<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Experiences of absence are common in everyday life, but have received little philosophical attention until recently, when two positions regarding the nature of such experiences surfaced in the literature. According to the Perceptual View, experiences of absence are perceptual in nature. This is denied by the Surprise-Based View, according to which experiences of absence belong together with cases of surprise. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of experience of absence—which I call <italic>frustrating absences</italic>—that has been overlooked by the Perceptual View and by the Surprise Based-View and that cannot be adequately explained by them. I offer an alternative account to deal with frustrating absences, one according to which experiencing frustrating absences is a matter of subjects having desires for something to be present frustrated by the world. Finally, I argue that there may well be different kinds of experiences of absence.</abstract>

Frustrating Absences

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In her paper “Why Suspend Judging?” Jane Friedman has argued that being agnostic about some question entails that one has an inquiring attitude towards that question. Call this the <italic>agnostic-as-inquirer thesis</italic>. I argue that the agnostic-as-inquirer thesis is implausible. Specifically, I maintain that the agnostic-as-inquirer thesis requires that we deny the existence of a kind of agent that plausibly exists; namely, one who is both agnostic about <italic>Q</italic> because they regard their available evidence as insufficient for answering <italic>Q</italic> and who decides not to inquire into <italic>Q</italic> because they believe <italic>Q</italic> to be unanswerable. I claim that it is not only possible for such an agent to exist, but that such an agent is also epistemically permissible.</abstract>

Agnosticism, Inquiry, and Unanswerable Questions

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this paper, I am concerned with what automation—widely considered to be the “future of work”—holds for the artificially intelligent agents we aim to employ. My guiding question is whether it is normatively problematic to employ artificially intelligent agents like, for example, autonomous robots as workers. The answer I propose is the following. There is nothing inherently normatively problematic about employing autonomous robots as workers. Still, we must not put them to perform just any work, if we want to avoid blame. This might not sound like much of a limitation. Interestingly, however, we can argue for this claim based on metaphysically and normatively parsimonious grounds. Namely, all I rely on when arguing for my claim is that the robots we aim to employ exhibit a kind of autonomy.</abstract>

Employing Robots

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Disputatio

Disputatio is an international journal of philosophy in the analytic tradition. It is owned by the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon and managed by the LanCog research group. The journal is a non-profit publishing venture. It is currently published by De Gruyter/Sciendo, exclusively online, as a fully open-access journal. Disputatio aims at publishing original, high-quality research articles on any aspects of analytic philosophy (broadly construed), written in either English or Portuguese.  Disputatio was founded in 1996 by João Branquinho, Fernando Ferreira, M.S. Lourenço and João Sàágua. It was published by the Portuguese Philosophical Society until 2004. Former editors include M.S. Lourenço, João Branquinho, Teresa Marques and Célia Teixeira. Since 2017, the journal has been jointly edited by Ricardo Santos and Elia Zardini.  Rejection Rate:   80%   Why subscribe and read  Disputatio aims at publishing high-quality articles on any aspects of analytic philosophy (broadly construed), written in either English or Portuguese.  Why submit  A submission accepted for publication in Disputatio should make at least one original (possibly negative) point with sufficient plausbility and rigour. Disputatio is one of the leading philosophy journals in the Romance-speaking world. It has been classified in category Q2 of the SCImago Journal Rank in 2021 and 2022 and Q1 in 2020 and 2023.  All unsolicited submissions to Disputatio are triple-blind refereed: the identity of the authors is not revealed to the referees, the identity of the referees is not revealed to the authors and the identity of the authors is not revealed to the editors.  The evaluation process has up to four stages, as follows:   Preliminary vetting by the editors.  Refereeing.  Scrutiny of submission and referees’ reports by the editors.  Decision by the editors.  The editors’ decision classifies the submission into one of the four categories: accepted, conditionally accepted, invited for resubmission after major revisions and rejected. Positive referees’ reports are not a sufficient condition for acceptance and each decision is the editors’ sole responsibility.  On average, each evaluation process as detailed above takes around four months.   Disputatio Fees and Charges  Authors who choose to submit and publish with Disputatio are not required to pay any submission or publication fees or charges   Archiving  Sciendo archives the contents of this journal in Portico - digital long-term preservation service of scholarly books, journals and collections.  Plagiarism Policy  The editorial board is participating in a growing community of Similarity Check System's users in order to ensure that the content published is original and trustworthy. Similarity Check is a medium that allows for comprehensive manuscripts screening, aimed to eliminate plagiarism and provide a high standard and quality peer-review process.  Sponsors Disputatio is currently sponsored by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (UIDP/00310/2020. 

Disputatio

Volume 11 (2019): Issue 53 (November 2019)

Frustrating Absences

Agnosticism, Inquiry, and Unanswerable Questions

Employing Robots

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