[[1] Initiative (in combat) = the capacity of commanders and troops to act in conditions which are not imposed by the enemy, but due to their own purposes and intentions, relative to the overall situation. It is achieved by ensuring freedom of action /.../. Cf. Lexicon militar, Chişinău, Editura Saka, 1994, p. 182.]Search in Google Scholar
[[2] Freedom of action = principle of the military art consisting in creating the conditions necessary for the friendly actions to be prepared and executed according to the plans elaborated, without being prevented by the enemy or by unexpected factors. It is obtained by acquiring and preserving strategic initiative./.../. Ibidem, p. 204.]Search in Google Scholar
[[3] Surprise = result of an action designed, organized and executed so as to have an unexpected effect on the enemy, by finding him unprepared or by making it difficult for him to take countermeasures. It is a principle of the military art whose application contributes substantially to success in warfare. Ibidem, pp. 310-311.]Search in Google Scholar
[[4] Cf. Udeanu, Gheorghe, Managementul securităţii naţionale, Sibiu, Editura Academiei Forţelor Terestre „Nicolae Bălcescu”, 2012, p. 177.]Search in Google Scholar
[[5] Gl.mr. (r) Arsenie, Valentin, col. Sîrbu, Cornel, Surprinderea în lupta armată, Bucureşti, Editura Militară, 1993, p. 15.]Search in Google Scholar
[[6] Udeanu, Gheorghe, op.cit., p. 178.]Search in Google Scholar
[[7] Ibidem.]Search in Google Scholar
[[8] However, the most controversial aspect of the air campaign was the detonation of atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The first nuclear weapons were developed within the US Manhattan Project, and the first one was thrown by plane B-29 named Enola Gay at 8:15 in the morning of August 6th. Approximately 100,000 people were killed then, and the world entered a new era of war. The dozens of bombers had needed several hours to destroy the city of Tokyo in March, compared to a few seconds and only one bomb used at Hiroshima. A second atomic bomb was dropped three days later on Nagasaki, where other 35 000 people were killed. In both cities, thousands of other people would die later because of diseases caused by radiation and many others would suffer the rest of their lives because of delayed effects. The effects of prolonged air campaign and blockade, combined with the use of nuclear bombs and with the Soviet Union’s declaration of war against Japan (August, 8) and the Japanese soldiers’ increasing despair, caused Japan’s capitulation on August 15.. Cf. Black, Jeremy, Şaptezeci de mari bătălii ale tuturor timpurilor, Bucureşti, Editura Aquila ‘93, 2006, pp. 277-278.]Search in Google Scholar
[[9] Udeanu, Gheorghe, op.cit., p. 179.]Search in Google Scholar
[[10] The war, called OperationIraqiFreedom, beganon the night of March 19, a few hours after the ultimatum issued by Bush to SaddamHussein had expired. Itwas going to bea new kind of highly effective warusinga minimum number ofsoldiersandalimited but aggressive participation at land, unlikethe comprehensive development of forces in theGulf War. The following nights, Baghdadwas hitrepeatedlywithcruise missilesandairstrikesperformed byB-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers, aimed at headquartersandoperational commandcenters. NoIraqiaircrafttook off. About 70 per cent of the ammunition used by aircraft was “smart’” missiles (precision-guided weapons), and the 30 percent normal missiles (non-guided). In 1991, there were only 10 percent of “smart” weapons. Cf. Black, Jeremy, op.cit., p. 288.]Search in Google Scholar
[[11] When conceiving the plan and establishing the standard measurement, focus only on what is appropriate! Cf. Sun Tzu II, Nobila artă a războiului, Piteşti, Editura Incitatus, 2004, p. 57.]Search in Google Scholar
[[12] Strategy has simple but merciless laws. One of the principles is concentration. The main “secret” of strategy is to concentrate a crushing force against the enemy’s most vulnerable point at the decisive moment. In order to concentrate the force, you must have it in reserve. Cf. Suvorov, Victor, Spărgătorul de gheaţă, Iaşi, EdituraPolirom, 1995, p. 18.]Search in Google Scholar
[[13] For the landing in the Malvinas Islands, the British troops executed intense fires on most beaches permitting this action. Surprisingly, the British maritime landing was successfully achieved during the night of May 20 – 21, 1982, starting with 12.15 a.m. (although friendly regulations stated that, in principle, landing begins at dawn), with a balance of forces unfavorable to actions in terrestrial environment (1 / 3), and in an area they had not done fire and where the relief was so rough and unsuitable for an offensive action from the sea that the Argentine commanding structure decided to ignore the minimum measures of safety defensive in the area (n.a.).]Search in Google Scholar
[[14] Attack the enemy’s weak parts with maximum of force! Cf. Sun Tzu, Arta războiului, Oradea, Editura Antet, 1996, p. 36.]Search in Google Scholar
[[15] The unpredictability of the ways in which a war can wage means boundless adaptability. When surprise attacks are repeated many times, they become conventional and lose their strategic value. Cf. Sun Tzu II, Nobila artă a războiului, Piteşti, Editura Incitatus, 2004, p. 29.]Search in Google Scholar
[[16] On June 5, 1967, at 07.45 a.m., Israel launched the first decisive air blitzkrieg in history, attacking dozens of airfields in Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq, destroying over 400 aircraft on the ground and losing only 26. / ... / This blow, skillfully coordinated, led to Israel winning the war in a few hours. Cf. Regan, Geoffrey, Bătălii care au schimbat istoria lumii, Bucureşti, Editura Enciclopedia RAO, 2004, pp. 212-213.]Search in Google Scholar
[[17] Udeanu, Gheorghe, op.cit., p. 182.]Search in Google Scholar
[[18] Ibidem, p. 183.]Search in Google Scholar
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