From English to First-Price Sealed Bid: An Empirical Assessment of the Change in Auction Type on Experienced Bidders

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Abstract

This paper estimate the differential impact of first-price sealed-bid (first-price) auctions relative to English auctions on auction revenue. While there is a theoretical literature on the potential outcomes of first-price relative to English auction, there is a paucity of articles that empirically estimate this relationship. The answer to this question is important not only to economists but also those designing auction for practical application. Using a unique dataset from tax lien auctions in Illinois, I empirically test the effect of a switch in auction type from English to first-price. I find auction revenue is greatly increased, by as much as 22 percent, under the first-price auction. The results are supported by a within county difference-in-difference model specification and are robust when restricting the sample across various specifications

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Review of Economic Perspectives

Národohospodárský obzor; The Journal of Masaryk University

Journal Information


CiteScore 2016: 0.50

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.262
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.516

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