I do not think for a long time before now that […] solidarity is something the broad public identifies with automatically. Antipathy to solidarity prevails among the people, especially when it costs some money; and it certainly does. We should be ready to face emergence of surprising displays of displeasure in this respect, which we will be ashamed of.
The Czech Republic definitely does not belong to the group of countries targeted the most by the recent wave of migrants/refugees from Middle Eastern and African countries suffering from long-term civil wars and other military conflicts. The Czech Republic does not even serve as an important transit country for the migrants seeking to get into Germany via the Balkans or other ways. According to the official public census, the number of Czech citizens of Islam religion even declined in 2001–11. In 2001, 3,699 respondents declared as belonging to Islam, while the number of believers sunk to 1,921 in 2011 (Czech Statistical Office [CZSO] 2016). One finds similar low numbers when one looks at the number of asylum seekers and those granted asylum in the Czech Republic. As Table 1 shows, the number of people granted asylum actually sunk in the period 2004–13 and it did not increase much ever since.
Asylum seekers in the Czech Republic, 2004–15
We can hardly call these data dramatic. Moreover, in the entire period in question, the highest number of successful asylum seekers were the citizens of Ukraine, Russia, or Vietnam (CZSO 2015, 11), countries with a long-term tradition of working migration to the Czech Republic. Taken from any point of view, one cannot rationally expect that the migrant crisis would grow to become one of the most prominent issues of Czech politics and party politics, reaching far behind the European Union (EU)-related dimension of the crisis.
Public opinion surveys nevertheless show deeper concerns of Czech citizens, with these issues typically leading to more hostile, or at least mistrustful, attitudes toward foreigners in general and (Moslem) migrants in particular. A survey of the academic research institute Public Opinion Research Centre (CVVM) shows that in March 2016, 40% of respondents claimed that too many foreigners live in the Czech Republic, while 51% claimed that the number of foreigners in the Czech Republic was “adequate”. Only 2% of the respondents claimed that there are too few foreigners in the country, and 8% “did not know” (Čadová 2016, 2). Looking at it from a longitudinal perspective, the data show a clear time correlation between decreasing willingness of Czech citizens for the permanent settlement of foreigners and solving the migration crisis, as Graph 1 shows.
According to the survey from May 2016, 61% of respondents were against the country accepting any refugees on its territory. This figure never dropped to <50% since September 2015 when this question was asked for the first time, and there is a clear trend of growth of the share of respondents who do not accept any refugees (Buchtík and Pilecká 2016, 2). In May 2016, 92% of respondents saw the immigration as a security threat to the Czech Republic, and this percentage remains on the same level since autumn 2015 (Buchtík and Pilecká 2016, 5). Securitization is the main trend in depicting the migrants in the media as well (Břešťan 2016; Tkaczyk et al. 2016). The Moslems, mainly ignored in the political debates of the 1990s, have been exposed to a steadily growing anti-Islam discourse after 2001, which stresses that they are strangers dangerous for the allegedly “ethnically homogeneous” Czech society (Topinka 2015, 31–34). Public opinion demonstrates a constantly high level of distance of the Czechs in regard to the Moslems (Topinka 2016a, 242), coupled with feelings of risk, danger, and threat. Increasing number of refugees in 2015 led temporally to the increasing coverage of issues related to migrants or Islam by the Czech media. The tenor of the news was negative, and the media used the concept of “othering” of the migrants (Burešová and Sedláková 2016).
It is therefore not surprising that the anti-Islam and antimigrant rhetoric is used by extremist politicians and their parties. This is a phenomenon typical for use in the toolbox of recent far-right parties in both Western and Central Europe (Fennema 1997; Brug and Fennema 2003). Moreover, most of the mainstream Czech parties and other important political actors, such as President of the Czech Republic Miloš Zeman, are more or less fiercely using the antimigrant card as well. In the same vein as in a case of “anti-Semitism without Jews” (Lendvai 1971), the majority of the Czech politicians opted apparently for populist rhetoric instead of an analysis of real challenges, risks, as well as the moral and international obligations stemming from the Czech Republic’s membership in the EU.
The Czech case can be placed within the context of the growing scholarly literature on migration and extremism in Europe as such. Wodak (2015) has comprehensively covered and analyzed the extreme right-wing populist discourse accepted by European extreme right-wing parties as legitimate forces within the mainstream political system. We identify similar central recurring concepts associated with anti-Islam politics, which – in the case of the Czech Republic – has insinuated into the vocabulary of mainstream political parties and official authorities without real experience. This is, as Wodak emphasizes, triggered by a strategy of provocation and calculated ambivalence in the rhetoric of populist subjects. Anderson (2015) explores the distinction between migrants and citizens in the case of UK migration, as well as citizen’s policies, through the use of the concept of community values. The ethnographic approach brings an interesting perspective on the immigration policy, as a system to control the mobility of the global poor, when comparing the vagrancy system to the link between modern nation-states and their citizens (Anderson 2015, 6–29). Similarly, Hampshire (2013) sums up the situation of the nation-states. The numerous common features shared by a rather large number of rich liberal democracies lead him to conclude that the intractable nature of immigration policy is a reflection of the contradictory imperative of the state. Furthermore, he suggests that normative as well as practical reasons of the legally protected principles of migration and asylum, as well as the successfully communicated business needs of a labor force, account for not translating negative public opinion on immigration into an equally restrictive policy. For our article, it is important to mention his validation of the gap between political rhetoric and the everyday reality of accommodating diversity in liberal society. This real experience is, however, not transmittable to the environment, where there are only a very limited number of Muslim immigrants (Hampshire 2013, 153).
Looking at the existing Czech literature covering the topics of Moslems and their treatment in the Czech Republic, there is a clear lacuna in scholarship when it comes to the stances of the main political actors toward Moslems in general and Moslem refugees in particular. There is a growing Czech scholarly literature dealing with Islam in general (refer Mendel et al. 2007, 445–457, for a comprehensive survey of the literature in Czech published until 2007), as well as Moslems living in the Czech Republic. Mendel et al. (2007) have been focusing mainly on the history of Islam in the territory of the Czech Lands and the general coverage of Moslems in the media, in books printed in Czech, and in Internet outlets (including anti-Moslem Webs). The anthology edited by Karel Černý (2015) has dealt with the integration of Moslems, as well as the relationship between Moslems and the Czech majority, and placed the Czech case within the broader (Western) European context. Yet, the book does not shed any new light on the position of the main political parties in the country vis-à-vis the Moslems. A collective volume edited by Daniel Topinka (2016b) has presented the newest and the most complex account on the Moslem population in the Czech Republic. The book is a complex study of the Moslem community, showing its internal diversity as well as diverse working and living careers, along with the rather individualized and privatized concepts of religion and religious practices. The book is a compulsory reading for everybody who wants to understand the issues salient for Moslems living in the Czech Republic, including how the community is discriminated against by the majority population. However, its impact on our research is mainly indirect, since the authors of this edited volume do not cover Czech political parties, and their research is based on data collected mainly before the refugee wave of 2015. The only book studying the way in which the Czech political actors deal with the Moslem and migration issues (Mareš 2015) pays attention to the extremist parties on the fringes of the Czech party system only. Apart from this, we have only a brief study on the perception of migrants by the Czech local politicians (Janků and Linhartová 2016). There is apparently a gap to be filled.
The main research question we pose is thus the following: how do the politicians use the anti-immigrant and anti-Moslem rhetoric in a country with only a couple of thousands Moslems and practically no migrants of the recent refugee wave? The focus of this paper will be on the “supply side” – the cognitive frames constructed by the main political actors – in order to simplify the complex reality and to offer an ontological and epistemic point of departure to the voters.
In order to answer this question, we organized the paper in the following manner. First, we provide a brief introduction into the concept of cognitive frames in order to delimit the scope and methods of research and to operationalize the research question. The ensuing section presents the sources of data for research and the method of elaboration of the data. Subsequently, the data are analyzed and the cognitive frames provided by particular political actors are compared in order to obtain a complex picture of the recent Czech political debate and the prevailing method of framing of migration-related issues. The discussion, including a debate on the potential political consequences of our findings, follows, and the concluding part sums up our findings.
Concept of Cognitive Frames
Social facts, such as ethnicity and religion, in ordinary times, constitute only one of the several layers of identity that influence everyday life. Constructivism considers the real world, including values ascribed to social facts, to be a result of social creation. This system of constructions is reconstructed through a constitutive relationship among the discourse, everyday practice, and structure. Hence, there is not a statement concerning reality but only our constructed views on its character (Hendl 2005, 91).
Group identity is often treated as a natural entity outside the range of individual influence. While it is still a culturally based construction, the consequences of these conclusions are tremendous. The mythical naturalization of these products is often considered an objective and unalterable factor (Barša 2008, 22).
Especially, political identity is not primordial and static but conditional and continuously changing, and thus, the generally accepted perspective is amenable to be influenced and used by political mobilization (Linz and Stepan 1996, 366). A constructivist view of ethnicity provides a unique opportunity to obtain insights and examine how cognitive frames are using the concepts of nationality and ethnicity, more specifically, how these social facts are constructed and eroded in response to mass media and the process of political securitization (Obershall 2000, 983).
The concept of cognitive frame is a tool that helps to make sense of the world. As introduced by Goffman, the meaning of frames has implicit cultural roots but it is regarded as primary and taken for granted by users. Individuals are capable users of this social frame, irrespective of whether they are aware of them or not (Goffman 1974). Cognitive structures held in memory are used to read and interpret situations. Thus, frames guide the understanding of complex phenomena by placing them within the multifaceted picture. While connecting some aspects and discounting others, one is sorting phenomena (Kaufman et al. 2016). Frames are built upon the underlying structure of beliefs, values, and experience and often exist prior to the conscious processing of information for decision-making. By affecting decisions and the understanding of the world, cognitive frames can significantly affect how conflict is perceived (Kaufman and Smith 1999).
Framing may be used also as a term to describe how issues are represented in media because language activates cognitive frames, and frame analysis is conducted using a variety of sources and the distinguishing content and language attributes of those texts, which can be manipulated to augment public beliefs and their perceptions regarding these texts (Goffman 1974). Based on Lakoff’s (2014) perspective, these rhetorical frames play a key role in persuading a political audience. Reframing is a social change and influences how the public sees the world. Language is used to activate the change of the frame.
Fear of being dominated by another group, fear of being assimilated, or fear of not being able to integrate newcomers is the emotion that poisons interethnic relationships before it is possible to build one. Fears for property and life turn into hate. Very powerful tools in the dissemination of fear of “others” is the demonization and dehumanization of their characters by media, popular culture, and social media, which all may be used to gain political support. To deal with illegitimate fears, it is necessary to build effective communication to recall the general value system, repeat the truths that reveal what is right about those values, and act with courage to promote the sense of confidence and hope that allow the truth to be meaningful and powerful. Within such a context, one can honestly and openly discuss the facts that undermine such fears, so that the illegitimate fears do not even get established (Lakoff 2014).
In case the communication fails to address fears arising from the status of migration policy, interethnic relations can be perceived to throw two different crises frames instead of a normal frame. People already have both frames in their minds; they are anchored in private and family experiences, in culture, and in public life. These aspects also create transposed experiences and information, which are presented publicly without the chance or will to be verified (Obershall 2000, 989). During peaceful times, the normal frame prevails. The interethnic relations are seen as cooperative and modest. These relations may face various problems; however, the existence or arrival of members of different ethnic or national groups is neither considered nor pictured as a threat to security. When groups of inhabitants begin to fear for their safety, it becomes dangerous and difficult to resolve strategic dilemmas (Lake and Rotschild 1996, 41). The crisis frame is activated by only one prevailing perspective. Selective representation of an aspect, preferred presentation of events with negative consequences, stereotyping of immigrants, and naturalization of their identity with implicated negative characteristics, together with the appearance of two antagonist sides “ours” and “their”, create the feeling that threatens the domestic nation as a whole (Dijk 2000).
The generally accepted view of immigrants is based on fear, which is built among the public through exaggerations and fabrications that fit the crisis frame. Mass communication and propaganda research help to explain why the use of ethnic insecurity and manipulation is successful for the crisis frame to eclipse the normal frame. Fear arouses appeals, originating in threats that are powerful and very effective in changing opinion and belief, and most importantly, the reaction is to remove the source of existing or alleged threats (Hovland and Hovland 1963). Nationalistic activists and political entrepreneurs build upon this fear of insecurity and polarize the society (Lake and Rotschild 1996).
Crises frames, supported by growing fear of the unknown, provide an opportunity for nationalists to mobilize a huge ethnic constituency and call for action against potential risks and moderates. Creation of a picture of fear works as a cycle of self-explanatory reasoning to justify the radicalizing rhetoric publicly. Ordinary people have difficulty in differentiating between the real imminent risk and the artificial risk described in the media. To be different is becoming even less tolerated by the majority than ever before. A request to defend “us” goes hand in hand with indoctrinating the general society with the beliefs and norms of the crisis frame about another ethnic group. The main idea is that in these extraordinary times, when one’s entire nationality is threatened, extreme measures are justified (Obershall 2000, 997). The concept of cognitive frames is used to provide a framework and to determine the research question and give directions to focus the research.
Research Questions, Data, and Methods
In order to study the formation of cognitive frames and to compare these, we interpret and contextualize the cognitive frames created and used by the Czech politicians in the context of more general political communication, securitization of migration issues in the Czech political and public discourse, and creation of the image of the “other”. The main aim of the paper is to answer the following research question: how do political actors use the anti-immigrant and anti-Moslem rhetoric in a country with only a couple of thousands of Moslems and practically no migrants belonging to the recent refugee wave? Taking into account the concept of cognitive frames and the comparative dimension of our research, we can decompose this basic research question in the following manner:
- RQ1What are the cognitive frameworks on migrants and migration the Czech political actors construct?
- RQ1.1Do the Czech political actors use the tool of “securitization”2 for migration issues? Do they prefer to frame migration as a security problem instead of a humanitarian one?
- RQ1.2Do the Czech actors use the tool of “othering”3 of migrants?
- RQ2What are the similarities and differences among these cognitive frames?
- RQ2.1Is there a trend of creation of a single cognitive framework on migration among the mainstream political parties?
- RQ2.2Do the cognitive frames of mainstream and extreme discourses differ?
With the exception of the President of the Czech Republic Miloš Zeman, we analyze public political speeches of the most relevant collective political actors – the political parties. For the mainstream political parties, we apply the classical criterion of political relevance. Among the extreme collective political actors, we selected those that are building their message to the citizens primarily on anti-immigrant and/or anti-Moslem rhetoric. For the purpose of this paper, mainstream political parties include the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), the ANO Party, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), the TOP 09 Party, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), and the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak Peoples’ Party (KDU-ČSL). Speeches made by President Miloš Zeman are included considering the symbolical importance and specific public perception of the ead of State in Czech politics.
Delimitation of the extreme political actors in the case of the Czech Republic is based on analysis of the long-term acting and most visible actors. Based on research already conducted by the team led by Miroslav Mareš (Mareš et al. 2015), we can sort out the following actors. First, we must take into account the popular initiative called We Do Not Want Islam in the Czech Republic (IVČRN) and its political follow-up Block against the Islam (BPI) as representatives of monothematic anti-Islam politics.4 Second, we must consider the minor far-right parliamentary parties: Dawn – National Coalition (Ú-NK) having seven MPs; and the Freedom and Direct Democracy Party (SPD) led by Tomio Okamura and which has three MPs. Both these parties are the products of the split of Okamura’s original party, Dawn of Direct Democracy, which happened in spring 2015. Last but not the least, we took into consideration the nonparliamentary extremist party National Democracy (ND) led by the long-term ultranationalist and anti-Semitic publicist Adam B. Bartoš.
