References ANDERSON, R. M. et al. (2006): Pharmacists and Conscientious Objection. In: Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal , 16(4), pp. 379–396. ASCH, A. (2006): Policy and Politics: Two Cheers for Conscience Exceptions. In: Hastings Center Report , 36(6), pp. 11–12. BEAUCHAMP, T. L. & CHILDRESS, J. F. (2001): Principles of Biomedical Ethics . Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 5 th edition. CAMPBELL, C. S., HARE, J. & MATTHEWS, P. (1995): Conflicts of Conscience: Hospice and Assisted Suicide. In: The Hastings Center Report
The Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe have been promoting the recognition of conscientious objection, mainly for military service but also in other domains, since the 1960s. However, for more than fifty years the precedents of the European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights repeatedly denied that conscientious objection could be found implicit in article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In 2011 the Court changed its standpoint and energetically affirmed that conscientious objection, at least for military service, is a derivation of freedom of conscience and religion, and that European states are thus bound to incorporate it to their internal legislations.
Joshua R. Farris and S. Mark Hamilton
The doctrine of the atonement is a subject of perpetual curiosity for a number of contemporary theologians. The penal substitution theory of atonement in particular has precipitated a great deal of recent interest, being held up by many (mostly evangelical) Protestants as ‘the’ doctrine of atonement. In this essay, we make a defense against the objection to the Anselmian theory of atonement that is often leveled against it by exponents of the Penal Substitution theory, namely, that Christ’s work does not accomplish anything for those whom it appears he undertakes his atoning work, but merely makes provision for salvation.
In the last several years, the European societies, that in their majority were fairly uniform as far as race, culture or religion, have been converted into intercultural places where many different visions of the world live together. Together with a factor of exogenous plurality, produced by the increase in immigration, an internal desegregation should also be highlighted in our own societies. In this new environment of diversity, it is without a doubt, difficult for the Law to accommodate all the different ethical, religious or cultural demands of the people. In my paper I study the means of accommodation rooted in our legal tradition such as: the conscientious objection, the agreements of the State with religious groups, mediation and arbitration as a way of accommodation of plurality in the field of Family Law, etc. I conclude by stressing the fact that allowing space for diversity does not mean giving up our own values. Quite the opposite, accommodation comes from our own values: that is, from the respect for freedom and non-discrimination, founded on the dignity of the person.
Since Michel Dummett published “Can an effect precede its cause?” (1954), in which he argued for the logical consistency of backwards causation, the controversial concept has turned to a subject of all kinds of interpretations and misinterpretations. Some like Ben-yami, Peijnenburg and Gorovitz have wrongly ascribed to Dummett the view that the argument for the consistency of believing in backwards causation applies only in cases where the agent doesn’t know about the occurrence of the past effect. In this paper I defend Dummett’s argument by clearing up the confusion caused by ascribing the ignorance condition to Dummett.
Hungarian family law is regulated primarily in the Family Act today. This Act was accepted in 1952 but as it has been modified several times it serves the legal interests of family and family members in harmony with European standards. Nevertheless, the idea of codifying a new Civil Code in 1998 raised the question whether family law should have been included in a new Civil Code. The scientific opinions were diverging on this issue at that time, but later on it became accepted that family law should get back into the corpus of a Civil Code. The article gives an analysis of the developments and most recent changes.