Classical and modern concepts of corporate governance (Stewardship Theory and Agency Theory)

Beata Glinkowska Ph.D. 1  and Prof. Bogusław Kaczmarek 2
  • 1 University of Lodz, Department of Management
  • 2 University of Lodz, Department of Management


The main issues in efficiency of a company as an organisation are relations between the Supervisory Board and the Management Board of a company, and the methods of functioning of Supervisory Boards in governance systems of a company.

The classical and modern approach to the role, place, and importance of corporate governance presented in this article, is yet another prompt to continue searching for the optimum in the organisational, economical, and social meaning.

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  • 1. Daily C.M., Dalton, D.R. (1994), Corporate governance and the bankrupt firm, “Strategic Management Journal” Vol. 15, No. 8.

  • 2. Grundei J. (2008), Are managers agents or stewards of their principals? Logic, critique reconciliation of two conflicting theories of corporate governance, “Journal für Betriebswirtschaft” Vol. 58, Issue 3.

  • 3. Gutenberg E. (1980), Funktionswandel des Aufsichttrafs, “Zeitschrift fun Betreibwirtschaft, Dezember.

  • 4. Jeżak J. (2010), Rada nadzorcza a sytuacja kryzysowa w spółce [in:] Nadzór korporacyjny w warunkach kryzysu gospodarczego, Urbanek P. (ed.), Lodz University Press.

  • 5. Urbanek P. (2005), Nadzór korporacyjny a wynagrodzenie menedżerów, Lodz University Press.


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