BACKWARD INDUCTION: MERITS AND FLAWS

Basu, K. (1988). Strategic Irrationality in Extensive Games. Mathematical Social Sciences 15: 247-260. - (1990). On the Non-Existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games. International Journal of Game Theory 9: 33-44. Search in Google Scholar

Binmore, K. (1987). Modeling Rational Players, Part 1. Economics and Philosophy 3: 179-214. - Modeling Rational Players, Part 2. (1988). Economics and Philosophy 4: 9-55. 10.1017/S0266267100002893Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Bonanno, G. (1991). The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information. Economics and Philosophy 7: 31-65. Search in Google Scholar

Cournot, A. (1838). Recherches sur les principes math´ematiques de la th´eorie des richesses. Paris: Chez L. Hachette. Search in Google Scholar

Flood, M. (1952). Some experimental games. RAND memorandum. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/researchmemoranda/2008/RM789-1.pdf. Search in Google Scholar

Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole. (1991). Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Search in Google Scholar

Gardner, M. (1963). The Paradox of the Unexpected Hanging. Scientific American 3. Search in Google Scholar

Kaminski, M.M. (2009). Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection. IMBS working paper, University of California, Irvine, 09-01. Search in Google Scholar

Kaminski, M.M. and Nalepa M.A. (2014). A Model of Strategic Preemption: Why do Post-Communists Hurt Themselves? Decisions 21: 31-65. 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.21Search in Google Scholar

Kuhn, H.W. (1953). Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. In H.W. Kuhn, and A.W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games 1 (pp. 193-216). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Search in Google Scholar

Myerson, R. (1991). Game Theory. Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Search in Google Scholar

Petit, P. and Sugden, R. (1989). The Backward Induction Paradox. Economics and Philosophy 14: 95-125. Search in Google Scholar

Romer, T. and Rosenthal, H. (1978) Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo. Public Choice 33: 27-44. 10.1007/BF03187594Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Rosenthal, R.W. (1981). Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing, and the Chain-Store Paradox, Journal of Economic Theory 25: 92-100. 10.1016/0022-0531(81)90018-1Open DOISearch in Google Scholar

Schelling, T.C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press. Search in Google Scholar

Schwalbe, U. and Walker, P. (2001). Zermelo and the Early History of Game Theory. Games and Economic Behavior 34: 123-137. Search in Google Scholar

Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung Eines Oligopolmodels Mit Nachfragetr ¨agheit. Zeitschrift f¨ur die gesampte Staatswissenschaft (pp. 667-689). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG. Selten, R. (1975). Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. International Journal of Game Theory 4(1): 25-55.Search in Google Scholar

Selten, R. (1978). The Chain Store Paradox. Theory and Decision. 9: 127-159. Search in Google Scholar

Stackelberg, H.F.V. (1934). Marktform Und Gleichgewicht (Market Structure and Equilibrium). Vienna: J. Springer. Search in Google Scholar

Tucker, A. W. (1950). A two-person dilemma. Mimeographed paper, Stanford University. Published in 1980 as: On jargon: The prisoner’s dilemma. UMAP Journal 1:101. Search in Google Scholar

von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Search in Google Scholar

Zermelo, E. (1913). ¨Uber Eine Anwendung Der Mengenlehre Auf Die Theorie Des Schachspiels. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 501-504. Search in Google Scholar