Justification and Argumentation

Krzysztof Szymanek 1
  • 1 University of Silesia


In her paper “Argumentation theory and the conception of epistemic justification”, Lilian Bermejo-Luque presents a critique of deductivism in argumentation theory, as well as her own concept of epistemic justification inspired by the views of Stephen Toulmin. Reading this paper induced me to reflect on the mutual relation between the notions of justification and argumentation. In this work I would like to first draw the reader’s attention to a few issues which seem debatable to me, or which I find worth presenting from a slightly different point of view than that of Lilian Bermejo-Luque. I agree that deductivism is not suitable for a general theory of evaluation of arguments although the critique of deductivism presented by the Author appears as not fully adequate to me. Then I proceed to presenting my doubts about the “conception of justification as a proper outcome of good argumentation” presented in the work. I need to emphasise that due to a broad range of topics addressed by me in this short paper, the description of some of them will be neither fully precise nor exhaustive.

If the inline PDF is not rendering correctly, you can download the PDF file here.

  • Govier, T. (1987). Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. Dordrecht: Foris Publications.

  • Govier, T. (1999). What is a Good Argument? In T. Govier, The Philosophy of Argument (pp. 107-122). Newport News, Virginia: Vale Press.

  • Govier, T. (2010). A Practical Study of Argument. Boston, MA: Wadsworth, Cen- gage Learning.

  • Hitchcock, D. (1999). The Thomas-Nolt Dispute: Some Lessons about Induction. Informal Logic, 19(2), 201-212.

  • Kyburg, H. (1961). Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Middletown: Wes- leyan University Press.

  • Lambert K., & Ulrich W. (1980). The Nature of Argument. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.


Journal + Issues