References Bird, A. . What is scientific progress. Nous, 41 (1), 64-89. Cevolani, G., Tambolo, L., . Progress as approximation to the truth. Erkenntnis, 78 (4), 921-935. Kieseppä, A. I., . On the Aim of the Theory of Verisimilitude. Synthese, 107 (3), 421-438. Kuipers, T., . A structuralist approach to truthlikeness. In T. Kuipers (ed.), What Is Closer-to-the-Truth?, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 79-99. Kuipers, T. . From instrumentalism to constructive realism
José L. Zalabardo
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The concept of truth as an integral component in the exercise of discourse and freedom of expression in democratic society has historically received considerable attention from the Supreme Court. Many of the Court’s pivotal decisions regarding First Amendment concerns have been determined by how justices have conceptualized truth and how they have understood the complex connection truth and falsity share in free debate. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Chaplinsky
York: Vintage Books. GABLER, N. (1998): Life and Movie: How Entertainment Conquered Reality. New York: Knopf. KEYES, R. (2004): The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life. New York: Museum Martin Press. MARCUSE, H. (1991): One-Dimensional Men: Studies in Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. London: Routledge. MROZOWSKI, M. (2007): Media masowe [Mass media]. Tarnów: ASPRA-JR. SCHOPENHAUER, A. (2004): The Art of Always Being Right. Thirty Eight Ways to Win When
The paper presents a method of truth-graph by truth-tables. On the one hand, the truth-graph constituted by truth value coordinate and circumference displays a more visual representation of the different combinations of truth-values for the simple or complex propositions. Truth-graphs make sure that you don’t miss any of these combinations. On the other hand, they provide a more convenient tool to discern the validity of a complex proposition made up by simple compositions. The algorithm involving in setting up all the truth conditions is proposed to distinguish easily among tautologous, contradictory and consistent expressions. Furthermore, the paper discusses a certain connection between the truth graphs and the symbols for propositional connectives proposed by Stanisław Leśniewski.
References Donnellan, K. S., (1966). Reference and definite descriptions, Philosophical Review, vol. 77, pp. 281-304. Duží M. (2010). The paradox of inference and the non-triviality of analytic information. Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 39, No. 5, pp. 473-510. Duží M. (2010a). Tenses and truth-conditions: a plea for if-then-else. In the Logica Yearbook 2009, Peliš, M. (ed.), London: College Publications, pp. 63-80. Duží M., Jespersen B. and Materna P. (2010). Procedural Semantics for
In this work the author considers how the Freudian psychoanalytic paradigm has been transformed by Bion’s theory and how the transference-countertransference dynamics must be transferred into an oneiric way of thinking. Here, a “quid” of lie becomes necessary to compare the traumatic experience of the patient with the analyst’s capacity to suffer his own personal and professional critical steps. If the analyst is to contact the O of the patient, it is necessary for him to contact his own O – during his training and in his personal narrative. Truth needs a “bit” of lie to be born, and the lie of the dream is one of the possibilities for intercepting the truth that the patient brings in analysis or, at least, the only truth that the patient can live. This truth, however, needs a share of lie (of poetry, of dream) in order to generate new emotions and new life.
Anne Bezuidenhout 1996 presents an argument for the claim that modes of presentation associated with referential terms are truth-conditionally relevant. I argue that her argument is flawed in light of the very same view on the interplay between reference and pragmatics she endorses.
The article tries to demonstrate that Ian McEwan’s novels, Enduring Love and Atonement, are similarly concerned with the way in which fiction writing is more apt to veil “truth” than to unveil it, also to invite partial readings of “reality” than to offer wide-ranging perspectives on it.