The corpus of our sources consists of three materials for each actor, materials that express the actor’s preferences concerning migrants/refugees and migration issues. The procedure for the selection of text for our analysis was as follows. First, we scanned the Web pages of selected political actors in the time span covering the period between January 2015 and June 2016, which corresponds with the peak of the political and public debate on migration issues. After the first reading of all documents, we selected the three most informative and typical texts for each of the actors. With respect to the materials used, our first preference was for the “collective” documents issued officially as party position papers or official statements. If we were not able to find such materials, we opted for interviews with the party chairs or members of the highest authorities of the parties. As these media outlets were included in the official Web pages of the parties, they meet the criterion as institutional, and not private, expressions. In some cases, typically small far-right parties, even the leaders’ interviews were not issued by the parties at all and, therefore, we had to consult blog entries marked as the official statements of the parties.
For the purposes of analysis, we grouped the actors into three clusters according to the role they played in the Czech politics in 2015–16. The first cluster includes President Zeman, as well as governmental parties (Social Democrats, ANO, and Christian Democrats). These parties are in power and, as such, should “ex officio” pay attention to the broader humanitarian, international, and European contexts. The second cluster consists of the parliamentary opposition (Communists, Civic Democrats, and TOP 09), parties that typically use more radical rhetoric to contest the capacity of the government to deal with the problem. The last cluster consists of the parties of the far-right (SPD, Ú-NK, IVČRN, and ND), which are the typical “entrepreneurs” of the antimigrant discourse.
Actors in Power
An independent observer might assume that the stances of the left-wing political actors, Social Democrats, and the President of the Republic – who places himself on the left wing of the political spectrum – shall be more moderate and develop, at least partially, the humanitarian framework of the discourse on migrants. Christian Democrats could be expected to demonstrate affinity to a “Huntingtonian” interpretation of the migration crisis as an element of the clash of civilizations, and ANO, being a party with strong elements of populist discourse, could be expected to surf on the wave of general public moods, securitizing the issue of migration and “othering” the Moslem refugees.
In fact, President Miloš Zeman is known for his very critical and provocative vocabulary when speaking about Islam and migration. Zeman strongly supports the protection of borders by the common EU forces and the establishment of detention centers against outside threat of “illegal and economic migrants”. According to Zeman, these migrants threaten Europe by creating ghettos of “culture of murderers and religious hatred”. Because of the “national, ethnic, religious, social and economic structure of immigrants has Europe zero chance to absorb them” (Zeman 2015). The presented framework has deeply primordial argumentation. The threat is linked with the pure existence of Islam as such and a violent behavior that does not respect European law, as well as a culture that rises directly from the Quran and other Islamic texts. Different interpretations are not mentioned or discussed at all. Besides the strong security frame, the immigration crisis is also presented in the viewpoint of a socioeconomic threat: migrants, “mostly young, well-nourished men with iPhone are coming instead of fighting on behalf of their state or working on developing it” (Zeman 2016a). Zeman assumes that the character of migrants is undoubtedly evil because they have abandoned their families. Migrants do not want to work in their own countries with their standard of living; moreover, they live here only from social benefits because their workforce productivity is very low. His discourse is based on the term “immigration wave”, against which one has to establish the “flood barriers” to be built before the water is already in cities (Zeman 2016b). The humanitarian aspect is limited to statements that the Czech Republic is already an important donor – a supporting help – in the Middle East. The European cooperation shall help to protect borders but shall not force the states into any immigration quotas as the basic failure is that they have allowed them to come into Europe in the first place. The President has used very offensive generalizations to rouse the basic human instincts to survive, which gain even higher power because of his official mandate. The way he frames the topic is, in fact, hardly differentiable from the radical frames of the far-right subjects.
Another left-wing actor serving in the position of the Prime Minister in 2015–16, the Czech Social Democrats, has been developing a cognitive framework since the beginning of the mass migration to Europe. It has been a fairly complicated process considering some internal diversity of opinion on the matter. Some Social Democrats are stressing on the humanitarian aspects of the crisis and on the necessity to develop an EU-wide solution; meanwhile, other top politicians securitizing the migration crisis are framing it in terms of border controls and reduction of numbers of asylum seekers. In September 2015, the official document summarizing the party’s position on the crisis, as well as the proposed solution, was approved. Some of the ambiguities remain even within the document. On the one hand, the ČSSD stresses that “ [t] he whole situation is a test of action readiness and coherence of the EU-28 countries. No single EU country is able to solve the serious and long-term problem of migration isolated and on its own. […] The EU must distinctively strengthen its common foreign and security policy.” On the other hand, this position paper stresses that “[i]t is unacceptable to introduce quotas or any other permanent measures of compulsory relocation of the migrants” (ČSSD 2015). ČSSD favors the principle of voluntary solidarity among the EU member-countries, sound control of the external borders of the Schengen Area, as well as creation of detention camps beyond the Schengen borders. We can see a combination of the “soft” securitization of the migration issues and the acknowledgment that there is a humanitarian dimension as well. The official position of the party is not to try to use the strategy of “othering”; ČSSD stresses instead the necessity to fight “fascism and racism” and to “grant efficient and sufficient aid to those who get asylum in our country and who would like to live here, an aid aimed at the best possible integration that will include education, language instruction and assistance with acquiring of job and housing” (ČSSD 2015).5 We can use Prime Minister Sobotka’s words for summarizing the cognitive framework produced by the ČSSD: “[w]e can help but not at the cost of our own endangerment. This is permanently present here and we have to face it ¼ Czech Republic cannot cope on her own, we need to have European solution” (Sobotka 2016). Similarly to other parties, Social Democrats stress that the asylum seekers must integrate into the mainstream society but – contrary to most of the others – without stressing the argument of cultural and religious otherness of the refugees and without overusing the rhetorical image of associating migrants and terrorists.
As expected, ANO presents immigration in a populist discourse. Since ANO does not provide the public with many party position papers on key policy issues, the main source of the party line on migration are statements made by the chairman Andrej Babiš. According to him, the United Nations (UN) and the EU are not able to act, issuing mere proclamations, unable to solve the problem. Fear and distrust of people toward the EU is thus logical. Therefore, migration policy needs to be retained strictly in national hands. The screening process of migrants should be moved outside of Europe and conducted prior to their entry into EU territory. Economic immigrants can be chosen at these distant hot spots based on the need of the country of entry as well (Babiš 2015b). Strong statements reflecting the prevailing moods of public opinion are dedicated to rejection of the compulsory quotas. The humanitarian aspect is turned around by stating that Europe must be, in the first place, responsible to Europeans. Babiš suggests supporting Slovakia, which sued the EU against the quotas (Babiš 2015b). The only viable solution is to secure the border against the uncontrolled entry of a high number of migrants. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or another armed force needs to be used in case it is not possible to stop the current situation (Babiš 2015b). Migrants are described as an illiterate mass, not able to speak any other language and aiming just to reach the countries with the highest social benefits. Migrants should not be let into the country also because of previous European experience, with no chance to integrate migrants from the Middle East and North Africa. Allegedly, they have completely different attitudes to and perceptions of the society. They are dangerous since they do not want to integrate into but want to change our society. Therefore, the European civilization and culture are threatened. Immigrants are compared with “attack of the groups on the lower level of civilizations, which in history destabilized other empires” (Babiš 2015a). Xenophobia in the Czech Republic is therefore only the result of uncontrollable chaos, which causes all the fear. Babiš also used the rhetorical image of association of migrants with terrorists (Babiš 2016). The prevailing framework is built on securitization. Humanitarian aspects are mentioned in a very incoherent manner, only where it fits the overall presented cognitive framework acceptable to the majority public opinion. The clear (negative) assumptions about the character, behavior, and aims of immigrants are used as an explanation. The feeling of otherness is built in a less-pressing manner than by President Zeman. The language of ANO is more cultivated, but the spread of fear and the strong words about how critical the situation is and the possible outcomes may be considered a very populist way of using just specific information for own political success.
