The aim of the paper is to analyse the relationship between group characteristics and the scope of reaction of the group to socially undesirable behaviour. Sometimes small groups or communities fail to react to undesirable or violent behaviour and their apathy can have devastating consequences. Such a situation can occur among co-workers witnessing workplace mobbing, or neighbours who do not react to a suspicion of domestic violence. Reasons for their inaction are diverse and can include fear, doubts concerning the necessity of such a reaction, and also conformity. In the paper I examine a seemingly favourable situation: I assume that reaction is costless and all the members of the group would like to react (internalised norm), but they also want to conform. In order to analyse the factors that can influence the scope of group reaction, a structurally embedded sequential coordination game was played for different initial conditions. Computer simulations were conducted for networks of a specific type (Erd¨os-R´enyi random graph). The main aim of the analysis was to identify non-structural and structural features of the group that can impede or even block the intervention of the group. There is a positive relationship between the scope of group reaction and the strength of the internalized norm, whereas the level of conformity affects the chances of group intervention in a negative way. Heterogeneity of the group is an important factor - the scope of reaction is higher when members of the group have different levels of norm internalisation and conformity. There is a non-linear relationship between network density and the scope of reaction. Both low and high density can make it harder for people to act.
If the inline PDF is not rendering correctly, you can download the PDF file here.
Aronson E. Wilson T. D. & Akert R. M. 2006. Psychologia społeczna. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka.
Chwe M. S. Y. 2000. Communication and coordination in social networks. Review of Economic Studies 67(1) 1-16.
Coleman James S. 1986. Social Theory Social Research and a Theory of Action. American Journal of Sociology: 1309-1335.
Coleman J. Katz E. & Menzel H. 1957. The diffusion of an innovation among physicians. Sociometry 20(4) 253-270.
Easley David & Jon Kleinberg. 2010. Networks Crowds and Markets. Vol. 8 Cambridge University Press.
Fischer Peter JoachimI. Krueger Tobias Greitemeyer Claudia Vogrincic Andreas Kastenmüller Dieter Frey Moritz Heene Magdalena Wicher and Martina Kainbacher. 2011. “The Bystander-Effect: A Meta-Analytic Review on Bystander Intervention in Dangerous and Non-Dangerous Emergencies. Psychological Bulletin 137 (4): 517-537.
Granovetter M. & Soong R. 1983. Treshold models of diffusion and collective behavior. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 9 165-179.
Haman Jacek. 2014. Gry wokoł nas. Socjolog i teoria gier. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
Jackson Matthew O. 2008. Social and Economic Networks Princeton University Press.
Kärnä Annti Marinus Voeten Elisa Poskiparta & Christina Salmivalli. 2010. Vulnerable Children in Varying Classroom Contexts: Bystanders’ Behaviors Moderate the Effects of Risk Factors on Victimization. “Merrill-Palmer Quarterly” 56 (3): 261-282.
Komendant-Brodowska Agata. 2009. Grzech zaniechania. Świadkowie przemocy szkolnej w perspektywie teorii gier. “Decyzje” 11: 5-47.
Komendant-Brodowska Agata. 2013.Między głosem sumienia a więzami przyjaźni. Zachowanie świadkow dręczenia (bullying) a struktura klasy szkolnej. Decyzje nr 20/2013 s. 67-104.
Komendant-Brodowska Agata. 2014a. Świadkowie przemocy na strukturalnym polu minowym. Analiza zależności między strukturą grupy a zakresem reakcji na agresję. Decyzje nr 2/2014.
Komendant-Brodowska Agata. 2014b. Grupowe uwarunkowania przemocy szkolnej. Doctoral thesis available at the University of Warsaw. https://depotuw.ceon.pl/handle/item/749
Lelarge M. 2012. Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks. Games and Economic Behavior 75(2) 752-775.
Olweus Dan. 1993. Bullying at School: What we Know and what we can Do. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Palfrey T. R. & Rosenthal H. 1984. Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: A strategic analysis. Journal of Public Economics 24(2) 171-193.
Rogers E. M. (2010). Diffusion of Innovations. New York: The Free Press Simon and Shuster.
Ryan B. & Gross N. C. 1950. Acceptance and diffusion of hybrid corn seed in two Iowa communities. Agricultural Experiment Station Iowa State College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts.