The Emergence of Denmark’s Tax Treaty Network — A Historical View

The authorization was initially used to conclude tax treaties with Iceland in 1927 and Germany in 1928. Both treaties were, however, quite limited in their content and scope, which explains why the treaty with Sweden from 1932 is normally considered to be Denmark’s first genuine tax treaty (Rørdam 1953; Weizman 1994a, p. 58). The Icelandic treaty was based on citizenship and provided the citizens, who were liable to pay taxes in both countries, with the right to demand that the given income tax and capital tax would be reduced by half in both countries. In relation to double taxation of real estate and income from a business, the source state was assigned the right to tax, while the domicile state had to provide relief. Additionally, the treaty contained provisions on change of domicile during the income year and about temporary residence.

A new and more comprehensive treaty was entered into with Iceland in 1939, which was broadly identical with the tax treaties that were entered into in 1932 and 1937 with Sweden and Finland, respectively (Glistrup 1957, p. 19–24).

The fact that Denmark’s first genuine tax treaty was entered into with the neighboring country, Sweden, is not surprising when the terms of geographical connection and the substantial trade relations between the two countries are considered. Hence, a parallel can be drawn to the first international tax treaties, which neighboring countries in Central Europe concluded with each other by the end of the 1800s and the beginning of the 1900s.

See Section 2.

The tax treaty with Sweden from 1932 had quite extensive similarities with other European tax treaties from that period of time, including the agreement that was entered into in the previous year between Germany and Switzerland (Weizman 1994a, p. 58). The Danish–Swedish tax treaty only concerned direct taxes and was applicable to the citizens of the two countries, as well as Danish and Swedish legal persons. The point of departure for the allocation of taxing rights was that the income and capital could be subject to taxation only in the country where the taxpayer was resident, unless a specific deviation appeared in the relevant provision of the treaty.

An individual would be considered resident in a given state if he or she had a permanent home and domicile there. If no permanent home and domicile existed in any of the states, the taxpayer should be considered a resident in the state of habitual abode, that is, in the state where the intention was to stay not only temporarily. An individual liable to pay taxes with no permanent home/domicile, and no habitual abode, should be considered resident in the state in which he or she was a citizen. However, should doubt occur, the question should be decided through an agreement between the tax authorities, who in this situation would need to take into account in which state the tax payer had his or her closest relations (vital interests). If that did not solve the situation either, the focus would need to be on the taxpayer’s citizenship. In cases of legal persons, they would be considered resident in the state where the Board of Directors or the top management had its seat.

A number of provisions deviated from the main rule and gave the source state the right to tax certain enumerated types of income. This concerned income from real estate in the source state (country of location) and income from a permanent establishment in the source state. Moreover, the income from enterprises, where the business consisted of shipping and airline transport, could only be taxed in the state where the place of effective management was located. A specific provision dealt with diplomatic and consular representatives. Moreover, it was determined that even though the treaty with Sweden was based on the principle that only the domicile state or the source state should be able to impose taxes on a given income, the domicile state was entitled to make the tax calculations on the basis of the full income (i.e., relief after the method exemption with progression).

It is interesting to see that the first genuine Danish tax treaty contained numerous principles that, to a smaller or larger extent, are still applicable in Denmark’s current tax treaties. As an example, modern tax treaties are still founded on the initial determination of which state is the domicile state and source state and, afterwards, on the allocation of the taxing rights between the domicile state and source state. In this connection, it is also worth noting that greater importance is still attached to the economic affiliation rather than nationality/citizenship, which is a principle that can be traced back to the first international tax treaty between Prussia and Austria-Hungary. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the persistently relevant term of permanent establishment had already been given importance in Denmark’s first genuine tax treaty. The content of the previous definition even seems to be quite similar to the current definition’s content, even though it was worded in a slightly different manner. Thus, permanent establishment should be understood as a site at which a special facility was placed or where business operations took place. Moreover, a permanent establishment should not be perceived to exist simply because a subsidiary was established in another state or through the use of an independent representative.

As stated above, to some extent, the tax treaty with Sweden appears to have created a pattern followed in subsequent treaties, including the treaty with Finland from 1937 (even though it did not rely on relief after the exemption method with progression and treated a change of domicile differently) as well as the new treaties with Iceland and Germany 1939.

