Change Blindness and Misrepresentation

Balog, Kati. 2000. Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments.” Conscious and Cognition 9(2 Pt. 1): 215-219; discussion: 231-242.10.1006/ccog.2000.0438Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Beck, Diane M., Rees, Geraint, Frith, Christopher D., and Lavie, Nilli. Nature Neuroscience 4(6): 645-650. 2001. Neural correlates of change detection and change blindness.10.1038/88477Search in Google Scholar

Berger, Jacob. 2014. Consciousness is not a property of states: a reply to Wilberg. Philosophical Psychology 27(6): 829-842.10.1080/09515089.2013.771241Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Block, Ned. 2011a. The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct. Analysis 71(3): 419-431.10.1093/analys/anr037Search in Google Scholar

Block, Ned. 2011b. Response to Rosenthal and Weisberg. Analysis 71(3): 443-448.10.1093/analys/anr036Search in Google Scholar

Busch, Niko. 2010. Objective and subjective measures of change blindness: where are the real pitfalls? Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 22(9):1903-1905.10.1162/jocn.2009.21405Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Busch, Niko, Fründ, Ingo, and Herrmann, Christoph. 2010. Electrophysiological evidence for different types of change detection and change blindness. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 22(8): 1852-1869.10.1162/jocn.2009.21294Search in Google Scholar

Carruthers, Peter. 1998. Natural theories of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 6(2): 203-222.10.1111/1468-0378.00058Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Dretske, Fred. 2004. Change blindness. Philosophical Studies 120(1-3): 1-18.10.1023/B:PHIL.0000033749.19147.88Search in Google Scholar

Gennaro, Rocco J. 1996. Consciousness and Self-consciousness: A defense of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishers.10.1075/aicr.6Search in Google Scholar

Gennaro, Rocco J. 2012. The consciousness paradox: Consciousness, concepts, and higher-order thoughts. Cambridger, MA: MIT Press.10.7551/mitpress/9780262016605.001.0001Search in Google Scholar

Grimes, John A. 1996. On the failure to detect changes in scenes across saccades. In Perception, ed. by Kathleen Akins: 89-110. New York: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Hollingworth, Andrew, and Henderson, John M. 2002. Accurate visual memory for previously attended objects in natural scenes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 28(1): 113.10.1037/0096-1523.28.1.113Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Kirkeby-Hinrup, Asger. 2014. Why the rare Charles Bonnet cases are not evidence of misrepresentation. Journal of Philosophical Research 39: 301-308.10.5840/jpr20148420Search in Google Scholar

Kozuch, Benjamin. 2014. Prefrontal lesion evidence against higher-order theories of consciousness. Philosophical Studies 167(3): 721-746.10.1007/s11098-013-0123-9Search in Google Scholar

Lamme, Victor A. F. 2003. Why visual attention and awarenes are different. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7(1): 12-18.10.1016/S1364-6613(02)00013-XOpen DOISearch in Google Scholar

Lau, Hakwan. 2007. A higher order Bayesian decision theory of consciousness. Progress in brain research 168: 35-48.10.1016/S0079-6123(07)68004-2Search in Google Scholar

Lau, Hakwan and Brown, Richard. (To Appear). The emperor’s new phenomenology? The empirical case for conscious experiences without first-order representations. In Themes from Block, ed. by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Search in Google Scholar

Lau, Hakwan, and Rosenthal, David M. 2011a. Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15(8): 365-373.10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009Search in Google Scholar

Lau, Hakwan, and Rosenthal, David M. 2011b. The higher-order view does not require consciously self-directed introspection: response to Malach. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15(11): 508-509.10.1016/j.tics.2011.09.005Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Matey, Jennifer. 2006. Two HOTs to handle: the concept of state consciousness in the higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 19(2): 151-175.10.1080/09515080600554753Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Matey, Jennifer. 2011. Reduction and the determination of phenomenal character. Philosophical Psychology 24(3): 291-316.10.1080/09515089.2011.556608Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Neander, Karen. 1998. The division of phenomenal labor: a problem for representational theories of consciousness. Nous 32(S12): 411-434.10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.18Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Rensink, Ronald A., O’Regan, J. Kevin, and Clark, James A. 1997. To see or not to see: the need for attention to perceive changes in scenes. Psychological Science 8(5): 368-373.10.1111/j.1467-9280.1997.tb00427.xOpen DOISearch in Google Scholar

Rosenthal, David M. 1997. A theory of consciousness. In The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, ed. by Ned Block, Owen Flanagan and Güven Güzeldere: 729-753. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Search in Google Scholar

Rosenthal, David M.. 2000a. Consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments. Consciousness and Cognition 9(2): 203-214.10.1006/ccog.2000.0437Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Rosenthal, David M. 2000b. Metacognition and higher-order thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition 9(2): 231-242.10.1006/ccog.2000.0441Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Rosenthal, David M. 2002a. Explaining consciousness. In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and contemporary readings, ed. by David Chalmers: 406-421. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Rosenthal, David M. 2002b. How many kinds of consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 11(4): 653-665.10.1016/S1053-8100(02)00017-XOpen DOISearch in Google Scholar

Rosenthal, David M. 2004a. Being conscious of ourselves. Monist 87(2): 159-181.10.5840/monist200487213Search in Google Scholar

Rosenthal, David M. 2004b. Varieties of higher-order theory. In Higher-order Theories of Consciousness, ed. by Rocco J. Gennaro: 19-44. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishers.10.1075/aicr.56.04rosSearch in Google Scholar

Rosenthal, David M. 2011. Exaggerated reports: reply to Block. Analysis 71(3): 431-437.10.1093/analys/anr039Search in Google Scholar

Rosenthal, David M. 2012. Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 367(1594): 1424-1438.10.1098/rstb.2011.0353Search in Google Scholar

Sebastián, Miguel Ángel. 2014. Not a HOT dream. In Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience, ed. by Richard Brown: Vol. 6, 415-432. New York: Springer Press.10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1_29Search in Google Scholar

Shepherd, Joshua. 2013. Why Block can’t stand the HOT. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20(3-4): 183-195.Search in Google Scholar

Simons, Daniel J., and Ambinder, Michael S. 2005. Change blindness: theory and consequences. Current Directions in Psychological Science 14(1): 44-48.10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00332.xOpen DOISearch in Google Scholar

Simons, Daniel J., and Rensink, R. A. 2005. Change blindness: past, present, and future. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9(1): 16-20.10.1016/j.tics.2004.11.006Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Tye, Michael. 2010. Attention, seeing, and change blindness. Nous 20(1): 410-437.10.1111/j.1533-6077.2010.00180.xSearch in Google Scholar

Van Gulick, Robert. 2004. Higher-order global states (HOGS): an alternative higher-order model. In Higher-order Theories of Consciousness, ed. by Rocco J. Gennaro: 67-93. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishers.10.1075/aicr.56.06gulSearch in Google Scholar

Weisberg, Josh. 2008. Same old, same old: the same-order representation theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor. Synthese 160(2): 161-181.10.1007/s11229-006-9106-0Search in Google Scholar

Weisberg, Josh. 2010. Misrepresenting consciousness. Philosophical Studies 154(3): 409-433.10.1007/s11098-010-9567-3Search in Google Scholar

Weisberg, Josh. 2011. Abusing the notion of what-it’s-like-ness: a response to Block. Analysis 71(3): 438-443.10.1093/analys/anr040Search in Google Scholar

Wilberg, Jonah. 2010. Consciousness and false HOTs. Philosophical Psychology 23(5): 617-638.10.1080/09515089.2010.514567Open DOISearch in Google Scholar