About this article
Published Online: Oct 14, 2019
Page range: 221 - 239
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/danb-2019-0012
Keywords
© 2019 Matej Kirn et al., published by Sciendo
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.
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Country performance rankings by indicators
| Indicators / Country | One bidder | No calls for bid | P.rate | Cop.Proc. | Award Criteria | D.speed | Missing values | Missing calls for bids | Missing reg.n. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Belgium | |||||||||
| Bulgaria | |||||||||
| Czech Republic | |||||||||
| Denmark | |||||||||
| Germany | |||||||||
| Estonia | |||||||||
| Ireland | |||||||||
| Greece | |||||||||
| Spain | |||||||||
| France | |||||||||
| Croatia | |||||||||
| Italia | |||||||||
| Cyprus | |||||||||
| Latvia | |||||||||
| Lithuania | |||||||||
| Hungary | |||||||||
| Malta | |||||||||
| Netherlands | |||||||||
| Austria | |||||||||
| Poland | |||||||||
| Portugal | |||||||||
| Romania | |||||||||
| Slovenia | |||||||||
| Slovakia | |||||||||
| Finland | |||||||||
| Sweden | |||||||||
| Great Britain | |||||||||
| Iceland | n/a | ||||||||
| Norway | n/a |
Violations of the principle of transparency at the state level
| 39 | 59 | 31 | 49 | 26 | 44 | 23 | 37 | 308 | |
| 1 | 5 | 4 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 33 | |
| 2.56 | 8.47 | 12.90 | 18 | 11.54 | 6.82 | 13.04 | 13.51 | 10.71 |
Violations of the principle of transparency, 2008–2015
| Total requests | 244 | 365 | 401 | 537 | 505 | 523 | 353 | 330 |
| Requests denied | 130 | 205 | 219 | 280 | 288 | 329 | 227 | 200 |
| Requests granted | 114 | 160 | 182 | 257 | 217 | 184 | 126 | 130 |
| Number of violations of the principle of transparency | 12 | 24 | 21 | 37 | 26 | 23 | 30 | 26 |
| % (Number of violations/Requests granted) | 10.53 | 15.00 | 11.54 | 15.18 | 11.98 | 12.50 | 23.81 | 20.00 |
Public procurement transparency indicators
| No. | Indicator | Weighting | Principle (Slovenian legislation) | Result for Slovenia | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| % | Performance level | ||||
| 1. | One Tenderer (proportion of contracts awarded where there was just one tenderer) | 3 | competition | Unsatisfactory | |
| 2. | No Calls for Tenders (proportion of procurement procedures that were negotiated with a company without a call for tenders) | 3 | transparency | 2015: 19% | Unsatisfactory |
| 3. | Publication Rate (proportion of public procurement advertised to businesses) | 3 | 2015: 5.6% | Average | |
| 4. | Cooperative Procurement (proportion of procurement procedures with more than one public buyer) | 1 | economy, effectiveness and efficiency | Unsatisfactory | |
| 5. | Award Criteria (proportion of procedures which were awarded only on the basis of lowest price) | 1 | proportionality, economy, effectiveness and efficiency | Satisfactory | |
| 6. | Decision Speed (time between the deadline for receiving offers and the award of the contract) | 1 | economy, effectiveness and efficiency | Satisfactory | |
| 7. | Missing Value (proportion of contracts awarded without sufficient information about the value) | 1/3 | transparency | 2015: 4% 2016: 19% | Satisfactory |
| 8. | Missing Calls for Tenders (proportion of contract awards for which a call for tenders took place, but it is not clear what the name of the call was or what the conditions were) | 1/3 | 2015: 4% 2016: 19% | Unsatisfactory | |
| 9. | Missing Registration Number (proportion of procedures where the registration number was not included) | 1/3 | 2015: 100% | Unsatisfactory | |
Pearson correlation test
| Mun. level | Pearson Correlation | 1 | 0.731* |
| Sig. (2-tailed) | / | 0.025 | |
| N | 9 | 9 | |
| State level | Pearson Correlation | 0.731* | 1 |
| Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.025 | / | |
| N | 9 | 9 | |
Violations of the principle of transparency at the municipal level
| 62 | 45 | 37 | 38 | 49 | 44 | 19 | 21 | 253 | |
| 5 | 6 | 4 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 43 | |
| 8.06 | 13.33 | 10.81 | 21.05 | 14.29 | 9.09 | 26.32 | 19.05 | 17.00 |
Anova
| Regression | 0.010 | 1 | 0.010 | 3.273 | 0.120 |
| Residual | 0.018 | 6 | 0.003 | / | |
| Total | 0.028 | 7 | / | ||
Coefficients
| B | Std. Error | Beta | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Constant) | −30.946 | 17.190 | / | −1.800 | 0.122 |
| year | 0.015 | 0.009 | 0.594 | 1.809 | 0.120 |
Anova state level
| Regression | 0.003 | 1 | 0.003 | 1.513 | 0.265 |
| Residual | 0.013 | 6 | 0.002 | / | |
| Total | 0.016 | 7 | / | ||
Coefficients state level
| / | / | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B | Std. Error | Beta | |||
| (Constant) | −17.709 | 14.485 | / | −1.223 | 0.267 |
| year | 0.009 | 0.007 | 0.449 | 1.230 | 0.265 |
Proving of hypothesis 3
| Municipal level | 16.999% | 58.32% |
| State level | 10.714% | 41.68% |
j.danb-2019-0012.tab.014.w2aab3b7b1b1b6b1ab1b1b4b1Aa
Summary of regression model
| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0.594 | 0.353 | 0.245 | 0.05538 |
Regression model
| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.449 | 0.201 | 0.068 | 0.04667 | |