Denmark’s treaties with Sweden, Iceland, and Germany at the time were based on the fundamental assumption that double taxation was a situation where the taxpayer–in the same taxable period—was fully liable to tax in both countries. In contrast, the treaty with Finland was based on the more modern assumption that double taxation was a situation where the taxpayer was being liable to tax on the same income in both countries, for example, as the taxpayer was fully liable to taxin one country, and liable to limited taxation in the other country. The abovementioned fundamentals were, nevertheless, not used unaltered, and the importance of these differences became most clear when people moved between the contracting states. For more details on this issue, see Thielsen (1959) and Blume (1960).

During the Second World War, Denmark did not enter into any new tax treaties. For this reason, the treaty with Norway from 1946 was the first extension of Denmark’s treaty network for a couple of years. As such, the treaty with Norway was not particularly groundbreaking, as it, to a great extent, corresponded with the treaties concluded with the other Nordic countries before the War’s eruption.

About Denmark’s first tax treaty with Norway, see Rørdam (1959).

As a contrast, the tax treaty entered into with the United States in 1948, alongside the London-treaty from 1946, seems to have affected Denmark’s conclusion of tax treaties all the way up until the origin of the (draft) OECD Model Tax Convention from 1963 (Weizman 1994a, p. 58). Hence, in the following, a few additional comments will be made about the Danish-American tax treaty.

The treaty with the United States only concerned direct taxes and not taxes on capital. As a contrast to the previous Danish treaties, the treaty with the United States did not only cover citizens in the two treaty states but all persons who met the requirements for being liable to pay taxes in the two states. Another new creation, from the Danish perspective, was the treaty’s relief provision, which prescribed that the relief provided in the domicile state should be based on the ordinary credit method, while the previous Danish treaties hitherto had been based on the exemption method (usually with progression). This involved that the domicile state could impose tax on the entire income of the tax payer but should allow a deduction from the tax of an amount equal to the tax paid in the source state (maximized to the part of the tax, computed before the deduction was given, which was attributable, as the case may be, to the income which could be taxed in the source state). Moreover, the treaty with the United States contained a more detailed description of permanent establishments; a provision concerning the regulation of the income base; specific provisions on the allocation of taxing rights concerning dividends, interest, and royalties; provisions about income from government services and income from employment including pensions; and special rules for students and professors. Moreover, the treaty included provisions concerning non-discrimination, assistance with respect to tax collection, and exchange of information.

For more details on the tax treaty with the United States from 1946, see Rørdam (1957).

In general, the contemporary opinion seemed to be that the treaty with the United States was complicated, and especially the use of the credit relief method was criticized for being too difficult (Glistrup 1957, p. 23; Rørdam 1957; Blume 1960).

Blume, however, added that credit relief should be considered the most reasonable method.

The US treaty, alongside the adjustments which followed the treaty with the United Kingdom, appears, to some extent, to have created the foundation for many of Denmark’s new or renegotiated treaties in the subsequent years, including the treaty with Canada from 1955. However, there was also room for further development. Among other things, the treaties with the United States and the United Kingdom did not contain a genuine double-domicile clause which the subsequent treaties from that era did with the exception of the treaties with India, Japan, and Pakistan (Nielsen 1972, p. 542). As an example, the new treaties with Norway and Sweden from 1957 and 1958, respectively, included a genuine, quite modern double-domicile clause for individuals.

A new agreement was also entered into with Sweden in 1953, but this was almost similar to the first treaty entered into in 1932.

Besides the previously mentioned tax treaties, Denmark entered into or renegotiated tax treaties with the following countries in the period up until and including 1962: France (1957), the Netherlands (1957), Switzerland (1957), Japan (1959), India (1959), Pakistan (1961), Austria (1961), and Germany (1962). Hence, Denmark had—by the end of 1962—concluded 16 tax treaties and had, in addition, entered into a number of more specific agreements on reciprocal exemption from income originating from shipping and air transportation, on avoidance of double taxation of inheritance, as well as on administrative assistance in tax matters.

For an overview, see Møller (1963b, 1966). Moreover, it should be mentioned that the geographical scope of the treaties (especially with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) were expanded multiple times over the years in order to also include the colonies of these countries.

As previously mentioned, a final draft version of the OECD Model Tax Convention was published in 1963. Even though Denmark’s negotiation of tax treaties has since been based on the OECD Model Tax Convention (Loft 2000, Hansen and Bjørnholm 2002, p. 30–31), the release of the model did not fundamentally change Denmark’s negotiation practice with respect to concluding tax treaties (Weizman 1994a, p. 58). This was primarily due to the fact that the OECD Model Tax Convention was based on the London Model Tax Convention from 1946 and a series of reports that had been published continuously in the time up until 1962. Hence, these already had an effect on Denmark’s newly concluded treaties. Moreover, the OECD Model Tax Convention was, to some extent, built upon the experiences that the Member States had already made through the negotiations of their bilateral treaties.

In contrast to some other OECD countries, Denmark had not made any reservations to the OECD Model Tax Convention of 1962. This was indirectly, although firmly, criticized by Professor Thøger Nielsen in connection with a discussion of the Model’s preference for domicile state taxation, as a contrast to source state taxation (Nielsen 1972, p. 483):

The tax treaty of 1966 with Italy was the first treaty Denmark concluded with another OECD member state after the OECD Model Tax Convention of 1962 had been published. The treaty with Italy did also, to some extent, follow the Model, even though it also had deviations that reflected Denmark’s particular preferences in relation to the treatment of pensions, hydrocarbon business, and the state-owned airline company, SAS.

As stated in Section 4.5, this is also one of the areas where Denmark has made reservations to the OECD Model Tax Convention.

Altogether, Denmark entered into and renegotiated an essential amount of treaties in the period between 1963 and 1976, and as a result, Denmark had—by the end of the period—entered into more than 30 tax treaties. Some were concluded with developing countries and often contained an expanded right to tax for the source state as well as a relief provision based on the matching credit method, for example, the tax treaty concluded with Israel in 1965 (at the time, Israel was considered a developing country). Moreover, by the end of the period, Denmark entered into tax treaties with countries from the Eastern bloc, for example, the treaties with Poland and Romania from 1976.

Even though the period—from a Danish perspective— appeared to be driven by a great desire to enter into new tax treaties, Denmark was, by the end of the period, slowly becoming aware of some of the problems that the tax treaties could also result in, especially the problem of abuse of tax treaties. Hence, in 1973, a particular anti-avoidance rule was implemented in the Inventory Valuation Act.

Cf. Varelagerloven [Inventory Valuation Act] sec. 5a (Den.), Law no. 200 of June 3,1967, as amended by Law no. 202 of April 12,1973.

The increasing attention regarding the abuse of tax treaties also influenced the Danish negotiation policy. Hitherto, the choice between the use of the exemption method and the credit method had largely depended on the wishes of the other contracting party, and the majority of Denmark’s tax treaties at the time actually prescribed the use of the exemption method.

For an overview of the relief methods used in Denmark’s treaties at the time, see Nielsen (1972, p. 581–582).

In 1977, the OECD published an updated version of the Model Tax Convention with commentaries. Compared against the version from 1963, the alterations were relatively insignificant and primarily concerned the commentaries that were elaborated. The amount of reservations made by the Member States had increased, while some countries had also made observations in the commentaries (Vogel 1986). However, Denmark had neither included reservations nor inserted observations. Thus, overall, the 1977 model did not cause any notable changes to the Danish negotiation policy (Weizman 1994a, p. 62–63).

The Danish treaty network continued to grow extensively in the period, and by the end of the period, Denmark had entered into around 50 tax treaties. In this connection, it must be taken into account that Denmark’s bilateral tax treaties with Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and Finland had been replaced by one multilateral Nordic tax treaty in 1983. A preliminary attempt at a multilateral Nordic treaty was already made in 1964, where the Nordic Council recommended that theMember States should investigate the presupposed conditions for a shared, common Nordic multilateral treaty. At first, it was decided to await the works that were in progress between the EFTA Member States, where the purpose was likewise to establish a multilateral treaty. As the efforts of EFTA fell to the ground, the Nordic countries continued their work on constructing a multilateral treaty. The negotiations hereof finished in 1980, and in 1983, the representatives from the five Nordic countries signed the Nordic multilateral treaty, which then became the first of its kind (Andersson et al. 1986).

