Transparency in Lobbying as Perceived by Organisational Representatives in the Czech Republic

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This paper focuses on transparency in lobbying as perceived by in sample organisations in the Czech Republic. The paper’s aim is to study how lobbying and its impact on decision-making practices are perceived by organisational representatives and to empirically assess the perceived transparency of lobbying with a view to the potential introduction of lobbying regulations and their role in Czech democracy. Data for the study was gathered from a sample of business institutions in the Czech Republic. In total, 73 organisations/institutions took part in the survey. One respondent was questioned per organisation/institution. 90 % of respondents perceive that transparent and regulated lobbying has a positive impact on democracy. Moreover, according to the respondents, lobbying facilitates more competent decision-making among politicians, brings more information into the decision-making process and makes the process more efficient. There has been a significant shift in the perception of lobbying over the past ten years in the Czech Republic. Regulations aimed at legitimizing lobbying are seen as having a positive impact on democracy.

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