The smallest coalition party, the Christian Democrats, also stresses the importance of securing the external European border. However, they emphasize the humanitarian and economic arguments, such as that it is eight times cheaper to help refugees in countries of the Middle East (KDU-ČSL 2015b). KDU-ČSL insists on the application of asylum laws, on making them stricter, and on returning illegal immigrants not qualified for status. Security and legal measures are not used without some elements of the humanitarian aspect of the crisis and the dehumanizing of migrants. They recall “Christian solidarity and humanity in general as a Christian duty to help fellowmen”, even though the need to “differentiate between people coming because of war and because of the wish to improve an own economic situation” is stressed (KDU-ČSL 2015a). Even economic immigration is not demonized as it also has an important role for the state. There is no tendency to oversimplify the role of migrants, and the party chairman Bělobrádek had to explain himself publicly for the statement that the immigration crisis may help to solve the decreasing birth rates as well as some of the economic needs in terms of new labor force (Bělobrádek 2016). Even though the European Christian tradition and culture are stressed here, it is done in a contextual, rather positive, and tolerant manner. KDU-ČSL differentiates between Islam as a religion, which has various interpretations and shall not be denounced completely, and political Islam as an ideology not reconcilable with democracy and human rights. The European values need to be presented to Moslem members of society in “dialog, stressing our values and their roles. Successfully integrated members of different communities are not a topic of the discussion as we do not actually know about them and therefore there is rising awareness against generalization” (KDU-ČSL 2015a), so we can see “soft” elements of othering here. The motto of the KDU-ČSL to “minimize suffering and ensure security” for migrants in extreme situations and for Czech citizens summarizes how complex is the framework articulated by the party.
Moderate Opposition Parties
We have shown that the stereotypes of the moderate-left and radical-right stances do not apply very much for the Czech parties that governed between 2015 and 2016. Now, we move to the analysis of the parliamentary opposition comprising the far-left Communists and two right-wing factions of the Civic Democrats and TOP 09. All these parties can be expected to maintain at least a balance between the securitizing and the humanitarian frames. Both right-wing parties are fully democratic, and Communists, although constantly having some antisystem stances, shall – as the left-wing party – solidarize with the suffering migrants.
In fact, the migration crisis does not belong in the most prominent topics on the “Communist” agenda. The Web pages of the party do, however, offer many articles discussing the topic and written typically by deputies of the party or by party experts. These contributions are not composed in a single tone. We can, however, summarize the analysis of the KSČM Web page with the observation that even among Communists, securitization of the issue is the most typical approach on how to frame it. KSČM frames the migration crisis in the context of the long-term party ideology and policy formulations. Therefore, the KSČM stresses on the international community’s necessity to solve the crisis, but at the same time, the party rejects the principle of obligatory quotas suggested by the European Commission as a “bureaucratic diktat from the EU” (KSČM 2015). The argument to support the application of the principle of voluntary contribution of the member-states to the joint effort expressed here is based on cultural differences as the potential source of conflict and problems. In the course of time, materials of the KSČM on migration are clearly heading toward securitization. As the chairman Vojtěch Filip presented it:
I dare to repeat a thesis that no one doubts today: Europe is in danger! No one stopped the migration wave yet. Refugees from Islamic countries, or rather those who pretend to be refugees, are freely moving around our continent and everything shows that many of them did not came to Europe to hide and find security against the terrorists; on the contrary, they came here to slaughter and murder as supporters or members of the Islamic State. […] The EU is still waiting. […] It only fights the fire that is looming around Europe with rising intensity (Filip 2016).
Communists are striving for an international approach that would include not only the EU but also the UN, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE). Securitization is completed by stressing on the humanitarian aspects of the crisis and calling for individual and fair treatment of asylum seekers (KSČM 2016). An interesting element of the Communist treatment of migration issues is the comparably low level of “othering”. Cultural differences are mentioned but not in a way that exacerbates the political implication of these differences. The official documents stress the necessity to fight racism and xenophobia (KSČM 2016). The cognitive framework of the KSČM thus combines two strong messages: (1) securitization of the issue, operationalized both in terms of strict border control and international engagement to settle the conflicts in the countries of origin of the migrants; and (2) the humanitarian dimension of the migration crisis, with strong emphasis on following the Geneva Conventions and other principles of international law prescribing how to deal with refugees.
Contrary to the Communists, the Civic Democrats have used the migration crisis as one of their profile issues since the very beginning of the first mass wave of migration toward Germany in the spring of 2015. There was no substantial internal dispute within the Party on how to frame the crisis, yet the Civic Democrats adopted an official position in the form of a policy paper as late as in April 2016 (ODS 2016).6 ODS frames the migration crisis in the broader context of the EU, similarly to the Social Democrats. In contrast to the Social Democrats, the Civic Democrats do not see the migration crisis as a window of opportunity to enhance integration but as a final proof of the failure of European integration in recent times, condemned as “unsustainable” (ODS 2016, 2). ODS frames the solutions of the migration crisis in terms of the final opportunity to replace the dysfunctional model of European integration with the liberal economic community and reinforce the sovereignty of member-states (ODS 2016: passim). However, the ODS is definitely not calling for a unilateral Czech reaction and stresses on the necessity to cooperate within the EU but within the broader international community and not only to increase the security of European citizens but to “increase the developmental aid in targeted regions” (ODS 2016, 5). The cooperation must, however, be strictly voluntary; ODS strongly rejects any compulsory quotas implemented based on the redistribution of migrants.7 Another constituting element of the ODS’s cognitive frame on migrants is based on the securitization of the issue: “the migration crisis is mostly a security problem which has one of its crucial reasons in uncontrolled organized crime at the periphery of Europe” (Fiala 2015). The concern for foreign political preconditions of the migration crisis is not stemming from “naïve idealism” (ODS 2016, 4) and “moralizing politics prevailing in Germany, in Sweden” (Vondra 2016), but it corresponds with the Czech and European vital interests. ODS puts stress on the impermeability of the sovereign Czech borders and the swift expatriation of rejected asylum seekers (ODS 2016, 8–9). Implicit association of the refugees with a terrorist threat could be found throughout the document. ODS materials contain a strong element of “othering” as a tool to frame the migration crisis. ODS treats the migration threat as a civilization threat “not […] for the EU but for the entire European civilization” (ODS 2016, 2). Moslems are unmodern, traditionalist societies prone to political radicalization with no real chance for quick Westernization or implementation of the democratic system.
TOP 09 as a traditional liberal–conservative party acknowledges democratic and humanistic values. Respect for human rights and tolerance transformed the TOP 09 to be the party speaking out against the populist misuse of immigration. This politically quite unique and isolated approach propounds a balance in the rule of law for everybody as well as solidarity:
Everybody, who faces political oppressions or flees to escape from violent conflict, has right for fair treatment and international protection, besides he may not qualify for the asylum seeker status¼. All people, who are in need shall receive help but to stay permanently shall be allowed only to people who will be willing to respect our values and legal system. These are Copts, Yazidis and other Christians as the most threatened groups, which have also the highest chances to successfully integrate (TOP 09 2015b).
TOP 09 however insists on the application of the Dublin Regulation until there comes another legal document that will determine the EU member-states’ responsibility to examine an application for asylum seekers (TOP 09 2015b). Even though symbolic quotas for the redistribution of immigrants are rejected in accordance with the overall perspective in media and other political subjects, TOP 09 gained a derogatory label of “welcomers”. Emphasis is, however, put on an approach of integrating possible immigrants to prevent “horror” stories of failing/missing integration processes in Western Europe. Still, the TOP 09 has used a comparably very modest and liberal rhetoric (TOP 09 2016). The party was the only one in our sample to compare the threat arising from accepting migrants with the threats brought by politicians who disseminate fear and panic among the Czech population (TOP 09 2015a). Facing decline of support in the public opinion census, even TOP 09 turned to the inclusion of some elements from the “civilizationist” discourse:
[S]upport to immigrants need to be fair to Czech citizens, who shall not be put into the worse position than these newcomers. Socioeconomic assistance to refugees must not handicap inhabitants of the Czech Republic, who are in need. […] Immigrants must learn the language and gain awareness and understanding of national identity and European culture, which is based on a spiritual heritage of classic antiquity, Christianity and humanism. Integration programs must be compulsory for everybody who has received protection because aid goes together with obligation (TOP 09 2016).
