Considering Dispositional Moral Realism

Prabhpal Singh 1
  • 1 University of Waterloo,

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to consider a series of arguments against Dispositional Moral Realism and argue that these objections are unsuccessful. I will consider arguments that try to either establish a dis-analogy between moral properties and secondary qualities or try to show that a dispositional account of moral properties fails to account for what a defensible species of moral realism must account for. I also consider criticisms from , who argues that there could not be a corresponding perceptual faculty for moral properties, and , who argues that Dispositional Moral Realism does not most plausibly explain the difference between moral disagreements and disagreements of mere preference. Finally, I examine a novel criticism concerning the relationship between the diverse variety of moral properties and the range of our normative affective attitudes, arguing that the view has no problem accounting for this diversity.

If the inline PDF is not rendering correctly, you can download the PDF file here.

  • Blackburn, Simon. 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Brower, Bruce. W. 1993. “Dispositional Ethical Realism.” Ethics 103 (2): 221-249.

  • Cuneo, Terence. 2007. The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Darwall, Stephen. 2018. “Ethics and Morality.” In The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett, 552-567. New York, NY: Routledge.

  • DeLapp, Kevin Michael. 2009. “The Merits of Dispositional Moral Realism.” Journal of Value Inquiry 43: 1-18.

  • Enoch, David. 2011. Taking Morality Seriously. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Johnston, Mark. 1989. “Dispositional Theories of Value.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 89-174.

  • Mackie, J.L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin Books.

  • McDowell, John. 1998. Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

  • Schafer-Landau, Russ. 2003. Moral Realism: A Defense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Strawson, Peter. 1962. “Freedom and Resentment.” In Proceedings of the British Academy, edited by Gary Watson, Vol. 48, 1-25. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Taylor, Charles. 2003. “Ethics and Ontology.” Journal of Philosophy 100 (3): 305-320.

  • van Roojen, Mark. 2015. Metaethics: A Contemporary Introduction. New York, NY: Routledge.

OPEN ACCESS

Journal + Issues

Search