<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Hypercompetition is at the very center of modern economies. As a consequence, both states and enterprises have been heavily engaged in an amoral power game (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_eoik-2017-0007_ref_013_w2aab2b8b5b1b7b1ab1ac13Aa">Colonomos, 2005</xref>) based exclusively on strength where tax systems have a prominent role. An obscure fiscal war takes place firstly between states seeking to increase their attractiveness. On the other hand, firms fight against states to optimize their revenues. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to discuss the components and the implications of the competition between states expressed through the establishment of tax havens and the launch of merciless fiscal policies. At the same time, enterprises try to shape the existing laws in a manner that favors their interests, using also aggressive fiscal strategies.</p></abstract>

Hypercompetition is at the very center of modern economies. As a consequence, both states and enterprises have been heavily engaged in an amoral power game (Colonomos, 2005) based exclusively on strength where tax systems have a prominent role. An obscure fiscal war takes place firstly between states seeking to increase their attractiveness. On the other hand, firms fight against states to optimize their revenues. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to discuss the components and the implications of the competition between states expressed through the establishment of tax havens and the launch of merciless fiscal policies. At the same time, enterprises try to shape the existing laws in a manner that favors their interests, using also aggressive fiscal strategies.

Hypercompetition &amp; Fiscal Attractiveness

ECONOMICS

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Hypercompetition & Fiscal Attractiveness"}

Hypercompetition is at the very center of modern economies. As a consequence, both states and enterprises have been heavily engaged in an amoral power game...

Hypercompetition & Fiscal Attractiveness

Publié en ligne: 18 févr. 2017

Pages: 75 - 93

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/eoik-2017-0007

Mots clés
tax optimization, harmful competition, aggressive tax planning, transfer pricing, tax havens, lobbying, subventions, fiscal incentives, flat tax

© 2016 Jean-François Rougé et al., published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Hypercompetition & Fiscal Attractiveness

Publié en ligne: 18 févr. 2017

Pages: 75 - 93

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/eoik-2017-0007

Mots cléstax optimization, harmful competition, aggressive tax planning, transfer pricing, tax havens, lobbying, subventions, fiscal incentives, flat tax

© 2016 Jean-François Rougé et al., published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
tax optimization, harmful competition, aggressive tax planning, transfer pricing, tax havens, lobbying, subventions, fiscal incentives, flat tax