Thus, TOP 09 stresses on the need to strengthen financial and humanitarian help in the locations of crises and in their neighboring countries, in addition to requesting an increase in funding for the external border of the EU and guarding the coasts. Even though the immigration crisis is framed within the security perspective, the argumentation used includes aspects of our responsibility to fulfill legal and human commitments, which is in direct clash with the generally presented picture. The language used is not attacking and derogatory.
Two of the far-right parties analyzed in our paper had some MPs in 2015–2016, namely, the Ú-NK and SPD. Did the parliamentary presence differentiate these parties from the nonparliamentary anti-Moslem far right in any way?
Ú-NK can be labeled as a populist party with strong far-right inclinations. As a product of the split within the original party Dawn of Direct Democracy, the party retains similar points of the program as those of contemporary Okamura’s SPD, such as direct democracy, referenda, revocability of politicians, and nationalism. Strong emphasis on nationalism frames the party’s treatment of the migrant issue. Stronger the cognitive framework is, the less sophisticated it is. Migrants are depicted primarily in terms of security threats. Acceptation of the refugees is not possible because it would lead only to “escalation of big social, economic, and cultural problems” (Černoch 2015). As the chairman of the party, Milošlav Lidinský, explained:
I am the soldier and I encountered in Afghanistan something which is recently an object of a heated debate in the Czech Republic. Islamic radicalism is for the Pan-European civilization a threat already since the early Middle Ages. For our culture is nevertheless absolutely incomprehensible aggressiveness of suicidal Islamic radicals who slaughter not only Christians all around the World in the name of Allah (Lidinský 2015).
The framework of security threat is reinforced by other rhetorical figures such as the decay of Western civilization. Migrants are – according to the leading politicians of the party – a kind of European “others”, whose “integration in Europe is impossible because of incompatibility of cultures, religions, traditions, and education” (Černoch 2015). Invoking European Christian tradition, the Ú-NK politicians do not totally deny the humanitarian aspects of the migration crisis but the securitization discourse prevails: Europe cannot cope with such a great amount of migrants; therefore, her borders must be closed. Border police forces shall be reestablished in border regions, no asylum shall be granted to any refugee within the Czech territory, and people shall be permitted to organize home guards, augmenting state armed forces (Ú-NK 2016).
Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) is the other follower of the Dawn of Direct Democracy. Immigrants are framed clearly negative in its discourse as a security-wise, socioeconomic, and cultural threat. The vocabulary used is not only very provocative but offensive. Apart from “othering”, there is a strong element of dehumanization of immigrants. Hatred and fear are disseminated in a very radical manner, without considering any context and consequence. The beginning of the illegal immigration process is the beginning phase of the conflict, which threatens freedom, democracy, and the existence of the Czech Republic and the Czech nation (SPD undated). People coming to Europe are allegedly only illegals, bringing only violence, thievery, and infection: “Peaceful refugees are just a lie”, and therefore, there must be “zero tolerance of illegal immigration” (Okamura 2015). There is also strong welfare chauvinism present in SPD’s frame. The Moslem religion of immigrants means that Europe faces a planned invasion of aliens. It is not possible to integrate Moslem migrants into domestic society at all. Therefore, any area they live in becomes a no-go zone and parallel society. Migrants are seen as uneducated and nonworking individuals misusing the social system, who were raised in the armed culture of violence starting with street criminality to terrorism because of their religious radicalism. The rising number of Moslems would mean the collapse of the Czech Republic (Okamura 2016). The only solution is to close the border.
The IVČRN is a political initiative that brings together opponents of Islam with extreme-right conviction. This initiative was founded in 2009 as a Facebook group of like-minded contributors led by Martin Konvička, a university associate professor, who became leader of the Initiative and, afterward, also a chairman of the Block Against Islam. They have organized the petition against quotas on immigrants, which garnered around 180,000 signatures (Konvička 2016b). Their point of departure is absolutely straight:
Islam is considered aggressive political ideology, historically presented as a religion, which is expansively attacking Europe for the past 1,400 years. Any actions to contain Islam will be taken with cooperation with any political party or subject with the same goal to let people perceive that Islam is totalitarian and warrior’s ideology using violence and comparable with Nazism or Communism (IVČRN 2015).
Migration crisis is thus an invasion of young men connected to terrorist organizations. How these young men will treat Europeans was supposedly expressed during the “Black Friday” in Paris,8 as well as during New Year celebrations in other cities (Konvička 2016a). Migrants are presented as a security threat with very strong vocabulary: Already, a small number of Moslems in the country has led to the existence of a parallel society living under different laws and refusing integration, with tendency to radicalize, ending with possible civil war (Konvička 2016b). Currently, settled Moslems are presented as Salafists, welcoming immigrants as their tool to gain more power. Anybody not refusing Islam in the Czech Republic is seen as a collaborator with alleged Islam invasions (Konvička 2016a). Konvička (2016b) himself became famous with even more radical statements of the need to reduce civic rights to people who sympathize with Islam, forced de-Islamization of Moslems who want to live in the Czech Republic, and other rhetorical terms recalling Nazi Germany (marches, concentration camps, and so on). Migration is securitized by the IVČRN and the elements of othering are strongly present in this cognitive frame. Moslems are depicted as completely different dehumanized objects. Any humanitarian aspect of immigration crisis is refused:
If you, dear politicians, do not move, we will take part in a politic competition, we will win elections. As election winners, we will mill Moslems into meat- and bone-meal. To win elections will be a piece of cake as Islam will prepare our campaign for free (Konvička 2016b).
The ND party represents an example of an extraparliamentary far-right party led by an anti-Semitic politician and publicist Adam B. Bartoš. The party does not produce coherent program materials; rather, it publishes brief statements and comments. The Web page of the party looks more like a Facebook page (without the possibility to interact). Attacks against migrants and against the allegedly weak position of the Czech government on this issue are some of the most-frequented topics of the party’s agenda. An analysis shows clear elements of “othering” and securitization of the migrants, while the humanitarian concerns are completely missing. “Islam is not a faith in the strict sense but it is a political ideology with religious elements which can be compared to ideologies of Zionism or Marxism” (ND 2015b). Migrants are systematically called “aliens” and the very typical motive is the call for use of the Czech Army to defend the state borders breached by the migrants:
We all know that the capacity of the Czech Army is not currently sufficient […] We deem a very suitable solution to create auxiliary voluntary troops of home guards, which would help to defend the borders of the Republic (without weapons and in full cooperation with the Police and the Army of the Czech Republic) (ND 2015a).
There is, however, nothing we can analyze as a concise cognitive frame produced by the ND party. The message created by the party is simple: migrants are Moslem “aliens” who are posing a security threat for the Czech Republic, Europe is facing a “tsunami” of the terrorists steered by the Islamic State and the EU is not capable of stopping it. Therefore, the Czech Republic must abandon the EU “paralyzed by the multiculturalism […] not to lose our traditions, habits, territory, and – in the end – even our lives” and deploy armed forces to protect the security of the country (ND 2015c).
