<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The paper addresses the family of questions that arose from the field of interactions between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. On the one hand, apparently partial coextensivity of research domain of phenomenology and the cognitive sciences sets the goal of their cooperation and mutual inspiration. On the other hand, there are some obstacles on the path to achieve this goal: phenomenology and the cognitive sciences have different traditions, they speak different languages, they have adopted different methodological approaches, and last but not least, their prominent exponents exhibits different styles of thinking. In order to clarify this complicated area of tensions, the paper presents the results of philosophical reflections of such topics as: 1) philosophical presuppositions and postulates of the cognitive sciences 2) abstraction of some phenomena during idealisation and the dialectical model of science's development 3) argumentation based on prediction of future development of the cognitive sciences. This finally leads to the formulation of a phenomenology-based postulate for adequate model of mind and the discussion of humanistic dimension of cognitive sciences.</p></abstract>

The paper addresses the family of questions that arose from the field of interactions between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. On the one hand, apparently partial coextensivity of research domain of phenomenology and the cognitive sciences sets the goal of their cooperation and mutual inspiration. On the other hand, there are some obstacles on the path to achieve this goal: phenomenology and the cognitive sciences have different traditions, they speak different languages, they have adopted different methodological approaches, and last but not least, their prominent exponents exhibits different styles of thinking. In order to clarify this complicated area of tensions, the paper presents the results of philosophical reflections of such topics as: 1) philosophical presuppositions and postulates of the cognitive sciences 2) abstraction of some phenomena during idealisation and the dialectical model of science's development 3) argumentation based on prediction of future development of the cognitive sciences. This finally leads to the formulation of a phenomenology-based postulate for adequate model of mind and the discussion of humanistic dimension of cognitive sciences.

Salva Phaenomenis. Phenomenological Dimension of Subjectivity in the Frame of the Reductionist Paradigm of the Cognitive Sciences

The University School of Physical Education in Krakow, Krakow, Poland

Studia Humana

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

The paper addresses the family of questions that arose from the field of interactions between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. On the one hand,...

Salva Phaenomenis. Phenomenological Dimension of Subjectivity in the Frame of the Reductionist Paradigm of the Cognitive Sciences

Publicado en línea: 24 jul 2015

Páginas: 3 - 12

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/sh-2015-0011

Palabras clave
phenomenology, the cognitive sciences, philosophical presuppositions, reductionism, naturalism, idealization, methodology, Husserl,

© Filip Kobiela

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Salva Phaenomenis. Phenomenological Dimension of Subjectivity in the Frame of the Reductionist Paradigm of the Cognitive Sciences

Publicado en línea: 24 jul 2015

Páginas: 3 - 12

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/sh-2015-0011

Palabras clavephenomenology, the cognitive sciences, philosophical presuppositions, reductionism, naturalism, idealization, methodology, Husserl,

© Filip Kobiela

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Palabras clave
phenomenology, the cognitive sciences, philosophical presuppositions, reductionism, naturalism, idealization, methodology, Husserl,