Laboratory Experiments in Teaching Public Economics and Policy

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This paper deals with classroom experiments in economics, which have been derived from laboratory experiments. These experiments cover a broad range of topics, from strictly economic ones (like market games or auctions) to those with overlaps to other domains such as public policy. The paper discusses different methodologies of research and classroom experiments, introduces the benefits of the latter and presents a concrete teaching experiment used in public economics courses at the Faculty of Economics and Administration of Masaryk University. Another link between economic experiments and public policy is outlined here as well, namely the importance of experimental results for public policy makers.

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