<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> Analyses of populism in East -Central Europe (ECE) necessarily depart from the general crisis of representative democracy in the EU and describe the ECE as a specifi c regional case reflecting the failure of the catch -up process. The first part of this article adopts this “classical” approach and considers the backsliding of ECE democracy alongside the rise of populist identity politics in the global context. In the second part, I turn to the historical trajectory of ECE populism as a “nested” or two -level game in the EU context of ECE developments. The third part of this article outlines the main contradictions in this process that has led to what I call the Juncker paradox. To understand this paradox, we need to return to what the Commission noted in the early 2010s as the Copenhagen dilemma: aft er the EU accession of ECE states, the EU had no means to control rule -of -law violations and, in fact, supported autocratic populist ECE regimes through European transfers. This article explains the worsening of this situation in the late 2010s as the EU polycrisis caused Juncker’s Commission to focus on Core -based priorities and marginalise rule -of -law violations in ECE. This inaction and neglect have produced a special case of negative externalities - the Juncker paradox - that has largely been counterproductive and further strengthened anti -EU populism in all ECE countries, especially Hungary and Poland. Despite this situation, I conclude that Juncker’s 2017 State of the Union address should be a turning point in the EU’s policy towards ECE; in particular, it should promote a better understanding of the regional situation and more effective enforcement of the rule of law.</abstract>

The EU polycrisis and hard populism in East -Central Europe: From the Copenhagen dilemma to the Juncker paradox

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> The recent financial crisis and the way it was handled by European Union (EU) received a great deal of media coverage, and since the media has a tendency to alter public opinion, it is safe to assume that it has affected some Europeans’ attitudes towards the EU. In order to test that assumption, a model was built around the theoretical framework of “media malaise,” and »political support«. It was found that the media certainly affected and shaped public opinion; however, study revealed that consuming media has not made people more cynical towards the EU. Based on secondary data analysis of Eurobarometer the study reveals positive relationship of media mobilization effect with European’s political attitudes and identity.</abstract>

Analyzing Malaise and Mobilization: The Effects of Media on Political Support and European Identity in Old and New Member States

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> The specificity of local elections supports the idea that there is significantly more chance of developing political identity at the local level. Given the social specificity of local elections, we propose three hypotheses with the aim of ascertaining whether (i) the greater significance of these elections, (ii) the specificity of their political programmes and/or (iii) the proximity of voters to candidates lead to a stronger sense of individual political identity. These hypotheses are verified from a comparative perspective by reference to local elections in Poland and Slovenia.</abstract>

Local Elections as a Sphere for Forming Citizens’ Political Identity

Democracy in East -Central Europe: Consolidated, Semi -Consolidated, Hybrid, Illiberal or Other?

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Politics in Central Europe

 POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE publishes original, double-blind, peer-reviewed manuscripts that provide scientific essays focusing on issues in comparative politics, policy analysis, international relations and other sub-disciplines of political science, as well as original theoretical or conceptual analyses. The essays should contribute to a broad understanding of the region of Central Europe.  The journal does not have article processing charges (APCs) nor article submission charges.  Archiving  Sciendo archives the contents of this journal in Portico - digital long-term preservation service of scholarly books, journals and collections.  Plagiarism Policy  The editorial board is participating in a growing community of Similarity Check System's users in order to ensure that the content published is original and trustworthy. Similarity Check is a medium that allows for comprehensive manuscripts screening, aimed to eliminate plagiarism and provide a high standard and quality peer-review process. 