Our findings fill the gap in existing empirical research on the Czech–Moslem relations and their politicization in the context of the refugee crisis. Our paper can also contribute to theoretical or comparative discussions. Previous research showed that there is potential for the politicization of Moslem issues in the Czech society since the events of 9/11 of 2001 (Topinka 2015; 2016a). The migration crisis poured the fuel to ignite the political debate, and all Czech political actors participated in this endeavor. Only a few of them did not capitalize on the securitization of the problem, and even fewer of them, namely, TOP 09 and the Social Democrats, did not use instruments of “othering” while depicting the Moslems. We showed that the anti-Islam rhetoric is not a phenomenon isolated at the far-right wing of the Czech party system. Yet, the concept of “normalization” proposed by Wodak (2015, 143– 148) does not actually work in the Czech Republic. There is no spillover of the far-right rhetoric from the margins to the core of the party system, but a mutually independent process of securitization of the migration discourse produced both by the far-right and moderate-right wings, as well as centrist parties (such as ODS and ANO) and President Zeman.9 It is interesting that in the Czech case, the issue of community values, stressed by Anderson (2015) while discussing the experiences in the UK – a country with real migration from the Moslem countries – was applied by some Czech political actors in a country without any sound experience of this kind. Following Hampshire’s (2013) findings, we can say that the gap between reality and rhetoric exists in the Czech Republic as well but in exactly the opposite direction: the migrant issue, which is not “real”, triggers very strong rhetoric of political actors.
On the basis of our analysis, we can map the stances of the Czech political actors to the migrant issues. Such a conceptual map of the Czech discourse on Moslems in the context of the discussions on the refugees coming to Europe in 2015–16 must take into account two dimensions. We can draw the first axis along the difference between the securitized discourse and the one that desecuritizes the migrant issues in favor of framing the discourse on migrants as the help that people who are facing human catastrophes in their countries of origin need and who shall be therefore provided with humanitarian aid. The second dimension deals with the strategy of “othering”. On the one hand, there is extreme dehumanizing of the refugees, as opposed to the position treating the refugees as human beings of the same “qualities” and “nature” as “us”. The nature of the data we worked with, as well as the method of analysis we used does not allow us to measure the distance, so we offer a typology of existing cases. Table 2 summarizes the parties’ stances.
Conceptual map of the frames of the main political actors
|Securitized frame||Mixture of both securitized and desecuritized frames||Desecuritized frame|
|Dehumanized frame||National Democracy; IVČRN|
|Frame with strong elements of “othering”||SPD; Ú-NK; Miloš Zeman; ODS|
|Frame with moderate elements of “othering”||ANO; KDU-ČSL; KSČM|
|Humanistic frame||ČSSD; TOP 09|
It is also relevant to compare the way in which the Czech political actors are able to recognize and thematize the international and European dimensions of the migration issues. Here also, we cannot provide any “measurement” of the relative distance among the stances. The nature of the data we worked with allows us only to mark whether and how the Czech political actors consider framing of the migration issue under such framework. Table 3 summarizes the international aspects of the survey.
International dimension recognized by the analyzed political actors
|ODS||No||Yes||No||No||Unspecified “international community”|
To sum up, there was not a single relevant political actor who would not use any instrument of securitization in the discourse on migration. In general, moderate actors used mixed frames, while the far-right parties placed migration only within the discourse on security. There are two exceptions to this “rule”: Civic Democrats and President Zeman. The “deviation” can be explained by the comparably higher level of criticism raised by both of these actors against the way in which the EU deals with the crisis. Therefore, the stronger Euroskeptic elements in the discourse of moderate actors are reinforcing the tendency to securitize the cognitive frames.
There is also a clear distinction between the far-right parties and the remaining actors in the way in which they work with the dimension of international solutions of the migration crisis within their cognitive frames. The far right is just neglecting any international dimension and the cognitive frames purely focus on the alleged domestic impacts. Among the remaining actors, we can – with “cum grano salis” – observe a correlation between the increasing level of recognition that the crisis is to be solved by the international community and the increasing ability to include both securitized and humanitarian concepts of the migration crisis into their cognitive frames.
The Czech political actors are more diverse in the way of using the element of “othering”. The hardest position on dehumanizing the migrants was adopted by the extremist parties on the fringes. Other far-right parties, as well as ODS and Zeman, stressed the “otherness” and cultural differences without denying the human nature of the migrants. There is correlation between the level of securitization and the level of “othering” in particular cognitive frames. On the other hand, the actors that use the mechanism of “othering” in a rather sparing way or do not use it at all show an increasing tendency to recognize humanitarian aspects of the refugee crisis. The Czech example suggests that it is in fact “othering” that pushes a frame from the humanitarian to the securitized discourse.
In general, the analysis of the Czech parties shows that there is no actor (regardless of the level of “othering” present in the particular cognitive frame) that does not use securitization as a tool to handle the discourse on the migrants. Even the moderate political parties are sensitive to public opinion shaped by enormous space dedicated to the topic of immigration, presented as an overall security problem. Therefore, they are very careful about presenting their opinions about the crisis and on what should be done. This is mostly visible in the framing used by TOP 09 and KDU-ČSL, who had adapted wording without much content and explained themselves to minimize the image of the party’s welcoming of immigrants as this may be considered as a political suicide.
With the exception of the far-right parties that work with the frames stressing the Moslem threat constantly, the Czech political actors have developed their cognitive frames of the (Moslem) migrants in reaction to media coverage and amid increasing concerns expressed by the Czech population since 2014. The Czech political actors surf on the wave of prefigured concepts and prejudices, and especially at the peak of the refugee crisis, they did not open a rational discussion but started a race among separate cognitive frames to capitalize from the public fears and perceptions of danger based on rather imaginative assumptions. The parties did not actually address the migration issue as such, but only its popular perception and imagination. The results are actually not unexpected but they confirm that the parties are not trying to shape public opinion but try to follow the public moods.
The first part of the analysis was aimed at exploring what are the cognitive frameworks that the Czech actors use (RQ1) and whether elements of securitization (RQ1.1) and othering (RQ1.2) are present. The second, comparative part of the research was aimed at finding out what similarities and differences do the cognitive frameworks have (RQ2), whether there is a single cognitive framework or more (RQ2.1), and whether there is a difference between the political mainstream and fringe parties (RQ2.2).
The answers could be summarized in the following way. There are many cognitive frames that partially overlap regardless of the presenters. What is prevailing is the framing of the immigration crisis with a strong blend of securitization. This perspective is common to all subjects. On the other hand, political parties such as ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, TOP 09, and KSČM also add a humanitarian perspective, which needs to be taken into consideration. This perspective is added when the parties in question search for a solution and the measures to be taken. ANO is more populist than other mainstream parties in its inadequacy to the humanitarian perspective and so is President Miloš Zeman. The far-right parties are omitting the humanitarian aspects, using a far stronger vocabulary of securitization and stressing especially the arguments that use the technique of othering of the migrants. The far-right rhetoric evokes pictures of “flooding” or even “tsunami” or “invasion” by dangerous and culturally incompatible strangers defined in very primordial and stereotyped categories. The most extreme rhetoric completely dehumanizes the immigrants as objects with a purely negative character. The wide use of the instrument of othering, together with the complete disregard for any humanitarian dimension of the migration, differentiates thus the most extremist cognitive framework from the mainstream cognitive one.
List of abbreviations
|English name||Czech name|
|AECR||Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists|
|BPI||Block Against the Islam||Blok proti islámu|
|ČSSD||Czech Social Democratic Party||Česká strana sociálně demokratická|
|CVVM||Public Opinion Research Centre||Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění|
|CZSO||Czech Statistical Office||Český statistický úřad|
|ECJ||European Court of Justice|
|IVČRN||We Do Not Want the Islam in the Czech Republic||Islám v ČR nechceme|
|KDU- ČSL||Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak Peoples’ Party||Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová|
|KSČM||Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia||Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy|
|NATO||North Atlantic Treaty Organization|
|ND||National Democracy||Národní demokracie|
|ODS||Civic Democratic Party||Občanská demokratická strana|
|OSCE||Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe|
|SPD||Freedom and Direct Democracy party||Svoboda a přímá demokracie|
|Ú-NK||Dawn – National Coalition||Úsvit – Národní koalice|
Anderson Bridget. 2013. Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Babiš Andrej. 2015a. “Evropská kultura a civilizace jsou v ohrožení tvrdí ministr Babiš.” [European Culture and Civilization are in Danger Minister Babiš Claims]. 27 December 2015 https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/388408-babis-k-migraci-se-zemanem-souhlasim.html.
