Whether CEO Succession Via Hierarchical Jumps is Detrimental or Blessing in Disguise? Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of hierarchical jumps in the CEO’s succession on firms’ financial performance. To contemplate deeply, hierarchical jumps have been categorized into high and low level evaluating the positive impact of high-level hierarchical jump on firms’ performance. Moreover, this study has also formulated hierarchical intensity signifying the idea that despite neglecting senior board members during hierarchical jumps, still marginal increment in the firms’ growth has been observed. Using panel regression technique along with 2sls instrumental regression, this research reveals that hierarchical jumps in CEOs successions are more conducive only if the incumbent CEOs are selected irrespective of age, degree or high hierarchical position within the hierarchical ladder. Lastly, this study enunciates that firms having high total assets boost their performance via hierarchical jumps emphatically.

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