Linguistic Criteria of Intentionality

Tadeusz Ciecierski 1
  • 1 Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to discuss theories that attempt to single out the class of intentional states by appealing to factors that are supposedly criterial for intentional sentences. The papers starts with distinguishing two issues that arise when one thinks about intentional expressions: the Taxonomy Problem and the Fundamental Demarcation Problem. The former concerns the relation between the classes of distinct intentional verbs and distinct intentional states. The latter concerns the question about how to distinguish intentional states and acts from the non-intentional ones. Next, the general desiderata for theories providing criteria for singling out the class of intentional sentences are introduced. Finally, distinct proposals for providing such criteria are analyzed. Author argues that neither is satisfactory.

If the inline PDF is not rendering correctly, you can download the PDF file here.

  • Ajdukiewicz K. (1967). Intensional Expressions. Studia Logica, 20, 63–86.

  • Brogaard B. (2007). Span Operators. Analysis, 67(1), 72–79.

  • Brown S. C. (1964–65). Intentionality without Grammar. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 65, 123–146.

  • Carnap R. (1947). Meaning and Necessity. University of Chicago Press.

  • Chalmers D. (2011). Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account. Nous 45(4), 595–639.

  • Chisholm R. C. (1955–56). Sentences about Believing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series, 56, 125–148.

  • Chisholm R. (1957). Perceiving. Ithaka.

  • Chisholm R. (1986). Bibliography. In R. J. Bogdan (ed.) Roderick M. Chisholm (pp. 219–233). D. Reidel Publishing Company, Springer.

  • Church A. (1954). Intensional Isomorphism and Identity of Belief. Philosophical Studies, 5(5), 65–73.

  • Dąbrowski A. (2013). Intencjonalność i semantyka [Intentionality and Semantics]. Universitas.

  • Dennett D.C. (1969). Content and Consciousness. Routledge.

  • Dennett D.C. (1989)a. Evolution, Error, and Intentionality. In D. C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance pp. 287–321). The MIT Press.

  • Dennett D.C. (1989)b. Making Sense of Ourselves. In D. C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (pp. 83–101). The MIT Press.

  • Fodor J. (1987). Psychosemantics. The MIT Press.

  • Foxall G. R. (2007). Intentional Behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 1–55.

  • Hocutt M. O. (1972). Is Epistemic Logic Possible?. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 13(4), 433–453.

  • Kenny A. (2003). Action, Emotion and Will. 2nd edition, Routledge (first edition: 1963).

  • Kim J. (2003). Chisholm’s Legacy on Intentionality. Metaphilosophy, 34(5), 649–662.

  • Łukasiewicz J. (1910). O zasadzie sprzeczności u Arystotelesa, Studium krytyczne. [On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle. A Critical Study.] Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności.

  • Marras A. (1968) Intentionality and Cognitive Sentences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 29(2), 257–263.

  • Matthews R.J. (2007). The Measure of Mind. Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution. Oxford University Press.

  • Marcus R.B. (1993). Modalities. Oxford University Press.

  • Morick H. (1971). Intentionality, Intensionality and the Psychological. Analysis, 32(2), 39–44.

  • Olafson F. (1975). Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality in Contemporary Perspective. Nous, 9(1), 73–83.

  • Prior A.N. (1968). Intentionality and Intensionality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 42, 92–106.

  • Putnam H. (1975). The Meaning of Meaning. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7, 131–193.

  • Salmon W., Soames S. (1988). Introduction, In N. Salmon & S. Soames (Eds.), Propositions and Attitudes (pp. 1–6). Oxford University Press.

  • Searle J. (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge University Press.

  • Sendłak M. (2016). Alternative Frameworks and Counterpossibles. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 93, 24–41.

  • Stalnaker R.C. (1984). Inquiry. The MIT Press.

  • Stich S. (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. MIT Press.

  • Tałasiewicz M. (2010). Philosophy of Syntax. Springer Netherlands.

  • Vendler Z. (1972). Res Cogitans. Cornell University Press.

  • Yoder J. L. (1987). Chisholm’s Criteria of Intentionality. Philosophia 17, 297–305.

OPEN ACCESS

Journal + Issues

Search