<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>According to phenomenal functionalism, whether some object or event has a given property is determined by the kinds of sensory experiences such objects or events typically cause in normal perceivers in normal viewing conditions. This paper challenges this position and, more specifically, David Chalmers’s use of it in arguing for what he calls virtual realism.</p></abstract>

According to phenomenal functionalism, whether some object or event has a given property is determined by the kinds of sensory experiences such objects or events typically cause in normal perceivers in normal viewing conditions. This paper challenges this position and, more specifically, David Chalmers’s use of it in arguing for what he calls virtual realism.

On Phenomenal Functionalism about the Properties of Virtual and Non-virtual Objects

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

According to phenomenal functionalism, whether some object or event has a given property is determined by the kinds of sensory experiences such objects or...

On Phenomenal Functionalism about the Properties of Virtual and Non-virtual Objects

Online veröffentlicht: 08. Juni 2020

Seitenbereich: 399 - 410

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0005

Schlüsselwörter
Virtual reality, virtual objects, phenomenal functionalism, secondary qualities

© 2019 Alyssa Ney, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

On Phenomenal Functionalism about the Properties of Virtual and Non-virtual Objects

Online veröffentlicht: 08. Juni 2020

Seitenbereich: 399 - 410

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0005

SchlüsselwörterVirtual reality, virtual objects, phenomenal functionalism, secondary qualities

© 2019 Alyssa Ney, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Schlüsselwörter
Virtual reality, virtual objects, phenomenal functionalism, secondary qualities