Babiš Andrej. 2015b. “Interview s Andrejem Babišem.” [Interview with Andrej Babiš]. 6 September 2015. http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/1580044-babis-popisuje-svuj-recept-nauprchlickou-krizi.
Babiš Andrej. 2016. “Uprchlíci se nedokáží integrovat ŽÁDNÉ nepřijímejme vyzúvá Babiš.” [Refugees Cannot Integrate; Let Us Not Accept ANY Calls Babiš]. 26 July 2016. https://echo24.cz/a/w9GRL/uprchlici-se-nedokazi-integrovat-zadne-neprijimejme-vyzyva-babis.
Barša Pavel. 2008. “Konstruktivismus a politika identity.” [Constructivism and Politics of Identity]. Antropoweb 1–2: 21–35.
Bělobrádek Pavel. 2016. “Rozhovor Pavla Bělobrádka pro Právo.” [Interview of Pavel Bělobrádek for Právo]. 13 February 2016. http://www.kdu.cz/aktualne/archiv/2016/Muslimskou-evropu-nechci.
Břešťan Robert. 2016. “Nahrávka z klíčové porady TV Prima k uprchlíkům: ‘Vedení televize má názor a vy ho budete respektovat’.” [Recording of the Key Meeting of TV Prima to Refugees: ‘The Management Has the Opinion and You Will Respect it’]. http://hlidacipes.org/nahravka-z-porady-zpravodajstvi-tv-prima/.
Brug Wouter Van and Meindert Fennema. 2003. “Protest or Mainstream? How the European anti-immigrant parties have developed into two separate groups by 1999.” European Journal of Political Research 42(1): 55-76.
Buchtík Martin and Jarmila Pilecká. 2016. Postoj české veřejnosti k přijímaní uprchlíků květen 2016. [Stances of the Czech Public to Acceptation of the Migrants May 2016]. Prague: CVVM. http://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c1/a7565/f3/pm160607.pdf.
Burešová Zdenka and Renata Sedláková. 2016. “Obraz Muslimů a islámu v českých médiích.” [Image of Moslems and Islam in the Czech Media]. In Muslimové v Česku. Etablování Muslimů a islámu na veřejnosti [Establishment of Moslems and Islam in the Public] edited by D. Topinka 273-95. Brno: Barrister & Principal.
Buzan Barry Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Čadová Naděžda. 2016. Názory veřejnosti na usazování cizinců v ČR – březen 2016. [Public Opinion on Settlement of Foreigners in the Czech Republic – March 2016]. Prague: CVVM. http://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c1/a7543/f3/ovl604l8a.pdf.
Černoch Marek. 2015. “Diktát EU nemůžeme zachránit všechny a zahubit sebe.” [The EU Dictate; We Cannot Save Everybody and Kill ourselves]. 3 June 2015 http://www.usvitnarodnikoalice.cz/novinky/marek-cernoch-diktat-eu-nemuzeme-zachranit-vsechny-a-zahubit-sebe/.
Černý Karel ed. 2015. Nad Evropou půlměsíc I. Muslimové v Česku a západních společnostech. [Crescent over Europe. Moslems in Czechia and Western Societies]. Praha: Karolinum.
Chovanec Milan. 2015. “Obávám se že Evropa pořád ještě dříme.” [I am Afraid That Europe Sleeps Still]. 15 October 2015. https://www.cssd.cz/media/cssd-v-mediich/m-chovanec-obavam-se-ze-evropa-por-orad-jeste-drime/.
ČSSD. 2015. “Stanovisko České strany sociálně demokratické k řešení migrační krize.” [Position of the Czech Social Democratic Party to the Solution Migration Crisis]. 5 September 2015. https://www.cssd.cz/aktualne/aktuality/stanovisko-ceske-strany-socialne-demokraticke-k-reseni-migracni-krize/.
CZSO. 2016. Obyvatelstvo podle náboženské víry v letech 2001 a 2011. [Population According to The Religion in the years 2001 and 2011]. Prague: Czech Statistical Office https://www.czso.cz/documents/10180/29508960/1702201402.pdf/35de35a0-fb2d-4921-9416-7d01fb0c8e05?version=1.0.
CZSO. 2015. Životcizinců v ČR2015. [Life of the Foreigners in the Czech Republc 2015]. Prague: Czech Statistical Office. https://www.czso.cz/documents/10180/20550363/29002615.pdf/8b37aeb6-f079-4de9-a211-32af9d0b80cb?version=1.1.
Dijk Thomas van. 2000. “New(s) Racism: a Discourse Analytical Approach.” In Ethnic Minorities and the Media edited by S. Cottle 33-49. Buckingham Philadephia: Open University Press.
Fennema Meindert. 1997. “Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the Comparison of Anti-imigrant Parties in Western Europe.” Party Politics 3(4): 473–92.
Fiala Petr. 2015. “Přojev predsedy ODS Petra Fialy na úvod mimořádné schůze Poslanecké sněmovny k migrační krizi.” [Speech of the Chairman of ODS Petr Fiala at the Opening of Extraordinary Session of the House of Deputies to Migration Crisis]. 1 October 2015. http://www.ods.cz/clanek/10356-projev-predsedy-ods-petra-fialy-na-uvod-mimo-radne-schuze-poslanecke-snemovny-k-migracni-krizi.
Filip Vojtěch. 2016. “Evropa pod atakem pěšáků IS.” [Europe under Attack of the GIs of the Islamic State]. 4 August 2016. https://www.kscm.cz/aktualne/medialni-vystupy/komentare/v-filip-evropa-pod-atakem-pesaku.
Goffman Erving. 1974. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. New York NY et al.: Harper & Row.
Hampshire James. 2013. The Politics of Immigration: Contradictions of the Liberal State. Malden: Polity Press.
Hendl Jan. 2005. Kvalitativní výzkum Základní metody a aplikace. [Qualitative Research. Basic Methods and Applications]. Praha: Portál.
Hovland Janis and Kelley Hovland. 1963. Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change. New Haven: Yale University Press.
IVČRN. 2015. “Návrh programu.” [The Proposal of the Manifesto]. 12 February 2015. http://www.ivcrn.cz/islam-v-ceske-republice-nechceme-navrh-programu/.
Janků Tomáš and Lenka Linhartová. 2016. “Islám a Muslimové v perspektivě představitelů obcí s rozšířenou působností.” [Islam and Moslems in the Perspective of Authorities of the Municipalities with Extended Competence]. In Muslimové v Česku. Etablování Muslimů a islámu na veřejnosti [Establishment of Moslems and Islam in the Public] edited by D. Topinka 145-50. Brno: Barrister & Principal.
Kaufman Sandra Michael Elliott and Deborah Shmueli. 2013. “Frames Framing and Reframing.” http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/framing/.
Kaufman Sandra and Janet Smith. 1999. “Framing and reframing in land use change conflicts.” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 19(2): 164-80.
KDU-ČSL. 2015a. “Beseda na téma migrace - Hradec Králové.” [Debate on the Topic of Migration - Hradec Králové]. 5 November 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bqfPwNT0VFU.
KDU-ČSL. 2015b. “Usnesení KDU-ČSL k migrační vlně.” [Resolution of the KDU-ČSL to the Migration Wave]. http://www.kdu.cz/aktualne/uprchlici/usneseni-predsednictva.
Konvička Martin. 2016a. “Projev Martina Konvičky – demonstrace ‘Pevnost EVROPA’.” [Speech of Martin Konvička – Demonstration ‘Fortress Europe’]. 6 February 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F0TuY2v1SnQ.
Konvička Martin. 2016b. “Rozhovor Martina Konvičky.” [Interview of Martin Konvička] August 2016. https://video.aktualne.cz/dvtv/dvtv-12-8-2015-martin-konvicka-cesko-bez-vody/r~29953baa410b11e5b22d002590604f2e/.
KSČM. 2015. “Ne! byrokratickému diktátu EU.” [No to Administrative Dictate of the EU]. 15 May 2015. https://www.kscm.cz/aktualne/stanoviska/ne-byrokratickemu-diktatu-eu.