The hope was that a multilateral treaty, as a contrast to a bilateral treaty, would make it easier to solve double taxation situations that involved more than two states and would be more effective with respect to stopping treaty shopping. However, a multilateral treaty presupposes that the involved countries’ rules on tax liability and their negotiation preferences are not too dissimilar. This seemed to be the case of the Nordic countries, which meant that the multilateral treaty could be a reality. The treaty was not only mainly built on the OECD Model Tax Convention but did also contain a number of deviations. Some deviations were a result of the countries’ particular preferences, for example, Denmark’s desire to make the source state eligible to impose taxes on pensions, while other deviations were caused by the fact that a multilateral treaty requires a series of additions that could regulate situations where more than two countries were involved. The Nordic tax treaty was subject to an update in 1989, where the Faroe Island also became included as a contracting party (Rasmussen 1990).

Although Denmark still seemed keen to continuously enlarge its treaty network, the 1980s illustrated an increasing attention to the problems of abuse of the tax treaties. In 1983, the Danish Government appointed a committee with the purpose of trying to investigate the problems of the so-called exodus of taxpayers from Denmark (Skatteflugtsudvalget). The committee’s report was published in 1985 and stated—about the tax treaties—that it was still the treaties based on the exemption method which presented the greatest problems (despite the abovementioned amendment to the Valuation of Inventory Act). In this connection, the committee recommended that Denmark should continue its processes of demanding the use of the credit method when negotiating and renegotiating the tax treaties. The committee rightly anticipated that a considerable amount of time would pass by before all the exemption treaties could be changed and thus suggested that internal Danish anti-avoidance rules should be implemented, in order to hinder abuse of the treaties based on the exemption method.

Cf. Betænkning [Government Recommendation] (Den.) no. 1060, 1985, p. 124–127.

The committee also concluded that some problems of abuse were caused by the lack of Danish source taxation and the use of Denmark as the so-called stepping stone jurisdiction. Hence, the committee suggested that the scope of the rules concerning limited tax liability to Denmark should be extended to also cover royalties and possibly interest. Moreover, it was also suggested by the committee that Denmark should introduce domestic rules mitigating the possibility of obtaining a double deduction, Denmark should introduce anti-avoidance provisions and provisions on subsidiary taxing rights in Denmark’s tax treaties, and, finally, Denmark should alter some of its tax treaties concluded with low-tax jurisdictions. The committee was attentive to the fact that some of the initiatives would primarily protect other countries from losing tax revenue and also stated that Denmark ought to be “putting its own house in order”, as Denmark demanded the support of other countries in the fight against international tax avoidance and evasion.

Cf. Betenkning [Government Recommendation] (Den.) no. 1060, 1985, p. 127–135.

As will be apparent later on, some of these initiatives were subsequently introduced in domestic legislation and in Denmark’s tax treaties.

For details on the development of the domestic provisions concerning companies’ limited tax liability to Denmark, see Ferniss (2010).

In relation to the committee’s suggestions concerning the introduction of general anti-avoidance provisions and of treaty provisions entitling Denmark to subsidiary taxing rights, the results appear more meager. Thus, no tradition for introducing general anti-avoidance clauses in the Danish tax treaties arose. Moreover, it did not become common to include provisions in the Danish tax treaties, which would explicitly establish that the states could apply domestic anti-avoidance rules (Bundgaard and Schmidt 2010). However, provisions providing subsidiary taxing rights began to appear in a number of the Danish treaties (Wittendorff 2015).

In 1992, another new and revised version of the OECD Model Tax Convention with commentaries was published. The changes were, to some extent, based on the initiatives that a series of OECD reports had brought into play in the years before the publishing of the 1992 model. Only few of the alterations concerned the model convention itself. In return, multiple important alterations and additions were made in the commentaries. A couple of the alterations concerned the increasing problems with international tax avoidance and abuse of tax treaties. Additionally, the alterations also concerned, for example, permanent establishment, payments for computer software, leasing payments, employee contributions to foreign pension schemes, nondiscrimination, as well as situations on triangular taxation. Moreover, it was an innovative feature that the model with commentaries was published in a loose leaf format in order to enable continuous updating (Wittendorff 1992; Rasmussen 1992).

In connection with the update of the OECD Model Tax Convention with commentaries in 1992, Denmark had taken the opportunity to make a number of reservations to particular articles of the convention, where a deviation would have significant interest for Denmark. To a great extent, these reservations reflected how the Danish negotiation policy already was.

For more details on Denmark’s negotiation policy before the 1992 model, see Sneum (1990).

With respect to the government-owned airline company, SAS, Denmark—as well as Sweden and Norway—had made reservations in relation to article 8 on international traffic, article 13 on capital gains, article 15 on income from employment, and article 22 on taxation of capital gains. The reservations concerning articles 8, 13, and 15 should indicate that Denmark desired only to make the tax treaties cover the Danish share of an international consortium that ran the international shipping or airline businesses. The reservation for article 15 indicated that in instances where a person was resident in Denmark and would receive remuneration for work conducted on an airline run by SAS in international traffic, the remuneration should be taxed only in Denmark.

Moreover, Denmark had also—in connection with articles 10 and 13—inserted a reservation in regard to the repurchase of shares by an issuing company, as Denmark desired to treat the transfer sum as dividends rather than a capital gain. Finally, and probably most essential, Denmark had inserted a reservation concerning article 18 on pensions, as Denmark desired to allocate the right to tax to the source state. The reason was (and continuously is) that Danish taxpayers’ pension payments were deductible pursuant to domestic Danish rules. From a Danish perspective, it was, therefore, important that Denmark as source country could continue to tax the subsequent pension remunerations, as Denmark had suffered the cost of providing the deductions. Also, with respect to social pensions, Denmark desired to maintain the right to tax as source state. Here, the background was that the Danish social pensions were set at a quite high level, in order to take into account that such remunerations are taxable. Accordingly, if these social pension remunerations were only taxed in the domicile state, and the domicile state applied a low tax rate, or did not impose tax on the given type of income, it would result in a net amount of social pension remunerations which would be above the intended (Ulstrup 2001).

With the exception of the reservation to article 18 concerning pensions, all of the Danish reservations are still in place, cf. the OECD Model Tax Conventions with commentaries (2014). Denmark’s reservation to article 18 was probably terminated as a consequence of the alterations of the commentaries in 2005 that contained a number of alternatives providing more room for taxation at source. It is thus still Denmark’s strict negotiation policy to attempt to ensure that Denmark, as source state, is able to impose taxes on pension remunerations. For more details, see Wiberg (2012).

Despite the fact that Denmark, in this period, continuously extended its treaty network, Denmark also focused on renegotiating numerous tax treaties in order to hinder different kinds of tax avoidance. An example hereof was the tax treaty with Ireland, where the parties—after a number of years—reached agreement about a new treaty in 1993. The Danish desire for a new treaty was caused by the fact that Ireland, according to the Danish authorities’ treaty interpretation, had the right to tax dividends distributed from companies domiciled in Ireland to shareholders resident in Denmark. As the relief provision in the treaty was based on the exemption method with progression, the result was that dividends from Irish companies were not subject to taxation at all for shareholders resident in Denmark. Combined with the fact that Ireland only imposed a tax of 10% on some financial companies, the overall amount of taxes levied on the Danish shareholders’ investments in such companies were thus considered improperly low (Michelsen 1994).

Although the negotiations with Ireland were not at all simple, the relationship between Denmark and Portugal developed even more drastically, as Denmark chose to terminate the tax treaty with Portugal in 1995. The background was a tax planning model that utilized the fact that Denmark had to provide relief after the exemption method with respect to dividend distributions from Portuguese companies and that Portugal had implemented a very generous tax regime on the island of Madeira (Hansen 1994). Accordingly, if a Danish company took a large loan, and on-lent the amount to a subsidiary on Madeira, a situation could arise where the Danish parent company would get a deduction of the interest expenses, the company on Madeira would not be subject to taxation of its income, and the Danish parent company (according to the treaty) could bring home the income of the subsidiary as tax-exempt dividends. The termination could obviously have created some significant fiscal consequences for individuals and companies with cross-border activities between the two countries, but a solution was not found until 2000, where the countries agreed on a new treaty that, to a great extent, was equivalent to the OECD Model Tax Convention.

However, it was not only through the amendment of tax treaties that Denmark in the period made efforts to prevent abuse. Hence, the period also saw the introduction of new anti-avoidance rules in domestic law, which was added to the legislation that had already been put in place earlier, including the previously mentioned alteration of the Inventory Valuation Act of 1973 and the taxpayer exodus package of 1987. Among other things, in the beginning of the 1990s and onwards, additional anti-avoidance provisions were introduced in order to limit the deductibility on losses of foreign shares in certain situations, secure the recapture of previously deducted foreign tax losses, ensure that only expenses incurred in relation to income taxable in Denmark could be deducted, ensure that income eligible for relief was determined pursuant to a net principle,

For more information with respect to the net principle, see Bundgaard etal. (2014).

