In this introductory study I discuss the notion of alternative possibilities and its relation to contemporary debates on free will and moral responsibility. I focus on two issues: whether Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities, and whether alternative possibilities are relevant to grounding free will and moral responsibility. With respect to the first issue, I consider three objections to Frankfurt-syle cases: the flicker strategy, the dilemma defense, and the objection from new dispositionalism. With respect to the second issue, I consider the debate between Alternative Possibilities views and Actual Sequence views, as framed by Carolina Sartorio in her Causation and Free Will. I then explain how these two issues are relevant to the papers included in this volume.
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Fara, M. 2008. Masked abilities and compatibilism. Mind 117: 843-865.
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Kane, Robert. 2003. Responsibility, indeterminism and Frankfurt-style cases: a reply to Mele and Robb. In Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, ed. by David Widerker and Michael McKenna, Ashgate.
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Sartorio, Carolina. 2016. Causation and Free Will. Oxford University Press UK.
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