Published Online: Apr 12, 2014
Page range: 161 - 170
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/slgr-2014-0008
Keywords
© Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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In this paper I will consider several interpretations of the fallacy of secundum quid as it is given by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations and argue that they do not work, one reason for which is that they all imply that the fallacy depends on language and thus fail to explain why Aristotle lists this fallacy among the fallacies not depending on language (extra dictione), amounting often to a claim that Aristotle miscategorises this fallacy. I will argue for a reading that preserves Aristotle’s categorization by a quite different account of how qualifications function.