These anti-avoidance rules all had a close connection to the Danish efforts of hindering the abuse of tax treaties. However, in the meantime, Denmark also introduced numerous anti-avoidance rules that did not directly concern abuse of tax treaties but that still had a definite international scope. Prominent examples hereof were the rules on thin capitalization and CFC taxation that were introduced in 1995 and 1998, respectively.

For more information about the origin of these rules, see Tell (2012) and Schmidt (2013).

Despite the fact that there are no examples in Danish tax law of the legislator consciously passing a law that entails taxation contrary to Denmark’s obligations following from international law, the literature began to discuss whether some of the abovementioned anti-avoidance rules could potentially be contrary to Denmark’s obligations following from the tax treaties. In particular, the discussion concerned whether or not the Danish rules on exit-taxation of capital gains on shares were in line with Denmark’s obligations. The opinions expressed in the literature were opposing, and the uncertainty caused Denmark to include a provision in a number Danish tax treaties that explicitly declared that Denmark was entitled to levy exit-taxation.

About this discussion at the time of the events, see Michelsen (1996, p. 283–285).

Even though the Danish legislator’s efforts in the period, to a great extent, concerned the combating of tax avoidance and abuse, it is worth noting the alteration of the rules on companies’ limited tax liability on dividends, which was passed in 1998.

Cf. SEL2(1)(c) (Den.), as amended by the adoption of Law no. 1026 of December 23,1998.

With the tightening of the rules in 2001, Denmark was back on its previous track, and at the end of the period in 2002, Danish tax legislation contained a significant amount of anti-avoidance rules. However, Denmark’s treaty network had again been growing again, and by the end of the period, around 60 genuine tax treaties had been concluded with other countries. Moreover, several tax treaties had been renegotiated in the period.

For more details on the new and renegotiated treaties in the period between 1994 and 2002, see Rasmussen (2001).

Following 1992, the OECD had—as previously mentioned— gone over to more continuous updates of the Model Tax Convention with commentaries. The individual updates will not be discussed here, even though it is worth noting that the OECD, in the 2003 update, took a tougher stand against tax avoidance (Hilling 2016, p. 88–102). As an example, it became explicitly mentioned in the commentaries that tax treaties should also contribute to the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion.

Cf. the introduction to the OECD Model Tax Convention (2003), para. 7.

Up until today, Denmark continuously appears to be interested in renewing and expanding its treaty network, and at the time of writing of this article, Denmark has entered into genuine tax treaties with around 70 countries. In addition, Denmark has entered into numerous special agreements concerning the shipping industry and the air transportation industry, as well as an increasing amount of agreements on exchange of information.

For a recent overview, see Askholt (2017). On agreements concerning exchange of information, see Christensen and Buchholtz (2013).

Although the tendency still pointed in the direction of a stronger and more comprehensive Danish treaty network, a few obstacles appeared on the way. As an example, Denmark chose to terminate its tax treaties with France and Spain as of 2009.

Cf. law no. 85 of February 20, 2008.

Finally, it must be mentioned that, in 2013, the OECD launched a project aiming at countering base erosion and profit shifting (the BEPS project). This project will influence Danish tax law, including Denmark’s tax treaties (OECD 2013, 2014). In connection with this project, the multilateral instrument, which Denmark signed on June 7, 2017, is of particular relevance (OECD 2015). The purpose of the multilateral instrument is to enable flexible alterations in the participating countries’ tax treaties in order to avoid having to renegotiate and alter a large number of separate bilateral tax treaties. The alterations, which are covered by the instrument, will primarily address different types of abuse of the tax treaties. More precisely, the instrument consists of a number of alterations that the countries have to ratify if they want to take part (the minimum standard), alterations that the countries can make reservations to, as well as alterations that the countries can opt for. Denmark has—to a great extent—made use of the opportunity to make reservations, and thus, the Danish treaties will, at least as a starting point, only be affected by the minimum standard.

Cf. Status of List of reservations and Notifications at the Time of Signature, The Kingdom of Denmark. June 7,2017, OECD.