Knowledge in Context: The Factivity Principle and Its Epistemological Consequences

Stefano Leardi 1  and Nicla Vassallo 2
  • 1 Northwestern Italian Philosophy Consortium, University of Genova, Italy
  • 2 Dafist, School of Humanities, University of Genova, Italy

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