<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>There are important differences between all Eastern European countries regarding the implementation of pension system privatization. The differences regarding the political configuration between the countries from Eastern Europe might be a possible explanation for the amount of diversity in this area. The ideology of political parties that form or sustain the government that implements the reform can also be an explanation, but this influence must be studied beyond the cliché that stipulates that the right-wing parties will support the public pension system reform and the left-wing parties will oppose it. Armeanu (2010a) showed that there are countries where privatization was supported by the centre-left coalitions that needed to overpass a strong opposition made by the right-wing parties. Using the Ideal Point Estimation technique within the voting sessions related to pension reform during the last three Romanian legislatures, we will explain the formation of pro and against coalitions regarding the pension reform from Romania during the privatization process of public pension system. We also test the hypotheses of the model presented by Armeanu (2010a, 2010b), model that predicts the behaviour of political parties based on the position they have on a two-dimensional space related to the costs of pension reform.</p></abstract>

There are important differences between all Eastern European countries regarding the implementation of pension system privatization. The differences regarding the political configuration between the countries from Eastern Europe might be a possible explanation for the amount of diversity in this area. The ideology of political parties that form or sustain the government that implements the reform can also be an explanation, but this influence must be studied beyond the cliché that stipulates that the right-wing parties will support the public pension system reform and the left-wing parties will oppose it. Armeanu (2010a) showed that there are countries where privatization was supported by the centre-left coalitions that needed to overpass a strong opposition made by the right-wing parties. Using the Ideal Point Estimation technique within the voting sessions related to pension reform during the last three Romanian legislatures, we will explain the formation of pro and against coalitions regarding the pension reform from Romania during the privatization process of public pension system. We also test the hypotheses of the model presented by Armeanu (2010a, 2010b), model that predicts the behaviour of political parties based on the position they have on a two-dimensional space related to the costs of pension reform.

The Romanian Pension System Reforms: Evidences from Legislative Roll Call Analysis

PhD Candidate in Sociology at the Babeș-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca

Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai Sociologia

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

There are important differences between all Eastern European countries regarding the implementation of pension system privatization. The differences regarding...

The Romanian Pension System Reforms: Evidences from Legislative Roll Call Analysis

Publié en ligne: 15 juil. 2016

Pages: 109 - 126

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/subbs-2016-0005

Mots clés
pension privatization, pension system reform, party system, DW-NOMINATE multidimensional scaling, Romania

© 2016 Claudiu Barbu, published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

The Romanian Pension System Reforms: Evidences from Legislative Roll Call Analysis

Publié en ligne: 15 juil. 2016

Pages: 109 - 126

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/subbs-2016-0005

Mots cléspension privatization, pension system reform, party system, DW-NOMINATE multidimensional scaling, Romania

© 2016 Claudiu Barbu, published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
pension privatization, pension system reform, party system, DW-NOMINATE multidimensional scaling, Romania