ADAPTING LEGISLATIVE AGENDA SETTINGMODELS TO PARLIAMENTARY REGIMES: EVIDENCE FROM THE POLISH PARLIAMENT

This paper draws on Cox and McCubbins’ comparison of floor and cartel agenda models and adapts it to the context of multi-party parliamentary regimes with the goal of clarifying some important differences between the legislative consequences of cohesion and discipline, on the one hand, and the effects of agenda setting, on the other. Internal party discipline and/or preference cohesion receives the bulk of emphasis in comparative studies of empirical patterns of legislative behavior, generally without considering the role of the agenda. In a series of stylized models, this paper highlights important differences between having more unified parties and/or coalitions as a result of discipline and/or cohesion and the successful use of agenda control. We show that cohesion or discipline - understood as the ability to achieve voting unity - does not produce the same patterns of legislative behavior as negative agenda control. Data on legislative voting in the Polish Sejm are used to illustrate some points.