In spite of the relevance of a scientific representation of the world for naturalism, it is surprising that philosophy of science is less involved in the debate on naturalism than expected. Had the viewpoint of philosophy of science been duly considered, naturalism could not have overlooked the established lesson, according to which there is no well-defined recipe for what science must or must not be. In the present paper I address some implications of this lesson for (some forms of) naturalism, arguing that a radically naturalistic outlook fails to pay sufficient attention to some of the main lessons that philosophy of science has taught us concerning the nature of scientific theories. One of these lessons is that real scientific theories are far more normative than ordinary scientific naturalism is ready to accept, a circumstance that at a minimum is bound to force most naturalization strategies to re-define their significance.
If the inline PDF is not rendering correctly, you can download the PDF file here.
Almeder R. 1998, Harmless Naturalism. The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy, Open Court, Chicago & La Salle, Ilinois.
Andler D. 2009, “Is naturalism the unsurpassable philosophy for the sciences of man in the 21st century?”, in Stadler, F., Hartmann, S., Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W.J., Uebel, T., Weber, M. (eds.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science, Springer, Berlin, pp. 283-304.
Armstrong D. 1981, The Nature of the Mind and Other Essays, Cornell University Press, Ithaca N.Y.
Armstrong D. 1983, What is a Law of Nature?, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Bird A. 2005, “Naturalizing Kuhn”, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105, pp. 109–27.
Bogen J. Woodward J. 1988, “Saving Phenomena”, The Philosophical Review 97, pp. 303-352.
Bonjour L. 2006, “Kornblith on knowledge and epistemology”, in Philosophical Studies 127, pp. 317-335.
Braddon-Mitchell D., Nola R. (eds.) 2009, Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Chandrasekharan, S. & Nersessian, N.J. 2015, “Building cognition: the construction of computational representations for scientific discovery” Cognitive Science 39, pp.1727-1763.
De Caro M., Macarthur D. (eds.), 2004, Naturalism in Question, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.
De Caro M., Macarthur D. (eds.), 2010, Naturalism and Normativity, Columbia University Press, New York.
Doppelt G. 1990, “The Naturalist Conception of Methodological Standards in Science: a Critique”, in Philosophy of Science 57, pp. 1-19.
Dürr D., Goldstein S., Zanghì N. 2013, Quantum Physics without Quantum Philosophy, Berlin, Springer.
Freedman K. 1999, “Laudan’s naturalistic axiology”, in Philosophy of Science 66 (Proceedings), pp. S526-S537.
Fuchs C.A., Peres A.2000, “Quantum theory needs no ‘interpretation’ “, Physics Today, March issue, pp. 71-72.
Giere R., 1999: Science without Laws, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Guillermin M., Dedeurwaerdere T. 2013, “Disagreement, Bell’s Inequalities and Realism: The Role of Epistemic Values in Contemporary Approaches to Quantum Mechanics”, paper available at Social Science Research Network: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2284104.
Heisenberg W. 1971, Physics and Beyond, Harper, New York.
Peierls R. 1986, in P.C.W.Davies, J.R. Brown (eds.), The Ghost in the Atom, Cambridge University Press, pp. 70-82.
Quine W.V.O. 1969, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, New York.
Quine W.V.O. 1986, Reply to Morton White, in L. Hahn, P. Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W.V.O. Quine, The Library of Living Philosophers, Open Court, La Salle.
Radder H. 2009, “Why Technologies are Inherently Normative”, in D. Gabbay, P. Thagard, J. Woods (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9 (ed. by A. Meijers): Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences, Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 887-921.
Ramstead M.J.D 2015, “Naturalizing what? Varieties of naturalism and transcendental phenomenology”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14, pp. 929-971.