[[1] Directive No. the Council of Europe, 114 of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection. Official Journal of the European Union/75, article L375. 2 (a).]Search in Google Scholar
[[2] The conclusions of the European Council of 10/11 December 2009 on the “Stockholm Program-an open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens (2012-2014).”]Search in Google Scholar
[[3] COM (2010) 673 final. National Security Strategy of the European Union: 5 steps to a safer Europe. Goal 2: prevent terrorism and concentrating on radicalization and recruitment. Goal 5: increase resilience of Europe in crisis situations and disasters.]Search in Google Scholar
[[4] COM(2006) 786 final.]Search in Google Scholar
[[5] Directive No. 114 of the Council of Europe, December 8, 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection. Official Journal of the European Union L375/75.]Search in Google Scholar
[[6] Interdependence: “a bidirectional relationship between two infrastructures through which the state of each infrastructure is influenced by or correlated to the state of the other,” Steven M. Rinaldi, James P. Peerenboom, Terrence K. Kelly, Identifying, Understanding and Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies. IEEE Control Systems Magazine, December 2001, p. 14]Search in Google Scholar
[[7] Working document of the Commission on the Review of the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection, (EPCIP), SWD (2012) 190 final]Search in Google Scholar
[[8] In the context of operationalizing and the functioning of the Single European Sky, EUROCONTROL Agency has been appointed as the Network Manager for The European Union of Air Traffic Management (ATM). This has required the establishment of some cooperation links for consultation and decision making between all actors involved in air traffic operations (for example: national suppliers of air transport services, airspace users, airports, the competent national authorities and the armed forces, both at the level of authority on the matter, and as provider of services).An important activity of the operational network Manager is the coordination of the Management of air traffic flow with organizations throughout Europe who are in charge of the air traffic control.Within this framework, one of the tasks of the Network Manager is to provide support for crisis management network: a European Coordination Cell Crisis in Aviation (ECCCA), composed of the permanent representatives of all the shareholders of the MTA and the various institutions of the European Union, as well as focal points of the respective Member States ' structures, was previously established to mitigate the effects of potential crisis network. Its activity consists in regular meetings to simulate possible scenarios with serious consequences for aviation, and which may be declared as crisis events to network, as well as for the organization of ad hoc events with focal points in the Member States. The Network Manager, alongside with ECCCA members, can activate and disable ECCCA, by coordinating the response to the crisis management network, monitoring the implementation of the action plans and proposing procedures, where there is a plan of action.EUROCONTROL functioning as a Network Manager and of CECCA, may be the subject of a case study on a large scale, developed by DGHOME in collaboration with other interested departments, aimed at identifying good practices in the implementation of the measures regarding the prevention, security and response, leading to the formulation of risk mitigation strategies which also contribute to a more suitable protection of critical infrastructures and sectors.Its complex infrastructure, responsive to a multitude of scenarios of threats, including cyber attacks, in which the disruption of its services can have a significant impact at the level of European economy, as well as the interrelationship of its subsystems that involve cascading effects/domino-type, can also be an interesting topic for a case study.]Search in Google Scholar
[[9] Space technology-based systems introduce a wide spectrum of applications that play a fundamental role in our daily work, and are critical for key areas of the economy and facilitate our security. With the increasing reliance on services provided by using spatial technology, the capability of the space infrastructure has become essential to our society.Any interruption in the operation, even partial, of the spatial infrastructure can have significant consequences for the proper functioning of economic activities and the safety and security of citizens, and it would disrupt the provision of urgent services. This applies in particular for Galileo - the European Global Navigation Satellite System (EGNSS) - which is the first space infrastructure owned by the European Union. A major failure, whether accidental or intentional, also EGNSS infrastructure would have an impact on users but will also affect many other critical infrastructures in which EGNSS services are deeply integrated: transport, telecommunications, trade and banking activities are based on EGNSS signals for synchronization, navigations and secure transactions.Galileo, as other spatial infrastructures, is subject to specific threats to satellites and signals. EGNSS transmissions may be susceptible to a number of threats through the prism of the connections of radiofrequency interference, such as unauthorized access and misuse, jamming, spoofing and cyber attack. The Galileo system has been subject to specific security processes designed to reduce the induced risks. Additionally, one of Galileo's services, The Public Regulated Service (PRS), was specifically enacted to assist the Member States and government-authorized users, for sensitive applications which require an effective access control provided on an unlimited and uninterrupted global scale.In addition, the steady growth of the number of scrap space has become a serious threat to the resilience of space activities, including operation of constellation of Galileo satellites, of the space segment Copernicus, or national public and commercial satellites. To reduce the risk of collision it is necessary to identify and monitor satellites and space debris, cataloging positions and monitoring their trajectory, when the risk of collision was identified, to alert operators of satellites with a view to repositioning them. This activity is known as surveillance and monitoring of space (SMS) and is currently based in large part on the ground sensors, such as telescopes and cameras. Currently, there is no SMS capability at EU level: the satellite operators are dependent on data issued by US for anti-collision alerts.The Commission issued a proposal for a European support program for the surveillance and monitoring of space. The objective of the program is the provision of assistance to Member States for their cooperation and interconnection capacity in order to provide SMS alerting anti-collision services at European level.]Search in Google Scholar
