This article focuses on problematic issues of the Maastricht criteria. The possible effect of attempt to meets the criteria is confronted with its intended purpose. Each criterion is analysed generally by pointing out problematic issues, subsequently, fulfilment by Eurozone members and risks for the Czech Republic, too, are shortly analysed. It is shown that in many cases fulfilling criteria can lead to a different development than was initially intended. The analysis reveals that attempts to meet the criteria can lead to divergence from Eurozone, can cause several economic problems and can bring pain with no gain.
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