Does a “Ceo Chairman” Guarantee Better Performance from a Firm?

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This paper provides a brief review of the state of knowledge in the field of agency theory. The managerial power approach assumes that a chief executive officer is able to affect the scale of his or her pay. However, Kaplan (2012) and others see a different picture of the corporate-governance landscape, hence they provide certain market-based explanations for high compensation. Our paper examines the relationship between a firm’s performance and the amount of managerial compensation, and the ability of a CEO to affect a board’s decision regarding his or her total compensation. The dataset consists of 75 companies traded in the capital market in the US. Our panel dataset covers a 10-year period from 2004 to 2013. We developed a single equation panel data model. The resulting parameter values provide a different picture of CEO power and the interconnection between a firm’s performance and CEO pay in both sectors.

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Journal Information

CiteScore 2017: 0.57

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2017: 0.386
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2017: 0.767


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