[[10] As demonstrated in previous years, as a result of current outages on extended areas, a single incident affecting a significant element of the network, can affect the supply to the entire continent. Threats (produced by humans) have a similar cross-border operation, while the attackers or coordinated actions may concern the networks at regional, European or international level, in the case of cyber attacks.An interruption of the electricity supply of major dimensions occurred within the transmission network in Northern Germany, on November 4, 2006 and was felt in most parts of the continent, beyond the borders of Germany to France, Belgium, Austria, Slovenia and Spain. Even if the actions taken by energy transmission system operators (ETSO) have prevented power outage, this case is considered to be one of the most severe and major disruptions of this kind in Europe. The effects were major from the point of view of disruption in the supply of electricity at industrial and domestic level (more than 15 million households) as well, and the electricity-dependent services, such as transport, have been affected (for example: hundreds of railway transports were postponed or cancelled).Thus, it requires a coordinated mechanism of protection, involving all the operators and their sectoral branches. Risks associated to the threats described above can be adequately addressed only at the system level, bearing in mind that the integrity and the functionality of the entire system are affected. This sector (especially ENTSO-E) has already invested in CIP measures and has expressed support for a European Union approach that will integrate the requirements imposed by the rules of the internal market. The code of networks provides a legislative support for the incorporation of common methodologies of protection for European operators of electricity transport networks. The Commission can support this process, during the following years, in terms of providing CIP tools and methods.Additionally, the development towards Intelligent Networks requires enhanced synergies between the sectors of information technology and communications (ICT) and energy. More than ever, the industry and investors are worried about the prospect of cyber attacks. In this respect, the Commission has initiated actions through the Intervention Team for Intelligent Networks, in which experts from the ICT and energy sector put up a framework for evaluation of cyber security. This framework includes the evaluation of the current methodologies for a stable network, disseminating the analyses of threats and vulnerabilities related to Intelligent Networks and smart metering systems, as well as identify the best techniques for smart metering systems.]Search in Google Scholar
[[11] Physical threats (from terrorism, the boycotts and strikes), destructive natural events (earthquakes, floods, low temperatures, storms) and commercial disputes to which this network is subjected, make it vulnerable and threaten Europe's access to natural gas.A relevant example of the effects of a disturbance on the transport network natural gas pipeline is that of the Fellowship pipeline in 2009. This pipeline, which carries daily nearly 300 million cubic meters of Russian natural gas through Ukraine to Europe, began to reduce the flow rate at the beginning of January, the transport being due to be stopped completely. The disturbance had a significant impact on many Member States, especially on those which entirely depend on this supply route, leaving households without heat and causing the abandonment of production in certain industries. Gas supply was fully restored on 21 January 2009. This disturbance was the most important of its kind in Europe's recent history: for an unprecedented period of 2 weeks, Europe was deprived of 30% of natural gas imports, which equals 20% of the stock of natural gas.The need for coordination, at European level, thus becomes clear and is recognized by the Natural Gas Infrastructure of Europe (NGIE), representing the operators in this sector. NGIE has expressed support of EPCIP program and proposed the development of a common methodology for the analysis of risks/threats in Europe for natural gas infrastructures, having an approach of all the hazards. This would be consistent with the coordination implemented in natural gas by the Council regulation 994/2010, namely preparing for a national risk analysis, establishment of preventive measures and the elaboration of emergency plans based on a profound risk analysis.]Search in Google Scholar
[[12] Directive No. 114/2008 of the Council of Europe of December 8, 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection. Official Journal of the European Union L345/75.]Search in Google Scholar
[[13] European Council conclusions of June 9/10, 2011 on the development of the external dimension PEPIC.]Search in Google Scholar
[[14] Proposal for athe EFTA Council decision on the position to be adopted by the European Union within the framework of the EEA Joint Committee, on an amendment to Protocol 31 of the EEA Agreement, on cooperation in specific fields, other than the four freedoms.]Search in Google Scholar
[[15] The Joint Committee of the EEA Decision 101/2012 (identification and designation of European critical infrastructure).]Search in Google Scholar
[[16] Notifications from Norway (7/12/2012) and Iceland (4/3/2013) for the specific constitutional requirements of decision No. 101/2012-improvement of Protocol 31 of the EEA Agreement-the Council of Europe Directive No. 114/2008.]Search in Google Scholar
[[17] COM (2011) 845 final.]Search in Google Scholar
