Singular Reference in Fictional Discourse?

Manuel García-Carpintero 1
  • 1 BIAP/LOGOS-Departament de Filosofia

Abstract

Singular terms used in fictions for fictional characters raise well-known philosophical issues, explored in depth in the literature. But philosophers typically assume that names already in use to refer to “moderatesized specimens of dry goods” cause no special problem when occurring in fictions, behaving there as they ordinarily do in straightforward assertions. In this paper I continue a debate with Stacie Friend, arguing against this for the exceptionalist view that names of real entities in fictional discourse don’t work there as they do in simple-sentence assertions, but rather as fictional names do.

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