020_w2aab3b7b2b1b6b1ab1ac20Aa">Singer 1972</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_disp-2018-0003_ref_007_w2aab3b7b2b1b6b1ab1ab7Aa">Greene 2008</xref>). This conclusion seems mistaken and horrifying, yet it cannot be the case both that ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuitions are more reliable than ‘impersonal’ intuitions, and vice versa. Thus, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_disp-2018-0003_ref_022_w2aab3b7b2b1b6b1ab1ac22Aa">Singer’s (2005)</xref> evolutionary debunking argument proves too much, and should not be taken seriously. However, Singer’s debunking argument is typical of an entire class of arguments that seeks to debunk normative principles by reference to evolution. This entire class of argument, I argue, therefore also proves too much to be taken seriously.</p></abstract>

Moral theorists like Singer (2005) and Greene (2014) argue that we should discount intuitions about ‘up-close-and-personal’ moral dilemmas because they are more likely than intuitions about ‘impersonal’ dilemmas to be artifacts of evolution. But by that reasoning, it seems we should ignore the evolved, ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuition to save a drowning child in light of the too-new-to-be-evolved, ‘impersonal’ intuition that we need not donate to international famine relief (contra Singer 1972; Greene 2008). This conclusion seems mistaken and horrifying, yet it cannot be the case both that ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuitions are more reliable than ‘impersonal’ intuitions, and vice versa. Thus, Singer’s (2005) evolutionary debunking argument proves too much, and should not be taken seriously. However, Singer’s debunking argument is typical of an entire class of arguments that seeks to debunk normative principles by reference to evolution. This entire class of argument, I argue, therefore also proves too much to be taken seriously.

Famine, Affluence and Intuitions: Evolutionary Debunking Proves Too Much

Disputatio

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{"article-title":"Famine, Affluence and Intuitions: Evolutionary Debunking Proves Too Much"}

Moral theorists like Singer (2005) and Greene (2014) argue that we should discount intuitions about ‘up-close-and-personal’ moral dilemmas because they are...

Famine, Affluence and Intuitions: Evolutionary Debunking Proves Too Much

Publié en ligne: 03 janv. 2019

Pages: 57 - 70

Reçu: 23 avr. 2017

Accepté: 28 août 2018

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2018-0003

Mots clés
Debunking, evolutionary psychology, metaethics, moral psychology, normative ethics

© 2018 Geoffrey S. Holtzman, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Famine, Affluence and Intuitions: Evolutionary Debunking Proves Too Much

Publié en ligne: 03 janv. 2019

Pages: 57 - 70

Reçu: 23 avr. 2017

Accepté: 28 août 2018

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2018-0003

Mots clésDebunking, evolutionary psychology, metaethics, moral psychology, normative ethics

© 2018 Geoffrey S. Holtzman, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
Debunking, evolutionary psychology, metaethics, moral psychology, normative ethics