KSČM. 2016. “Přístupy KSČM k problematice a příčinám migrace.” [Approaches of the KSČM to the Problems and Causes of Migration]. 26 January 2016. https://www.kscm.cz/aktualne/stanoviska/pristupy-kscm-k-problematice-pricinam-migrace.
Lake David A. and Donald Rothschild. 1996. “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict.” International Security 21(2): 41–75.
Lakoff George. 2014. Don’t Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate. Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing.
Lendvai Paul. 1971. Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe. New York: Doubleday.
Lidinský Miroslav. 2015. “Nominační projev Miroslava Lidinského na předsedu strany.” [Nomination Speech of Miroslav Lidinský for the Chairman of the Party]. 8 August 2015. http://www.usvitnarodnikoalice.cz/novinky/nominacni-projev-miroslava-lidinskeho-na-predsedu-strany/.
Linz Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Consolidation. Baltimore: John Hopkons University Press.
Mareš Miroslav et al. 2015. Ne islámu! Protiislámská politika v České republice [No to Islam! Anti-Islamic Politics in the Czech Republic]. Brno: CDK and Masaryk University.
Mendel Miloš Bronislav Ostřanský and Tomáš Rataj. 2007. Islám v srdci Evropy. Vliv islámské civilizace na dějiny a současnost českých zemí. [Islam in the Heart of Europe. Impact of Islam Civilization on History and the Present of the Czech Lands]. Praha: Academia.
ND. 2015a. “Dopis Národní demokracie prezidentu republiky Miloši Zemanovi.” [Letter of National Democracy to the President of the Republic Miloš Zeman]. 26 June 2015. http://narodnidemokracie.cz/dopis-prezidentovi/.
ND (2015b): “Prohlášení Národní demokracie k událostem v Paříži.” [Declaration of National Democracy to the Paris Affairs]. 11 January 2015. http://narodnidemokracie.cz/prohlaseni-narodni-demokracie-k-udalostem-v-parizi/.
ND (2015c): “Prohlášení Národní demokracie ke včerejšímu setkání ministrů vnitra a k dnešnímu setkání předsedů vlád členských států EU (Evropské rady) konaných ve dnech 22. – 23. září 2015 v Bruselu.” [Declaration of National Democracy to yesterday’s and today’s Meeting of the Prime Ministers of Member Countries of the EU (European Council) Held in the Days of 22 and 23 September 2015 in the Brussels]. 23 September 2015. http://narodnidemokracie.cz/prohlaseni-narodni-demokracie-ke-vcerejsimu-setkani-ministru-vnitra-a-k-dnesnimu-setkani-predsedu-vlad-clenskych-statu-eu-evropske-rady-konanychve-dnech-22-23-zari-2015-v-bruselu/.
Oberschall Anthony. 2000. “The manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23(6): 982–1001.
ODS 2016. ODS a migrační krize. [ODS and Migration Crisis]. Praha: ODS.
Okamura Tomio. 2015. “Boj o naše přežití.” [Fight for Our Survival]. 29 August 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2fh4ILkg7Ns.
Okamura Tomio. 2016. “Odmítání imigrace není xenofobie.” [Refusal of Immigration Is Not Xenophobia]. 29 March 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=orgRn9o2xHg.
Pithart Petr and Martin T. Zikmund. 2010. Ptám se tedy jsem. Rozhovor. [I Ask So I Exist. An Interview]. Praha: Portál.
Said Edward W. 1985. Orientalism. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Sobotka Bohumil. 2016. “Pokud lidé utíkají před válkou máme povinnost jim pomoci.” [When the People Flee from War We Are Obliged to Help Them]. 21 February 2016. https://www.cssd.cz/media/cssd-v-mediich/sobotka-pokud-lide-utikaji-pred-valkou-mame-povinnost-jim-pomoci/.
SPD. Undated. “Deset zásadních programových bodů politického hnutí SPD.” [Ten Basic Program Moments of the Political Movement SPD]. http://spd.cz/program/.
Tkacyzk Michal Pavel Pospěch and Jakub Macek. 2016. “Analýza mediálního pokrytí uprchlické krize.” [Analysis of Media Coverage of the Refugee Crisis]. https://www.research-gate.net/publication/286454922_Analyza_medialniho_pokryti_uprchlicke_krize_vyz-kumna_zprava.
TOP 09. 2015a. “Řešíme migrační krizi.” [We Are Solving the Migration Crisis]. 10 September 2015. www.youtube.com/watch?v=B693lhwGBwI.
TOP 09. 2015b. “Stanovisko TOP 09 k evropské imigrační krizi.” [Position of the TOP 09 to European Migration Crisis]. 14 January 2015. http://www.top09.cz/co-delame/tiskove-zpravy/stanovisko-top-09-k-evropske-imigracni-krizi-17627.html.
TOP 09. 2016. “Zásady úspěšné integrace.” [Principles of a Successful Integration]. 3 June 2016. http://www.top09.cz/co-delame/tiskove-zpravy/zasady-uspesne-integrace-20381.html.
Topinka Daniel. 2016a. “Islám a Muslimové ve veřejném prostoru optikou veřejného mínění.” [Islam and Moslems in the Public Space in the Eyes of Public Opinion]. In Muslimové v Česku. Etablování Muslimů a islámu na veřejnosti [Establishment of Moslems and Islam in the Public] edited by D. Topinka 229–43. Brno: Barrister & Principal.
Topinka Daniel ed. 2016b. Muslimové v Česku. Etablování Muslimů a islámu na veřejnosti. [Moslems in Czechia. Establishment of Moslems and Islam in the Public]. Brno: Barrister & Principal.
Topinka Daniel. 2015. “Role religiozity a etnicity v procesu integrace Muslimů-imigrantů do české společnosti.” [Role of Religiosity and Ethnicity in the Process of Integration of the Moslems-Migrants into the Czech Society]. In Nad Evropou půlměsíc I. Muslimové v česku a západních společnostech [Crescent over Europe I. Moslems in Czechia and Western Societies] edited by K. Černý 24-63. Praha: Karolinum.
Ú-NK. 2016. “Program strany pro krajské volby: HRDÁ A BEZPEČNÁ ZEMĚ.” [Program of the Party for the Regional Election: PROUD AND SAFE COUNTRY]. 17 August 2016 http://www.usvitnarodnikoalice.cz/program-strany/.
Vondra Alexandr. 2016. “Evropsští politici žijí ve svých iluzích opájí se krásnými úsměvy na televizních záběrech ale podstata problému jim totálně uniká.” [European Politicians Live up to Their Illusions They Are Self-Satisfied with Their Beautiful Smiles on the Screens but They Misunderstand Completely the Substance of the Problem]. 18 February 2016. http://www.ods.cz/clanek/11208-evropsti-politici-ziji-ve-svych-iluzich-opaji-se-krasnymi-usmevy-na-televiznich-zaberech-ale-podstata-problemu-jim-totalne-uni.
Wodak Ruth. 2015. The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publishing.
Zeman Miloš. 2016a. “Projev prezidenta Zemana na jednání o migraci.” [Speech of President Zeman at the Talks on Migration]. February 2016. http://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/politika/politici-volicum/Prezident-Zeman-Zdedili-jsme-karikaturu-trzni-ekonomiky-po-pravicovych-vladach-42163225.
Zeman Miloš. 2016b. “Rozhovor prezidenta republiky pro deník Právo.” [Interview of Prezident Zeman for the Daily Právo]. 23 January 2016. https://www.hrad.cz/cs/prezident-cr/soucasny-prezident-cr/vybrane-projevy-a-rozhovory/rozhovor-prezidenta-republiky-pro-denik-pravo-5-12403#from-list.
Zeman Miloš. 2015. “Rozhovor prezidenta republiky pro časopis Reflex.” [Interview of Prezident Zeman for the Weekly Reflex]. 8 October 2015 http://www.zemanmilos.cz/cz/clanky/rozhovor-prezidenta-republiky-pro-casopis-reflex.htm.