<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Owing to the problem of inescapable clashes, epistemic accounts of might-counterfactuals have recently gained traction. In a different vein, the might argument against conditional excluded middle has rendered the latter a contentious principle to incorporate into a logic for conditionals. The aim of this paper is to rescue both ontic mightcounterfactuals and conditional excluded middle from these disparate debates and show them to be compatible. I argue that the antecedent of a might-counterfactual is semantically underdetermined with respect to the counterfactual worlds it selects for evaluation. This explains how might-counterfactuals select multiple counterfactual worlds as they apparently do and why their utterance confers a weaker alethic commitment on the speaker than does that of a would-counterfactual, as well as provides an ontic solution to inescapable clashes. I briefly sketch how the semantic underdetermination and truth conditions of mightcounterfactuals are regulated by conversational context.</p></abstract>

Owing to the problem of inescapable clashes, epistemic accounts of might-counterfactuals have recently gained traction. In a different vein, the might argument against conditional excluded middle has rendered the latter a contentious principle to incorporate into a logic for conditionals. The aim of this paper is to rescue both ontic mightcounterfactuals and conditional excluded middle from these disparate debates and show them to be compatible. I argue that the antecedent of a might-counterfactual is semantically underdetermined with respect to the counterfactual worlds it selects for evaluation. This explains how might-counterfactuals select multiple counterfactual worlds as they apparently do and why their utterance confers a weaker alethic commitment on the speaker than does that of a would-counterfactual, as well as provides an ontic solution to inescapable clashes. I briefly sketch how the semantic underdetermination and truth conditions of mightcounterfactuals are regulated by conversational context.

Might-counterfactuals and the principle of conditional excluded middle

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Might-counterfactuals and the principle of conditional excluded middle"}

Owing to the problem of inescapable clashes, epistemic accounts of might-counterfactuals have recently gained traction. In a different vein, the might argument...

Might-counterfactuals and the principle of conditional excluded middle

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 127 - 149

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2011-0003

Palabras clave
Inescapable clashes, counterfactuals, Lewis-Stalnaker, possible worlds, semantic underdetermination

© 2011 Ivar Hannikainen, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Might-counterfactuals and the principle of conditional excluded middle

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 127 - 149

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2011-0003

Palabras claveInescapable clashes, counterfactuals, Lewis-Stalnaker, possible worlds, semantic underdetermination

© 2011 Ivar Hannikainen, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Palabras clave
Inescapable clashes, counterfactuals, Lewis-Stalnaker, possible worlds, semantic underdetermination